Maneuverable elements of Atlantic super ships. Power plant with diesel geared transmission

In 1964, in Germany, a new stern trawler "Bonn" was delivered to a West German customer http://www.shipspotting.com/gallery/photo.php?lid=424751 which was the next generation of trawler after the English project "Fairtry" to which BMRT belonged type "Pushkin", also built in Germany.

Having adopted the concept of the trawler "Bonn", by order of the MRP / MRKH USSR and in cooperation with specialists from the Soviet department, a project of a fishing trawler was developed in the GDR, which received the code "Atlantik", which compensates for a number of shortcomings of the first generation BMRT that had been in operation for almost a dozen years by that time, and exactly:

* applied combined navigation and commercial felling
* a diesel geared installation with 2 main engines and a power take-off was used, which significantly increased the reliability and survivability of the vessel, and also expanded the possibilities of working in the field. It should be noted separately that the trawler's power plant had a 3-fold survivability due to the installed electric shaft machine, which after 40 years became almost mandatory for tankers with one main engine.
* the longest fishing deck is provided
* applied whole line automated control and management processes made the trawler one of the most modern automated vessels of that time.

A total of 171 vessels were built in Stralsund (147) and Wismar (24) from 1966 to 1976. The first fifty trawlers belonged to the Atlantic I project.
The next 121 ships, built between 1968 and 1976, belonged to the modernized Atlantic II project.
Also, on the basis of this project, in 1971-72, seven Research Vessels (NIS) of the "Eureka" type were built, and in 1973 - seven training fishing vessels (OPS) of the "Kursograf" type.
The bulk of trawlers of this type left the stocks of the Stralsund shipyard, and only 24 units. were built in Wismar.
In addition, 24 vessels were built for Bulgaria, 8 for Romania, and 5 for Cuba.

Purpose of the vessel:
- fishing with bottom and midwater trawls;
- processing of fish into frozen products;
- processing of inedible by-catch and fish processing waste into fodder meal and technical fat;
- storage and transfer of manufactured products to transport refrigerators or transportation to the port.

Length overall, m: 82.20
Overall width, m: 13.62
Depth to the upper deck, m: 9.55
Average draft when loaded, m: 5.16
The greatest displacement, t: 3362
Deadweight, t: 1150
Registered tonnage gross / net, reg. t: 2657/1139
Main engines:
Quantity and power, pcs * HP: 2 * 1160
Brand: 8NVD 48A-2U

Productivity of technological lines:
Frozen fish, t / day: 45
Fish meal and technical fat, t / day: 35
Refrigerated holds, quantity and total volume, pcs * cu. m: 3 * 1095
The volume of premises for storing fishmeal, cubic meters m: 163
Volume of fat tanks, m3: 9
Temperature in holds, degrees С: -25
Refrigerant: Ammonia
Cargo booms, number and carrying capacity, pcs * t: 4 * 3.0 (2 * 3.0; 2 * 5.0)

Diesel fuel, t: 602
Heavy fuel, t: 69
Fresh water, t: 133
Speed, knots: 13.8

45 years ago, on February 28, 1967, the Soviet trawler Tukan sank in the North Sea. According to one of the many versions of the disaster, the ship was destroyed by its secret cargo. Columnist for "Vlast" Evgeny Zhirnov found in the archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU the solution to this mystery.

"The ship felt the shaking of the hull"

Much of what happened during the last cruise of the "Toucan" looked strange, and sometimes inexplicable.

This type of RTM (freezing fishing trawler) was designed in the GDR on a Soviet order and was called "Tropic": trawlers were intended for fishing in southern latitudes. Ships of this series were built in the same place, in the German socialist state, and received names depending on the place of their future basing. Those heading to the Black Sea were named after the Black Sea cities - "Alupka", "Yalta", etc. And the trawlers destined for the Baltic were named after the southern constellations. That is why the RTM, built in 1962 at the shipyard in Stralsund for Kaliningrad fishermen, was named Tukan.

Vyacheslav Morozov, captain of the Kaliningrad sea fishing port, wrote about the further work of the Tukan, one of the most famous specialists in the history of the Russian fishing fleet:

"Since the time when the trawl fleet was added to the balance of the Kaliningrad base in September 1962, the vessel has made five fishing trips (of which two are doubled), and from June 1966 to February 1967 it was under scheduled maintenance."

The repair, however, as Captain Morozov wrote, did not go entirely smoothly:

"Due to the lack of necessary spare parts in Tralflot's warehouses, the faulty active rudder was dismantled from the vessel. According to the USSR Register Rules, the absence of an active rudder did not affect the seaworthiness of the vessel, and therefore the trawler's crew had no reason to demand its restoration."

The entire further history of the "Tukan" and its crew was restored by Vyacheslav Morozov on the basis of an investigation conducted by a commission of the USSR Ministry of Fisheries:

"The RTM Tukan went on its 6th fishing voyage on February 25, 1967 at 17.30. Sailing in the Baltic and the Danish straits to Cape Skagen took place in normal navigation conditions. The crew recovered from the coastal retreat turmoil. During February 25 and 26 The boatswain handed out life bibs to the crew members. A characteristic nuance for ships of the "Tropic" type: 10 people refused to receive them, citing the lack of space in the cabin for storing life-saving equipment. This practice took place on more than one "Tukan", I can confirm this as a person , who worked on the "tropics" for four years ... On February 27, at about 6 pm, in conditions of relatively good weather, they entered the Skagerrak Strait. But they were preparing for the upcoming storm. on the deck, all hatches and necks were battened down, and the cargoes were secured "in a stormy way" ... By 23.30 the wind had noticeably increased, pitching intensified. At 23.50 we received a weather forecast on the radio. from the southwest with a force of 10 points. "

The tragic events began two and a half hours later:

"On February 28, at about 02.30, the ship felt a shaking of the hull (as some of the rescued crew members assume, from a strong shock of the wave). At about the same time, the engine room saw water entering the propeller shaft tunnel ... It turned out that it was coming from the reinforcement room. Sea water poured into the vessel in a stormy stream through the wide slots intended for receiving fish. "

On the ships of the "Tropic" series, the German quality of workmanship was fully compensated for by design flaws.

"Didn't answer either the radio or the lightgram"

“At about 3 o'clock,” Vyacheslav Morozov continued the description, “the ship noticed a roll to the left side. At 03.20 the captain gave the order to pump fuel from the left side tanks to the starboard tanks in the engine room to reduce the roll. But the ship continued to roll to the left side. .. At about 4 o'clock Captain Khramtsov ordered to pump out fuel from the left side tank No. 23. By this time the wind had reached a force of 9 points from the south-west, the roughness of the sea - 7 points ... Captain Khramtsov entered the cabin of the head of the radio station Efimov, woke him up ...

At 04.10 the sailor of the watch reported that he saw an oncoming ship directly on the course. The captain gave the command to disperse on the port sides. After that, Captain Khramtsov, Senior Mate Safonov and First Mate Mayevsky briefly entered the navigator's cabin to discuss the situation.

At 04.20, after diverging from the oncoming vessel (it was the Vilis Latsis floating base of the Riga BRF), the captain, senior and first mates again entered the navigator's room. After a short meeting, the senior mate gave the order over the broadcast: "Everyone get up, put on life bibs and go to the upper deck." Subsequently, none of the surviving members of the Toucan team could unequivocally explain the logic of this act. "

Ten minutes later, when the crew had gathered at the boats, the captain gave the command to turn towards the shore. But the list has increased dramatically.

“At 04.35,” wrote Morozov, “the senior assistant Safonov on the broadcast gave the command:“ All the crew in the boat on the left side. ”Chief engineer Kuzub ordered everyone in the engine room to go to the upper deck. The chief engineer himself remained in the engine room, and with Since then, none of the surviving crew members have seen him again. After the command "everyone in the boat" the head of the radio station Efimov stopped the chief officer who was running past the door of the radio room and asked him to give the coordinates of the vessel for dialing a distress signal. the captain will come. Without waiting for captain Efimov, he started giving the SOS signal, but at that time the captain entered and brought a note with the coordinates of the ship's position. The SOS signal was broadcast at 04:42-43 min ... left. After that, none of the surviving crew members saw him again. "

Many team members also failed to escape:

Unlike other fishing bases (pictured), in Kaliningrad, drinking on vacation was not only not prohibited, but also encouraged

“An attempt to lower the port side boat,” wrote Captain Morozov, “failed ... The starboard boat could not be lowered because of the large roll to the left side. In these moments of general despair, suddenly someone shouted:“ Steamer! ” a well-lit ship was approaching. It was impossible to send distress signals with rockets, the wheelhouse, where all the pyrotechnics were stored, was already at the mercy of the waves. They shouted, waved their hands, but they were all unsuccessful - no attention was paid to them. The ship, without stopping, proceeded by. the trawler began to sink quickly, and the bow came out of the water. Many crew members began to jump into the water, those who remained on the deck were washed away by the waves. Electrician Artemiev with several crew members rushed to the upper bridge, where there were life rafts, but emergency beams that fell from their regular places and by the boards almost all the sailors were knocked down and washed overboard by the waves. of them. Immediately after that, all the rafts were also washed overboard, and three of them were in working order, and two did not open. Around this time, the starboard boat was torn from the ship and overturned, and the port side boat was broken and also torn off, but kept afloat in an inverted state. The ship continued to sink into the water astern. At about 04.50 the bow of the trawler also disappeared under water. Sailors caught in the water were scattered over a large area. Those who were close to the life-saving equipment, with great effort, nevertheless managed to use them. At first, there were about 20 people on the bottom of the overturned starboard boat, but soon half was washed away by the waves. Eleven people in the water were able to climb into one of the three rafts. The raft on which Artemyev was, no one else managed to use it. The third open raft floated empty. "

The Toucan crew was lucky in only one thing. The Soviet floating base did not have time to go far.

"At 05.10, after receiving a distress signal and analyzing the situation, the floating base" Vilis Latsis "turned to the area of ​​the accident. At 05.40, flickering lights were found on the water. These were the lights on the life rafts and life jackets of the Tukanites. About 7 o'clock 10 people were removed from the bottom of the overturned lifeboat. By 8 o'clock 11 people were lifted on board the floating base from the life raft. The last person was lifted (from the second life raft) at 09.06 ".

Of the 79 crew members, only 22 were saved.

"Booze on ships should not be encouraged!"

The commission appointed by the USSR Ministry of Fisheries conducted a detailed investigation of all the circumstances of the tragedy and found out a lot of interesting things. For example, "Information on stability for the captain of ships of the" Tropic "type", which should have been guided in emergency situations, had a lot of unclearly written passages, which was the result of an inaccurate translation of it from German language... In addition, the designers ensured that if one pressurized compartment was flooded, the vessel would remain afloat and would not capsize. But in fact, the design was made in such a way that when water entered the fish shop, the adjacent compartment was also flooded. So the firm guarantee of unsinkability was worth nothing.

The commission also investigated how the water got inside the ship's hull. The version of the hole did not match the description of the disaster compiled after interviewing the surviving crew members. They tried to figure out the way of water intake, as Captain Morozov wrote:

"Kaliningrad scientists from the Department of Ship Theory KTIRPiKh (Kaliningrad Technical Institute of Fishing Industry and Economy) investigated and calculated six options for water penetration into the hull. bunkers; through loose hatches of the 2nd or 3rd fish bunkers.

It is estimated that in both cases, through any of these holes, within 2-2.5 hours, enough water could have entered the vessel to lose the buoyancy of the vessel. This happens even if the sewage tank bilge pump is constantly running. "

Deputy Prosecutor General of the USSR Mikhail Malyarov (pictured on the podium) did not disclose the conclusion that those responsible for the death of the trawler died with him

The theoretical calculations were confirmed by the testimony of the witness:

"From the testimony of the fishmaster Myasishchev, it follows that during the repair, a rubber sealing gasket was not installed on the cover of the 3rd fish bunker, without which a large gap formed around the perimeter of the lid. The ship's adjusting mechanic had to install the gasket at the transition to the fishing area."

Only one thing remained unclear:

“Based on the requirements of ordinary maritime practice, - wrote Vyacheslav Morozov, - the captain, having received information about the water entering the vessel, was obliged first of all to declare a water alarm and make every effort to find the causes and place of water inflow, and then take measures to eliminate it. But the crew was not prepared for the fight for survivability, and the alarm was not announced ... The commission did not find an explanation of the reasons why Captain Khramtsov, in violation of the instructions of the Service Charter, did not send a distress signal on time. immediate use when the ship has actually died. "

The Commission suggested that alcohol abuse could be the reason for this behavior of the ship's command. Moreover, the immediate superiors not only did not forbid drinking on ships, but, on the contrary, encouraged it in every possible way. For example, the sea captain Leonid Tatarin, who had sailed on the vessels of the Kaliningrad trawl fleet base for many years, recalled:

"One of the striking examples is the former head of the Kaliningrad Tralflot, Vasily Dmitrievich Albanov. Nobody will argue that he was a wonderful man. The tug in the port, named after him, is a well-deserved memory of him. But everyone was ashamed to tell him the truth - it is impossible fishermen's Day was officially introduced in our country in 1965. Then I was the third navigator on the RTM Pallada in the South-East Atlantic, just north of Walvisbay. fishing arrived at TR "Priboy" the head of "Tralflot" himself. Our captain was the Hero of Socialist Labor AF Tsygankov. Of course, Albanov decided to celebrate the holiday on board. In the morning our captain moored to board the "Priboy" - beautiful The chief immediately switched to the Pallada. We were reloaded with a line of vodka, then a line of brandy, a line of champagne - to the loud shouts of the crew “Hurray!”.

But some of the surviving members of the Tukan's crew, instead of an alcoholic one, put forward a completely different version of the death of the ship, which Vyacheslav Morozov wrote down from their words:

“Mechanic Zolotarev claims that there can be no talk of any general drunkenness. If only because the ship had just come out of repair, the crew was hastily recruited from the reserve, and few knew each other in this“ hodgepodge ”. But the mechanic has a different answer to the questions.

“Shortly before the departure, four containers were loaded aboard the RTM - as they said, with equipment intended for a secret Soviet facility in Cuba,” Zolotarev recalls.

During a storm in Skagerrak, one of the containers fell off the anchorages and hit the slipway, which brought it into an open position. Obviously, at this time on the "Tukan" and felt the shaking of the hull, which became fatal for the ship. Another member of the crew, V. Mezentsev, also recalled the mysterious containers. "

The version that the reason for the sinking of the "Toucan" was the opening of the slip (platform for lifting the trawl with the catch to the deck) had every right to life. Just as the version discussed in Kaliningrad that the reason for the trawler's death was a Soviet submarine that accompanied him and the secret cargo was not devoid of meaning. It was said that it was she who hit the Toucan, after which it sank. In support of these mysterious versions, then and much later it was indicated that the Toucan was never raised, although it sank at a shallow depth: it is more convenient to hide the truth this way.

However, in 1967, none of the officials began to either confirm or deny these versions. And not only because the party and the government only in the rarest cases reported disasters with the death of such a number of people, and even more so about their causes. The silence was also explained by the fact that the USSR Prosecutor General's Office had not completed the investigation.

"The investigation of the case is closed"

Acting Prosecutor General of the USSR Mikhail Malyarov reported to the Central Committee of the CPSU only in the following year, 1968:

"An investigation into the causes of the sinking of the Tukan fishing trawler, which occurred on February 28, 1967, when the vessel left the Skagerrak Strait to the North Sea, established the following:

On February 25, 1967, after completion of scheduled maintenance and receiving a class from the Register of the USSR, the Tukan trawler left Kaliningrad for fishing in the Northwest Atlantic. On February 28, en route to the North Sea, the trawler "Tukan" was caught in a severe storm and, as a result of water penetration into the compartments of the ship's hull, sank at a depth of 37 meters. During the shipwreck, 57 crew members were killed. "

The expedition, intending to raise the Tukan, did not have the necessary skills, healthy divers, and most importantly, as evil tongues claimed, the desire to work

In contrast to the conclusions of the departmental commission, the investigators of the Prosecutor General's Office came to more definite conclusions:

"The death of the trawler" Tukan ", according to experts, was due to the flooding of two adjacent compartments - a fish shop and a fish meal installation (reinforcement department), from where the water quickly spread to other rooms of the ship's hull. and industrial discipline on the ship, dulling vigilance and disregard for danger in a storm, as well as the result of clearly wrong actions and gross violations of the Charter of service on ships of the fishing industry fleet, the Rules technical operation and provisions governing the safety of navigation by the ship's officers.

Upon receipt of a storm warning on February 27, Senior Mate Safonov did not take the necessary measures to ensure the hermetic closure of all hatches on the aft deck, and navigator Gutsulyak did not organize monitoring of their condition, as a result of which the flow of water into the production premises of the hull was noticed with a great delay. The captain of the trawler Khramtsov did not announce a water alarm and did not take urgent measures to clarify and eliminate the causes of the water leakage, did not inform the Kaliningrad trawling fleet base about the trawler's emergency condition. Khramtsov and his subordinate commanders Safonov, Gutsulyak, Kuzub did not take appropriate measures to effectively fight for the ship's damage and rescue the crew, who, moreover, due to their fault, was not prepared and trained for organized and decisive action. It was established that on February 26-27, individual members of the ship's crew, including Khramtsov, Safonov, Kuzub and Eresko, consumed alcoholic beverages and, at the time of an emergency, showed obvious inaction and passivity.

Despite the opportunity, Khramtsov did not ask for help from the Soviet ship "Vilis Latsis", with which he parted twenty minutes before the shipwreck.

In the presence of a real threat of death of the vessel and the crew, the distress signal was given with a great delay, and orders to the crew to prepare for the rescue were given at the moment when the trawler began to submerge. The command to the crew to "leave the ship" was not given at all, and no one was in charge of rescuing people during the shipwreck.

The situation created by this time was aggravated by the fact that most of the crew members did not know how to properly use the collective life rafts. "

The conclusions of the Prosecutor General's Office also contained information about the design flaws of the vessel:

"The flooding of the trawler was facilitated by some design flaws of the vessel (the location below the waterline of two industrial premises communicating with each other through a drainage system, unreliable fastening of the slip cover and inconvenient closing of hatch covers in the aft deck coamings)."

And about. The Prosecutor General unequivocally pointed out the perpetrators of the tragedy:

“Considering that Khramtsov, Safonov, Kuzub, Gutsulyak, who caused the shipwreck, died, the investigation was terminated. flight, punished in the party and disciplinary order. "

But not only the conclusions were interesting in the note. It did not say a word about any secret cargo. It is doubtful that and. O. Prosecutor General, if the "Toucan" transported something secret, bypassed this circumstance in his report to the Central Committee. Moreover, the document itself was not classified as classified, which clearly indicated that it was not talking about any military or state secrets.

True, the note stated that "the final conclusions about the reasons for the trawler's sinking could be made only after the recovery and careful examination of the sunken ship." But, as it turned out, the trawler had not been raised yet. A new detective story unfolds around the ship-lifting operations.

"Get more currency and dress up"

In February 1968, an anonymous letter was sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU about how the Tukan was organized and carried out:

“At the beginning of 1967, the Soviet fishing vessel Tukan of the Ministry of Fisheries perished off the coast of Denmark. - "Power") Baltic Shipping Company with the obligation to finish in 1967. However, they worked for about 6 months. The composition is about 160 people. A floating base with a displacement of 14,000 tons, rescue vessels, diving boats, equipment, machinery, etc. But the ASPTR did not succeed. Spent more than 1.5 million rubles, more than 28 thousand gold. rub. in foreign currency.

Reasons for failure: illiteracy, lack of any practice in this type of work. Lack of desire to work. The presence of a desire to get more currency and dress up abroad. The selection of the team, in essence, was not proper. In pursuit of the currency, they went, who could. We got 3 diving specialists, and none of them has the right to launch under water. What did you do there under water for 6 months? What did they do there? It is unknown and lies on the conscience of the divers. The Danes offered to officially raise the ship in 1.5 months, but ours? It’s a shame, they have disgraced themselves and they still say: they will work in 1968 and spend the same amount of currency, and it will cost at least 4 million rubles. That's what they call it. This is a feeding trough: you can earn extra money, and without any guarantee for the end of the ascent in 1968. The indignation of the fishermen is understandable ... It's time to stop all this economy and waste money, because you can build three new vessels. "

Usually, anonymous letters were not paid much attention. However, this was transferred to the transport department of the Central Committee of the CPSU with instructions to immediately investigate the matter. The department sent inquiries to the USSR Ministry of the Sea Fleet and the USSR Ministry of Fisheries, and, as it turned out from their answers, the facts given in the anonymous letter were fully confirmed.

Minmorflot, however, tried to make excuses. Deputy Minister Timofei Guzhenko's reply to the Central Committee's request, sent on March 12, 1968, said:

"In connection with the limited technical means for such work in the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, a number of items of material and technical equipment for the lifting expedition were provided with the involvement of other specialized organizations and the owner of the ship. the number of ropes, cables and hoses, installation of offshore equipment at the work site.

The total duration of the work envisaged by the project for raising the vessel was 109 days. In conditions of unstable weather during the period May - October 1967, which sharply differed from the average long-term, it turned out to be possible to use only 65.5 days, including 12 in August, 14 in September and 5 days in October. In the same period, there were strong storms lasting 8-9 days, disrupting not only the rhythm, but causing serious damage to the work already completed (storms in August and September 1967). The floating base, the killer and rescue vessels were repeatedly forced to leave the place of work for shelter.

Deputy Minister of Fisheries Vladimir Kamentsev presented to the Central Committee a calculation showing that "Tukan" is not worth the cost of lifting it

Taking into account the difficult weather conditions and the loss of time for the repeated rearrangement of boats, measures were taken to speed up the work: the number of divers and other specialists increased, an operating mode was introduced with the use of overtime hours, and the lifting technology was changed. In early September, the state of the work was reviewed by the Ministries of the Marine Fleet and Fisheries. At the suggestion of the Ministry of Fisheries, the work was continued in the autumn period; by a joint decision, measures were taken to accelerate them. However, continued unfavorable weather prevented the progress of the work. Involvement of Crowe's Danish firm in collaborative work, under the conditions of the actually developing weather, turned out to be inexpedient. In connection with the onset of the autumn-winter period on November 14, with the consent of the owner of the vessel, it was decided to temporarily suspend lifting operations until the spring of 1968.

For the entire period from June to October 1967, 70-75% of the total volume of ship-lifting work was completed, for which the customers paid the ASPTR detachment about 900 thousand rubles. All payments for the work performed, including the payment of currency to the personnel, were made with the execution of the relevant documents with the confirmation of the customer's representative who was constantly at the place of work.

In December 1967, the Baltic Shipping Company analyzed the operation to lift the trawler. It was noted that, in addition to unfavorable weather, there were significant shortcomings in the preparation and performance of the expedition's work. The main disadvantages are: the delay in the start of work at the lifting site by one month due to the late arrival of the killer vessel belonging to the DKBF to equip the roadstead; inconsistency of the actual state of the soil at the site of the wreck with the characteristics presented on the basis of a survey carried out by a third-party organization at the request of the trawler owner (the soil turned out to be much harder, which was not taken into account by the lifting project); insufficient attention to the material and technical support of the expedition and the organization of ship lifting operations on site; the lack of diving specialists who, for health reasons, are capable of descending to a sunken ship to a depth of 40 meters. "

Probably, if some super-secret cargo existed and was lifted, the position of the Ministry of Morphlot would look much better and Guzhenko would definitely mention this. But the note of repentance further said only that the ministry was going to raise the "Toucan" in the coming 1968 year.

"The ship broke off and fell to the ground"

However, the Ministry of Fisheries of the USSR on the issue of raising the "Tukan" had a completely different opinion. The report of Deputy Minister Vladimir Kamentsev, sent to the Central Committee on April 19, 1968, said:

“Considering that the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet has a special organization for ship-lifting operations, it was decided to lift the vessel by the forces of the rescue team of the Baltic Shipping Company and refuse the proposals of foreign companies that undertook to carry out this work. contract agreement with the detachment for the lifting of the Tukan trawler in 1967 with the cost of lifting approximately 610 thousand rubles ...

According to the information of the Ministry of the Marine Fleet, in 1967 the detachment washed 4 tunnels and brought in the ship lifting slings, sharpened 4 lagged 400-ton ship-lifting pontoons and 1 suspended 400-ton pontoon, carried out preparatory work to raise the stern of the Tukan from the ground in order installation of slings for mid-section 400-ton pontoons.

After these works, two attempts were made to raise the aft part of the vessel, but in both cases, for various reasons, the vessel broke off and fell to the ground.

In the second half of September, the detachment made new attempts to raise the bow end of the "Tukan", however, in this case, the ship-lifting equipment was damaged, and the work was unsuccessful.

Taking into account these circumstances and the beginning of the stormy period, the Ministry of the Navy raised the issue of recalling the detachment and postponing the ship lifting work to 1968.

According to the reporting data, in 1967 the Kaliningrad production department of the fishing industry spent 2,146 thousand rubles on ship-lifting operations on the Tukan, including 900 thousand rubles (instead of 610 thousand rubles) to pay the emergency rescue team (instead of 610 thousand rubles) and, in addition, 22,086 foreign currency rubles to pay the foreign currency part of the salary to engineering and technical personnel, divers, sailors and other participants in the work.

In the first quarter, the rescue team presented to the Kaliningrad production department of the fishing industry a draft contract for the performance of work on lifting the Tukan trawler in 1968 within 150 days. "

There was not a single word about the secret cargo here either. However, the following was a calculation, which the Central Committee did not dispute the loyalty of:

"According to the calculations carried out by the detachment, the cost of the work planned for 1968 will be about 850 thousand rubles for the work of the detachment, 750 thousand rubles for the maintenance of the Tungus base, for paying for the services of a killer vessel, renting pontoons, services of a rescue vessel and others about 400 thousand rubles, and only about 2 million rubles and 32 thousand rubles in foreign currency Thus, the total cost of lifting the trawler was determined in the amount of at least 4.2 million rubles.

At the same time, the contract does not provide any guarantees for the recovery of the vessel and does not provide for liability for expenses in case of non-performance of work.

During the long stay of the vessel at the bottom, it received additional damage and wear from the effects of bad weather and corrosion, and especially from impacts when falling to the ground during the failed attempts to lift the stern in 1967, in this regard, the restoration of the trawler will require high costs, which are determined calculations of 1.3 million rubles.

Consequently, the total cost of lifting and repairing the Tukan trawler will amount to about 6 million rubles, with a residual value of the vessel of 1.4 million rubles. In connection with the above, as well as due to the lack of guarantees of unconditional provision for the lifting of the Tukan trawler, the USSR Ministry of Fisheries decided not to continue this work in 1968. "

So the secret of why the ship was not raised turned out not to be military, but financial. The importance of the cargo that was sent to Cuba with the "Toucan", apparently, is also greatly exaggerated. And the whole story turned out to be not about secrets, but about the human factor. In all the variety of its manifestations.

This installation usually includes two main motors, from which power is transmitted to one propeller through a gearbox.

Gear ratio of gearboxes 1: 2; 1: 4 allows the use of motors with increased speed. Reducers in such installations only reduce the crankshaft speed; reverse gear is provided by reversing the engine or using a CPP.

The diagram of the diesel-gear transmission is shown in Figure 2.5. The crankshafts of the two main engines 5 are connected through couplings 4 to the primary shafts of the gearbox. The reducer is a single-stage gear train. Gears 3 and 6 rotate a large gear wheel connected to the shaft line 2 and the propeller 1. A thrust bearing of the shaft line is mounted in the gearbox. Due to the presence of a gear transmission, the propeller shaft speed can be reduced to a value that provides a high efficiency of the propeller.

Figure 2.5 - Diagram of a diesel gear transmission

As couplings, induction or hydraulic couplings that allow sliding are used, which ensures quick disconnection of the shafting from the crankshafts, disconnection of one of the engines in case of malfunctions, and also protects the gears of the reducer from sudden shocks when the gear is engaged.

Diesel gear transmission is currently widely used in installations with two medium-speed main engines of the French company "Semt-Pilstick". These engines are four-stroke, trunk, V-type, gas-turbine-supercharged engines with 12 to 16 cylinders. All engines of this type (PC-2V-400) have the same cylinder sizes and piston strokes. Their cylinder power is 342 kW (465 hp) at a speed of 500 rpm.

Figure 2.4 - Arrangement of mechanisms in the engine room of PPR "Rembrant"

1 - pumps of fresh and sea water of the main engine; 2 - evaporators; 3 - distillate pumps; 4 - watermaker; 5 - pumps of ship systems; 5 - diesel generator; 7 - warm box; 8 - boiler feed pumps; 9.10 - hydrophores of sea and fresh water; 11 - steam boiler; 12 - desk; 13 - oil and fuel separators; 14 - pumps serving the main engine; 15 - compressed air cylinders; 16 - pumps for fresh and outboard water of the main engine; 17 - bilge water separator; 18 - pumps for cooling water of a refrigeration unit; 19 - fresh water coolers for auxiliary engines; 20 - diesel generators; 21 - oil coolers of the main engine; 22 - fresh water coolers of the main engine; 23 - main engine

Gear drives with such engines are installed on transport refrigerators of the types "Sea of ​​Okhotsk", "Amur Bay", "Russian Island".

Plants of the same type are used at the Tropic and Atlantik RTMs. They consist of two main in-line engines NVD SKL at RTM "Tropic" 490 kW (670 hp) each, at RTM "Atlantic" at 850 kW (1160 hp), connected to the gearbox by means of induction couplings.

A feature of these plants is the use in their composition of reversible electric shaft generators (shown by a dashed line in Fig. B), which allow either to take power from the main engines to supply electricity to ship consumers, or to use the power of the ship's power plant for the movement of the ship. Shaft generators are driven by a driven gear wheel through a gear that increases the speed. Such installations allow, when performing field operations (lowering, lifting of fishing gear), to use the power reserve of the main engines to supply electric power to the field mechanisms through a shaft generator.

During the transition period, the shaft generator can be used as a shaft motor to increase the speed of the vessel.

RTM type "Atlantic"

Fishing freezer trawlers of the Atlantik type were built by the People's Enterprise Volkswerf in Stralsund (GDR) by order of the Soviet Union. The trawler is designed to operate in the areas of the Mid and South Atlantic, equipped with a device for trawling for food, an installation for freezing the catch and storing fish products in refrigerated holds.

The vessel is single-screw, double-deck, with an excess freeboard and the location of the power plant in the middle part. The main deck houses a three-tiered superstructure. The bow is inclined, the stern is transom with a flat transom inclined towards the bow. The main characteristics of the vessel of the "Atlantic" type:

Trawlers of the "Atlantik" type were built to the class of the Register of the USSR

Propulsion plant - diesel geared, two-machine, with CPP and power take-off for shaft generators.

Two main engines of type 8NVD-48. 2AU transmits power to the CPP through induction couplings and a gearbox. Part of the power through the same gearbox can be taken by a three-phase alternating current shaft generator operating on the ship's network, and by a direct current generator operating on field mechanisms. The AC ship power plant consists of four diesel generators with a capacity of 320 kVA each, an emergency diesel generator with a capacity of 50 kVA, switchgears, equipment and electricity sewerage networks.

The basis of the auxiliary boiler plant is a water-tube boiler of the Wagner-Khokhdruk system with a steam capacity of 2.5 t / h at a pressure of 785 kPa (8 kgf / cm2).

Evaporation plant vacuum, direct evaporation. All auxiliary mechanisms serving the power plant are electrically driven.

The layout of the trawler's engine room is shown in Figure 2.6.

Propulsion plant. The main engines on the RTM of the "Atlantik" type are SKL engines manufactured by the V.I. K. Liebknecht (GDR). Single-action four-stroke engines, trunk, reversible, gas turbine supercharged. The main characteristics of the motors are shown below.

Engine type 8NVD-482AU

Number of cylinders z 8

Cylinder diameter Du, mm 320

Piston stroke Sп, mm 480

Cylinder volume Vts, dm3 38.6

Compression ratio 13.25

Rotational speed n, rpm 375

Continuous power Ne, kW (e. Hp) ... 852 (1160)

Starting speed n START, rpm. 80

Minimum stable frequency

rotation n min, rpm 200

Forbidden speed zone n cr,

rpm 250-300

Average piston speed with t, m / s 6.0

Compression end pressure MPa (kgf / cm 2) .. 4, 12-4.1 (44-43)

Maximum cycle pressure p Г, MPa

(kgf / cm2) 6.67-7.705 (68-72)

Average effective pressure pe, kPa

(kgf / cm *) 883 (9)

The degree of pressure increase in the turbocharger 1.27-1.33

Maximum exhaust back pressure

R V.G. , kPa (mm wg) 1.962 (200)

Exhaust gas outlet temperature

from cylinders t C VG, ° C 375-425

Exhaust gas temperature before turbo

supercharger t * Г, ° C 435-85

Specific fuel consumption g E g / kWh

(g / e.l.with h) 218+ 5% (160 + 5%)

Figure 2.6 - General arrangement of mechanisms in the engine room of the RTM type

"Atlantic"

1 - main engines 8NVD-48A2U; 2 - induction couplings; 3 - reducer; 4 - AC shaft machine; 5 - DC shaft machine; 6 - condenser of the boiler plant; 7 - auxiliary steam boiler; 8 - oil pump; 9 - lubricating oil pump; 10 - feed water pump; 11 - bilge pumps; 12 - bilge water separator; 13 - bilge pump; 14 - seawater pump for diesel generators; 15 - seawater pump for main engines; 16 - auxiliary diesel generators; 17- starting cylinder of a diesel generator; 18 - fuel pumps; 19 - reserve oil pump of the main engines; 20 - air cylinder of the control system; 21 - starting cylinders of the main engine; 22 - fuel separator; 23 - electric compressor; 24 - pump of fresh cooling water for diesel generators; 25 - backup fresh cooling water pump for main engines; 26 - vacuum pump of the evaporation plant; 27- desalination condenser; 28 - evaporator condenser cooling pump; 29 - fire pump; 30 - evaporator brine pump, 31 - oil separator; 32 - pump for cooling water for oil coolers of the gearbox; 33 - oil heater; 34 - gear oil cooler; 35 - gear oil pump

The design of the engine is similar to that of the 8NVD-48AU diesel engine installed on the Mayak SRTM. The increase in power is achieved by increasing the speed to 375 rpm and increasing the degree of boost.

Power is transmitted from the main engines to the gearbox through two inductive couplings. Couplings have the following main characteristics:

Type 1K2000-16 / 3

Rated torque, MN m (kgf m) 218 ​​(2220)

»Excitation current, A 85

Rated excitation voltage, V 120

Forced excitement:

voltage, V 170

Torque limit at nominal excitation

MN-m (kgf-m) 245 (2500)

Limiting moment at forced

excitation MN m (kgf m) 275 (2800)

Nominal slip,% 2.5

The excitation voltage of the induction clutches is supplied from two converters consisting of three-phase current transformers and silicon rectifiers. The clutches are switched on from the CPU. The clutch engagement system has a blocking device that is triggered in the following cases:

If the shafts of the main engines rotate in different directions;

if the pressure of oil in the gearbox and cooling water in the stern tube device is below the minimum permissible;

When the barring device is on;

When the rudder blade is shifted to an angle exceeding 40 °.

The reducer is designed to transfer the power of the main engines to one propeller shaft and power take-off shaft, as well as to change the speed. Gearbox characteristics:

Input shaft speed, rpm 375

»» Propeller shaft, rpm 175

»» Power take-off shaft, rpm. 1000

Power transmitted to the propeller shaft, kW (e. Hp) 1705 (2320)

»» »Selection shaft, kW 556

Maximum transmitted power, kW (e. Hp) 1935 (2633)

The gears of the reducer are cylindrical, helical. All shafts of the gearbox, except for the power take-off shaft, are packed in sleeve bearings filled with babbitt. The power take-off shaft rotates in rolling bearings. A barring device is mounted on the free end of the power take-off shaft. The gearbox contains a segmented thrust bearing designed for a maximum thrust of 265 kN (27 tf).

As a propeller on the trawler, an adjustable pitch propeller produced by the plant named after V.I. K. Gottwald (GDR). CPP characteristic:

Screw diameter, mm. 3400

"Hubs, mm 1000

Constructive step ratio 0.852

Rotation frequency, rpm 175

The maximum angle of rotation of the blades forward / backward, ° 25/20

The hydraulic pitch change mechanism is located outside the hub.

The propulsion system is controlled from the CPU in the engine room, and the propeller pitch is controlled from the control stations located in the wheelhouse and in the CPU. In the control system of the unit there are indicators of the load on the main engines, which provide control over its distribution between the diesel engines.

The rotational speed of the motors and the CPP is not regulated.

Let's consider the characteristics of the propulsion plant.

Due to the fact that power is taken from the main engines to the AC shaft generator, the engines operate at a constant speed. Changing the speed of the vessel is carried out by changing the pitch of the propeller.

As tests have shown, the maximum freewheel speed when operating on the propeller of one engine at the nominal mode is 10.4 knots. The angle of rotation of the CPP blades is 16 °.

When the AC shaft is operating in the shaft motor mode together with two main motors, the freewheel speed increases by 0.2 knots, which is practically insignificant.

The tests of the RTM "Aviator" were carried out when the vessel was operating with a 31-meter bottom trawl and 25-meter deep trawls.

Wind and waves during the test period did not exceed three points.

Tests of the propulsion unit on trawling showed that at towing speeds of a bottom trawl of 4.5 knots and a mid-depth trawl of 4.7 knots, the power consumed from the main engines is 0.65-0.67 of the nominal at an angle of rotation of the blades of 15 °.

The maximum speed of trawling in calm weather when the two main engines are operating at a mode close to the rated one and the blades turning angles within 16-16.5 ° is about 5 knots.

When one main engine is operating at a load of 80-4-85% of the nominal (a = 11.5-f-12 °), the trawling speed is 3.5-3.9 knots.

Trawling upwind with waves up to 6 points is possible at a speed of up to 4 knots without overloading the main engines. During the transitions to the place of fishing, the vessel's progress is ensured by the operation of two main engines. The angle of rotation of the CPP blades is set within 19-21 ° depending on the weather conditions.

When moving from the fishery to the port due to the increase in the vessel's load, the angle of rotation of the CPP blades decreases to 17-20 °. Average daily fuel consumption for main engines at crossings is 8.7 tons / day, and in the field - 5.1 tons / day.

A diesel geared installation with power take-off through AC and DC shafts is called a "father and son" installation.

A diesel-gear unit similar to the SEU RTM "Atlantika" with power take-off is installed at the UPS "Khersones", as well as on the ships of the RTM-K-S "Moozund" type.

Power plants with diesel-electric transmission. Such installations were used mainly on ships with powerful fish processing equipment on board (industrial refrigerators, canning trawlers), where flexible redistribution of energy generated by the power plant is required: at crossings - maximum use of the generated energy for the needs of the vessel's movement, and in the fishing industry - to ensure work fishing and fish processing mechanisms. This possibility is provided by a power plant with electric transmission. The electrical transmission diagram is shown in Figure 2.7.

Figure 2.7 - Scheme of electrical transmission

In the engine rooms of ships with diesel-electric transmission, units are installed, consisting of diesel engines 5 and driven by them generators 4 of electric current. The propeller 1 in this transmission is driven by an electric motor 2, which receives energy through the switchboard 3. The mechanical work of the main engines 4 in such a transmission is converted into electrical energy, which is then converted into mechanical work in the propeller motor 2 to drive the propeller. This double conversion of energy naturally reduces the transmission efficiency.

Electric transmission has become widespread on a number of industrial refrigerated trucks and canning trawlers due to the following advantages:

The ability to maneuver the number of working diesel operators, which allows them to be used in whole or in part, depending on the energy needs;

Easy reversing by means of electric switches or CPP, which allows you to control the rowing machine from the bridge;

Possibility of placing the power plant independently of the propeller shafts (no intermediate shafts and their tunnels);

Possibilities of using the main generators to obtain current supplying auxiliary mechanisms.

The disadvantages of the electric drive include low efficiency, the complexity of the equipment and the need to increase the number of maintenance personnel (in addition to mechanics, electromechanics are also needed); high initial cost.

The installation shown in figure 2.7 is an installation with a single power system. Diesel generators in this case are not divided into main and auxiliary ones. The energy generated by them, depending on the mode of operation of the vessel, is distributed through the switchboard between the propeller electric installation and other consumers. The power plants of trawlers of the Sever type, commercial industrial refrigerators of the Altai type and canned fishing trawlers of the Natalia Kovshova type operate according to this scheme.

There are diesel-electric ships that have main and auxiliary diesel generators, i.e. rowing electrical installation and the ship's auxiliary power plant are autonomous in this case.

Depending on the type of current, power plants with diesel-electric transmission can be direct current (field refrigerator of the Druzhba type) and alternating current (commercial refrigerator of the Altai and Zelenodolsk types). The wider use of alternating current in modern diesel-electric installations is due to the compactness, simplicity of design and maintenance of generators, electric motors and other alternating current equipment compared to direct current equipment.

Power plants with reverse gear transmission to the propeller from a non-reversible engine.

This type of installation is used on low-tonnage fishing vessels: medium and small seiners, small trawlers and receiving transport vessels with a main engine power of 60-140 kW (80-200 HP). The scheme of the engine room with such a power plant of the middle Black Sea seiner is shown in Figure 2.8.

Figure 2.8 - Schematic plan of the engine room of a sea fishing vessel

The main engine 8 (diesel with a power of 110 kW) rotates the propeller 1. The transmission of power from the engine to the propeller is carried out by the shaft line. It consists of separate shafts: intermediate 24 and stern tube, or propeller, 26, connected by flanges 3. The intermediate shaft is located in the support bearings 4, and the stern shaft is located in the stern tube bearings 2, which are installed in the stern tube 25. At the end of the stern shaft fixed propeller 1. The crankshaft of the engine is connected to the shafting through the reverse-reducer 21, with the help of which the direction of rotation of the shafting and the propeller is changed. The thrust bearing is located in the reverse gear housing. It senses the pressure generated by the propeller.

To provide power to the ship's auxiliary and field mechanisms - pumps, winches, network lifting machines - in the engine room at the starboard side there is an auxiliary engine 17 (diesel with a power of 14 kW), which drives an electric generator. On the left side there is a fire pump 9 driven by an electric motor. In the bow there is a bilge pump 12, which pumps out water from the hold and is driven directly from the main engine. The main engine is started with an electric starter.

For powering the electric starter and for lighting the premises, batteries are provided, located in cabinet 22 on the starboard side. In case of failure of the electric starter, the main engine can be started up with compressed air, which is stored in cylinders 20. Compressed air is also used for other needs. Its stock can be replenished with a compressor 19. At the aft bulkhead there are a switchboard 23 of the ship's electrical facilities, a water heating boiler 6 and a coal bunker 5. There are tanks on the sides: the main fuel supply 7 and 18, oil 14 and fuel supply 16. Installed at the bow bulkhead consumable oil tank 11. Next to the tanks there are hand pumps: 10 - for water, 13 - for oil, 15 - for fuel.

To carry out maneuvers and reverse of the main engine, the small-sized vessel is manufactured together with reverse gears, with the help of which it is possible to change the direction of rotation of the propeller shaft and reduce its rotation frequency. The design of the reverse gear also includes an uncoupling device.

Shafts 13 and 9 have discs 3 and 15. Between them is placed the third disc 4, which rotates together with the housing 2, which is connected by a flange 1 to the crankshaft of the engine.

Figure 2.10 shows a longitudinal section of the reverse gear of the 2CHSP 10.5 / 13 engine, operating according to the above scheme with a gear ratio of 1: 1.35 for reverse and 1: 1.25 for forward. Key numbers in figure 2.9 are the same as in figure 2.10.

Figure 2.9 - Diagram of a two-disk reverse gear

When moving to the right, the disc 4 enters into engagement with the disc 15 and drives it into rotation, and with it through the gear 12 and the shaft 11 (forward motion). When moving to the left, the disc 4 engages with the disc 3 and together with it drives the shaft 9. The rotation of the shaft 9 is transmitted to the driven shaft 11 through the gears 8 and 10. The direction of rotation will be the same as that of the shaft 9, i.e. opposite to the direction of rotation of the pinion 12 (reverse). The stop position corresponds to the center position of disc 4. In the stop position, the engine crankshaft continues to rotate and the propeller shaft will stop. The movement of the pressure plate 4 is carried out by the shift lever 5 with the help of the shift clutch 6 of the lever mechanism 14. The advantage of the reverse gears of this scheme is the possibility of their long-term operation in reverse.

The disadvantages include the limited amount of transmitted torque, as well as the need for very accurate mounting of disks in the case. The slightest misalignment of discs can lead to overheating and jamming.

To transmit large torques, reverse gears with hydraulic or pneumatic control are used. Maneuvering of such installations can be carried out from remote automated consoles.

Figure 2.10 - Longitudinal section of a two-disk reverse gear