Military history, weapons, old and military maps. Book of memory and glory - Kalinin defensive operation Location of units of the Kalinin front autumn 1941

The counteroffensive of the Red Army near Moscow was the first major offensive operation in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). By the beginning of December 1941, the groupings of German troops rushing to the capital of the USSR in fierce battles with the forces of the Western, South-Western, Kalinin fronts suffered significant losses, turned out to be stretched out on a wide front and, as a result, lost their striking power.

So on December 1, 1941, the commander of the forces of Army Group Center, von Bock, sent a report to the commander-in-chief of the ground forces von Brauchitsch, in which he said that there was not enough strength for a larger enveloping maneuver. The battles of the last two weeks have shown that the assumption that "the enemy is" close to defeat "turned out to be an illusion." Army Group Center was forced to hold the front for about 1,000 km and had only one weakened division as a reserve. The German commander wrote that with such an alignment of forces on the Eastern Front, when the troops suffered heavy losses in the officer corps, and the combat effectiveness of the troops fell, the Wehrmacht was not able to conduct more or less systematic offensive actions. Due to disruptions in the operation of the railway, the command also does not have the opportunity to prepare troops widely along the front for defensive actions and to ensure a full supply of forces in the course of such battles.

Von Bock suggested that if Army Group Center had to go over to the defensive at its present lines for the winter of 1941-1942, then given the current balance of forces at the front, this would be "possible only if large reserves are allocated" that will be able to block possible enemy strikes, front breakthroughs. And to allow the divisions of the first echelon, weakened in battles, to be taken in turn to rest and replenishment. And for this, the army group will additionally need at least 12 divisions. The next a prerequisite, according to the German Field Marshal General, was the order and reliable operation of railway transport. This made it possible to regularly supply German troops and create the necessary supplies (ammunition, ammunition, food, etc.). If it is not possible to strengthen the army group with reserves, and to put things in order in supply, then it is necessary to immediately choose an advantageous and less extended line in the rear for the forces Eastern Front... The new line must be prepared for defense with the appropriate forces, the necessary rear communications must be built so that, upon receiving the appropriate order from the high command, it can be occupied within a short time.

Soviet side

For the Soviet command, the Kalinin operational direction came as a big surprise. It appeared due to a catastrophe that occurred during the first stage of the October battle on the distant approaches to the capital of the Soviet Union. Then, as a result of the environment of four Soviet armies(19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd) of the Western Front, the formation of the so-called. "Vyazemsky cauldron" Hitler's troops were able to move unhindered deep into the USSR on the right wing of the Western Front.

As a result, I had to spend Kalinin defensive operation (October 10 - December 4, 1941). Active actions of the commander of the Western Front, General Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, who replaced Ivan Stepanovich Konev, the creation of a special group of forces as part of the troops of the left wing of the Western Front and the operational group of the North-Western Front under the command of N.F. Vatutin, and then the Kalinin Front for action on the Kalinin direction prevented the catastrophe. Although Kalinin himself had to give up on October 14th. By October 16, Soviet troops withdrew fought across the Volga River and fortified on the Selizharovo-Staritsa line. With the capture of the city of Kalinin, the Wehrmacht was able to develop an offensive bypassing Moscow from the north and north-east, as well as to the rear of the North-Western Front. On October 17, an order was given to form the Kalinin Front from 4 armies: 22, 29, 30, 31 and a number of separate units. The Germans, and in this direction the 9th Army and the 3rd Panzer Group were advancing, and had superiority in manpower and equipment (in the infantry - 1.9 times, tanks - 3.5, guns - 3.3, machine guns - 3.2 times), they could not develop the offensive.

For several days there was a battle for the city of Kalinin. Parts of the 256th rifle division General SG Goryachev and the Kalinin detachment of the people's militia under the command of Senior Lieutenant Dolgoruk held the north-western part of the city. NF Vatutin's operational group repulsed an attempt by the 41st Motorized Corps of the 3rd Panzer Group to break through to the rear of the North-Western Front. We repulsed the blow in the Torzhok direction. After continuous and bloody battles, which, although they did not bring significant territorial successes to the Red Army, the Wehrmacht units were exhausted and suffered significant losses in people and equipment. The Kalinin Front with active defense and constant counterattacks pinned down 13 enemy divisions and did not allow them to be transferred to the Moscow sector, where the decisive battle was going on. By December 4, the front's troops were firmly entrenched on the line east of Selizharov, north of Martynov, west, north and east of Kalinin, the left bank of the Volga, the Volga reservoir. The Kalinin Front occupied an enveloping position in relation to the northern flank of Army Group Center, which was advantageous for launching a counteroffensive.

Preparing an offensive

In the course of planning a general offensive near Moscow, it was decided to strike at the Kalinin Front. On December 1, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General A.M. Vasilevsky informed the commander of the Kalinin Front, Colonel-General I.S.

On December 1, 1941, the balance of forces in this sector of the Soviet-German front was as follows: the Soviet forces were opposed by the 9th German army under the command of Colonel General Adolf Strauss, consisting of 12 infantry divisions, the 1st security division and the 1st cavalry brigade of troops "SS". Its number was about 153 thousand people, the Germans had about 2200 units of guns and mortars, and 60 tanks. There were about 200 thousand people in the Kalinin Front, about 1000 guns and mortars, 17 tanks. The ratio in manpower was 1.5: 1 in our favor, in terms of guns and mortars we were inferior - 1: 2.2, in tanks - 1: 3.5.

On December 1, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command (SVGK) issued a directive on the offensive actions of the front. The headquarters ordered to create within the next 2-3 days a shock group of at least 5-6 divisions and strike from the front Kalinin, Sudimirka in the direction of Mikulino Gorodishche and Turginovo. The strike group was supposed to go to the rear of the Klin group of the Wehrmacht and thereby contribute to its destruction by the troops of the Western Front.

On the morning of December 1, Lieutenant General A.M. Vasilevsky arrived at the front to clarify the situation. It turned out that I. S. Konev, given his limited manpower and resources, decided instead of an operation with a decisive goal, which included a victory over the right wing of Army Group Center in cooperation with the Western Front, to conduct a local operation to liberate the city of Kalinin. A.M. Vasilevsky was able to convince the front commander that the plan of the Headquarters was real. Konev only asked to strengthen the front.

By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the forces of the Kalinin Front were regrouped. The 31st Army under the command of Major General V.A.Yushkevich gave up a significant part of the front line (including the city of Kalinin) to the 29th Army. All units of the 31st Army were concentrated in a 30-kilometer strip - from Kalinin to Sudimirok. On December 2, 1941, the front commander Konev, in accordance with the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters, gave the troops a combat order. The front was to deliver two blows. The first by the forces of the 31st Army from the east and southeast of Kalinin. The second formations of the 29th Army under the command of Lieutenant General II Maslennikov bypassing Kalinin from the west. The 29th Army was also supposed to defend the Torzhok direction.

The offensive operation was planned to be carried out in 2 stages. At the first stage, the formations of the 29th and 31st armies, on the first day of the offensive, were to break through the German defenses and capture Kalinin. Then the advancing troops of the armies had to reach the line: Danilovskoe, Negotino, Stary Pogost, Kozlov. At the second stage, the troops of the front were to develop their success in the southern direction and reach the line of the Shoshi River with a strike group.

The commander of the 31st Army, Major General V.A.Yushkevich, decided to deliver the main blow in the 6-kilometer sector with subunits of the 119th (Major General A.D. Berezin) and 250th (Colonel P.A. Stepanenko) rifle divisions in the direction of Stary Pogost, Pushkino. For the development of the breakthrough, the reserve of the 31st Army was the 262nd Rifle Division (Colonel M.S.Tereshchenko). At the same time, in order to divert the attention of the German command, it was planned to carry out two auxiliary attacks: the 256th rifle division attacked Bolshiye Peremerki with its right flank, and the 5th rifle division beat on Smolino Gorodishche. Thus, the 31st army of Yushkevich, having rather limited forces - the army did not receive new divisions in its composition and led the offensive with the formations that had thinned out in previous battles, inflicted not one blow, but three. In addition, it was not possible to suppress the German defense with strong artillery fire: the density of artillery in the direction of the main attack of the 31st Army was only 45 units per 1 km of the front.

Within a very short period of time, the front carried out a fairly significant regrouping of forces. All troop movements were carried out at night, with careful camouflage. The Germans, apparently, were so confident in their power that they overlooked the preparation of the front for a counteroffensive, and, as the prisoners later told, the Soviet offensive was completely unexpected for them.

The Germans had a fairly solid defense; a chain of trenches and long-term protected firing points stretched along the Volga. In some places, the river bank was abruptly cut off and watered with water. Therefore, it was almost impossible to climb under enemy fire on a slope covered with ice. The Germans turned the villages in the front line and in the depths of their defenses into strong strongholds, and the stone and most powerful wooden buildings- in long-term firing points with circular fire. The gaps between the strongholds were covered with minefields and two or three lines of barbed wire. In the city of Kalinin itself, the enemy created a continuous line of defense from trenches, bunkers and dugouts.

Due to the fact that the 262nd Rifle Division did not have time to reach its initial positions and the rear did not have time to catch up, the beginning of the front offensive was changed and postponed from 4 to 5 December 1941.

Adolf Strauss (right) Commander of the 9th Army

Offensive

On December 5, the armies of the Kalinin Front launched a counteroffensive. Following them, on the morning of December 6, the shock groupings of the Western Front and the right wing of the Southwestern Front went over to the offensive. Fierce battles unfolded on a front of more than 1000 km (from Kalinin to Yelets).

At 3 am on December 5, assault battalions of the divisions of the strike group of the 31st Army moved across the ice to the right bank of the Volga in order to capture bridgeheads in the settlements of Peremerka, Gorokhov, Staro-Semenovskoye and thereby ensure the overcoming of the water line by the main forces of the army. Battalions of the 119th and 5th rifle divisions by 10 o'clock captured bridgeheads at Gorokhov and Staro-Semenovsky.

At 13 o'clock, after a 45-minute artillery barrage and air strikes, the main forces of the army went on the offensive. From the very beginning, the battle became fierce. The rifle companies, which were advancing virtually without the support of armored vehicles, were able to overcome the Volga in one throw, but on the other side they came under heavy enemy fire. But, despite the deadly fire of the Germans, the Red Army men boldly rushed to capture the settlements of Gorokhove, Gubino, Emmaus, Staraya Vedernya, Aleksino. Grenades were used, and it came to hand-to-hand fights, when they used bayonets, butts, knives. In fierce battles, by the end of December 5, the formations of the 31st Army were able to break through the first line of defense of the 9th German Army, and cut the Moscow-Kalinin highway. Soviet troops advanced 4–5 km forward, advanced units came close to the October railway. In just the first day of the fighting, 15 settlements were captured. But the troops of the 31st Army could not fully fulfill the task set by the front commander.

At 11 o'clock on December 5, in the general direction of Danilovskoye, units of the 29th Army of Lieutenant General II Maslennikov went on the attack. The troops of the 246th (Major General I.I.Melnikov) and 252nd (Colonel A.A.Zabaluev) rifle divisions crossed the Volga by 14 o'clock and entered the Krasnovo-Migalovo road. The 243rd Infantry Division (Major General V.S. Polenov) reached the northern outskirts of the city, meeting strong resistance from the Germans. The divisions could not do more. The Wehrmacht, fearing for its rear, put up fierce resistance to units of the 29th Army, constantly going over to counterattacks. Therefore, the formations of the 246th and 252nd rifle divisions were forced to withdraw to the left bank of the Volga. And even by the end of the fifth day, the battles actually remained at the same line from which they began the offensive. The 243rd Infantry Division received an order not to get involved in heavy street battles in the city of Kalinin and to limit itself only to reconnaissance in battle and conducting artillery and mortar fire at the defensive positions of the Germans.

The offensive of the 31st Army almost failed. On December 6-7, units of the army fought fierce battles on the lines they had reached. Already on the night of December 5-6, the German command transferred significant reserves to the breakthrough site and in the morning the Nazis launched strong counterattacks, as a result the Germans managed to recapture the settlements of Myatlevo, Oshchurkovo, Emmaus. And the formations of the 250th rifle division, which achieved the greatest success on December 5, were forced to withdraw to the left bank of the Volga. The main reason for this failure was the mistakes of the commanders and the lack of reliable communications in the division. On the morning of December 6, one of the battalions of the 922nd Infantry Regiment was deployed to repel the attack of the German group, which threatened the flank of the neighboring 5th Division. The 916th and 918th regiments considered that this was a departure from Kuzminsky, wavered and began to withdraw. The panic began. The Wehrmacht command took advantage of this oversight and threw its formations into a counterattack. Control was lost in our retreating regiments. An unorganized mass retreat led to significant losses (about 1.5 thousand people killed, wounded and missing). The command of the division lost control of the situation.

To restore the situation, the commander of the 31st Army brought into battle on the afternoon of December 6 a reserve - the 262nd Rifle Division. The command of the retreating regiments was punished: a military tribunal sentenced the commander and commissar of the 918th regiment, the commissar of the 916th regiment to be shot, and the commander of the 916th regiment to 10 years in prison for unauthorized withdrawal from their positions.

With the help of the 57th pontoon-bridge battalion, two pontoon crossings were created near the village of Orshino, they were laid directly on the ice, since due to severe frosts it was impossible to organize a ferry crossing. All day on December 6, stubborn battles were going on for crossings across the river. With the help of aviation, the Germans managed to destroy the crossing at Orshino, but at Podduby, on the night of December 6-7, they were able to transport part of the RVGK artillery and 6 T-34 tanks to the captured bridgehead.

On December 7, after a 15-minute artillery barrage, the offensive was continued. After a fierce battle, the forces of the 31st Army again occupied Emmaus, which was an important stronghold on the Moscow-Kalinin highway. And on December 8, Soviet troops went to railroad Wedge - Kalinin and recaptured the Chupriyanovka railway station. On the right flank of the army, units of the 256th Infantry Division also entered the railway.

It should be noted that from the very beginning of the offensive there was a severe frost - 30–33 °. And in the morning of the 8th, heavy snow began to fall, which brought all the paths and roads. If the field guns could move because a sled had been prepared for them in advance, then the vehicles got stuck. And the formations had to deliver ammunition, fuel, food, fodder. In this regard, the local population was of great help, which provided support with horses and sledges. The German command, given the weather conditions that hampered the room for maneuver, concentrated all its forces on the defense of settlements, which had been turned into fortified areas in advance.

On December 9, the forces of the 31st Army on their right flank captured the Koltsovo stronghold. Kuzminskoye was liberated in the central direction. By the end of the day, the 256th Infantry Division cut the Turginovo-Kalinin highway 1.5 km east of Mozzharin. For 5 days of heavy offensive battles, the army's troops advanced 10-12 km and practically broke through the entire tactical defense zone of the German army.

But it cannot be said that everything was going well - units of the 29th Army were unable to liberate Kalinin. The 31st Army, reinforced by one rifle and 1st cavalry divisions, advanced slowly. The German command understood that the rapid movement of parts of the Kalinin Front in the southwestern direction could eventually lead to disaster for its 3rd and 4th tank groups, which at that time were retreating under pressure from the forces of the Western Front. Therefore, the 129th Infantry Division was transferred under Kalinin, which was removed from the Moscow direction, as well as the 110th and 251st Infantry Divisions (they acted against the troops of the right wing of the front).

Order of the VKG Headquarters, strengthening the front

In connection with the slow movement of the troops of the Kalinin Front, the Supreme Command Headquarters ordered to turn part of the 31st Army formations around Kalinin from the southeast and, in cooperation with the 29th Army, immediately recapture the city, and the rest of the 31st Army forces to develop an offensive to the southwest and, together with units of the Western Front, defeat the enemy.

The liberation of the city made it possible to free the forces associated in this area and send them to strike in the rear of the Wehrmacht grouping retreating from the capital. In addition, this step made it possible to resume railway communication on the Moscow - Bologoye - Malaya Vishera section, which was of strategic importance.

Taking into account the large role of the units of the Kalinin Front in the further development of the offensive operation near Moscow, the Supreme Command Headquarters took significant measures to strengthen it. To strengthen the front, the 359th and 375th rifle divisions were transferred. Parts of these divisions on December 12 began to arrive at the Kulitskaya railway station (15 km north-west of Kalinin). At the same time, the Supreme Command Headquarters informed Konev about the transfer of the 39th Army (consisting of 6 rifle and 2 cavalry divisions) to the Kalinin Front to enter into battle on the Rzhev or Staritsa directions.

Further battles. Liberation of Kalinin

To complete the encirclement of the Germans, the commander of the 31st Army created a shock group. It included the 250th and 247th divisions, 2 regiments of the 119th rifle division, 2 tank battalions, 2 artillery regiments of the RGK (reserve of the main command) and other units. But she could not strike right away - during December 13, the strike group had to repel strong counter-attacks by the Germans at the previous line. Up to 6 German battalions with four tanks broke through to the rear of the 247th Infantry Division and attacked its headquarters. The divisional commander was wounded. As a result, the control of the units was lost for some time. The army headquarters regained control, and the German battalions that had broken through were destroyed.

By the end of December 14, for the third time during the offensive, units of the 246th Infantry Division of the 29th Army were repulsed from the Germans locality Krasnovo. The 31st Army developed an offensive, the Volokolamskoe highway was cut. In the center and on the left flank of the army, Soviet troops also successfully advanced. The 262nd Rifle Division, repelling up to six German counterattacks, by the end of the day captured the strong fortified points Baksheevo and Stary Pogost. The 5th Infantry Division entered the line: Trunovo, Megevo. The 46th Cavalry Division was moved to the Trunov area for a raid on the German rear. To build up the offensive of the army, the 359th Infantry Division was transferred.

After the formations of the 31st Army cut the Volokolamskoe highway, the fate of the Kalinin group of the Wehrmacht was decided. The German troops had only one escape route: Kalinin - Staritsa. In addition, the withdrawal of the troops of the 30th Army of the Western Front to the line of the Lama River created a great threat to the rear of the 9th German army. Therefore, realizing that the city could not be defended, the Germans began to prepare to retreat - in the evening of the 15th, arson began, on the night of the 16th, the Germans destroyed the highway and railway bridges across the Volga.

Breaking the resistance of the rear units of the Nazis, the formations of the 243rd rifle division of the 29th army liberated the northern part of Kalinin by 3 o'clock on December 16, and by 9 o'clock they made their way to the area of ​​the railway station. By 13 o'clock the city was completely liberated from the Germans.

Results of the first stage of the operation

During 12 days of offensive battles, the forces of the left flank of the Kalinin Front defeated 5 Wehrmacht infantry divisions, which accounted for almost half of all the troops of the German 9th Field Army. During the period from 5 to 16 December, the formations of the Kalinin Front destroyed more than 7 thousand German soldiers and officers. 14 tanks, 200 vehicles, 150 guns and mortars were captured.

Kalinin suffered heavy destruction, the Germans destroyed 70 factories, factories and workshops, the best city buildings were destroyed or burned: regional and city councils, regional and city party committee, drama theater, theater for young spectators, cinemas, 50 schools, 7.7 thousand residential buildings , more than a hundred shops, 25 canteens. Power plants and a railway junction, water supply and sewerage systems, tram lines, telephone communications, etc. received significant damage.

The victory at Kalinin was a major operational success for the Red Army. This success ensured the movement of the troops of the right wing of the Western Front. More favorable conditions were created for the continuation of the offensive operation of the Kalinin Front in the southwestern direction. The formations of the left flank of the front made their way forward 10 - 22 km. The advance of the front was relatively slow. The reasons for this were quite understandable: the almost complete absence of armored vehicles (especially at the beginning of the offensive), a lack of artillery, ammunition, transport and other means of logistical support for troops. The formations of the advancing armies were not replenished before the offensive and were reinforced with fresh units. There were also shortcomings in troop command and control and in the field of communications. During the offensive of the armies of the Kalinin Front, the interaction of formations was disrupted, the setting of tasks often exceeded the potential capabilities of the divisions, frontal attacks were used against strong points and fortified positions of the Germans, instead of bypassing and blocking them. We must also take into account the fierce resistance of the 9th German army.

Completion of the Kalinin offensive operation

By the end of December 16, the formations of the left flank of the Kalinin Front reached the line: Motavino - Kurkovo - Maslovo - Boldyrevo.

The further development of the offensive took place in conditions of fierce resistance from the Nazis and a harsh winter, with a general lack of military equipment and transport among the Soviet troops. The Kalinin Front did not have large tank and motorized formations that could build on the success, enter the operational space, crush the German army to a great depth and quickly complete their encirclement, and then the elimination of its groupings. The offensive of the Soviet units was of a frontal nature; shock groups were not created everywhere. The pace of movement of the front's troops was low. The German command managed to withdraw most of the troops.

After the liberation of Kalinin, the front was given the task of continuing the vigorous pursuit of the Nazis in the direction of Staritsa, getting on the path of the withdrawal of the Kalinin group of the Wehrmacht, encircling and eliminating it.

Fulfilling this task, the troops of the Kalinin Front (and it was reinforced with the 30th Army from the Western Front and the 39th Army from the Supreme Command Headquarters reserve), on January 1, 1942, overcoming stubborn German resistance, liberated Staritsa, the regional center of the Kalinin region. Then the Soviet troops reached the approaches to Rzhev and Zubtsov and by January 7 they occupied advantageous lines in relation to the Rzhev group of the Wehrmacht. So the Kalinin offensive operation was completed.

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Operations department of the headquarters front.TsAMO: fund 213 inventory 2002

List of maps and documents:

1.0032 - Map of the position of the front troops from 17.10 to 21.10.1941

2.0033 - Map of the position of the front troops for the period from 21.10 to 26.10.1941

3.0034 - Map of the position of the front troops for the period from 10/27 to 10/31/1941

4.0036 - Map of the position of the front troops for the period from 01.11 to 05.11.1941

5.0037 - Map of the position of the front troops for the period from 06.11 to 10.11.1941

6.0038 - Map of the position of the front troops for the period from 11.11 to 15.11.1941

7.0039 - Map of the position of the front troops for the period from 16.11 to 20.11.1941

8.0040 - Map of the position of the front troops for the period from 21.11 to 25.11.1941

9.0041 - Map of the position of the front troops for the period from 26.11 to 30.11.1941

10.0043 - Map - plan of the front of 12/15/1941 for the development of the Kalinin offensive operation in connection with the strengthening of the front 39A

11.0044 - Map - plan of the front of 12/16/1941 for the encirclement of the grouping of the pr-ka in the Staritsa-Gorki district and the position of the troops by the end of December 16

12.0045 - Map - plan of the front of 12/21/1941 for the completion of the operation to destroy the Rzhev group of the pr-ka and liberate the city of Rzhev

13.0047 - Map - the decision of the front commander of 12/30/1941 on the offensive of the troops

14.0048 - Map - a diagram of the military operations of the front troops in the Kalinin region during the period from 5 to 9 December 1941.

15.0049 - Map of the position of the front troops for the period from 01.12 to 05.12.1941

16.0050 - Map of the position of the front troops for the period from 06.12 to 10.12.1941

17.0051 - Map of the position of the front troops for the period from 11 to 15.12.1941

18.0052 - Map of the position of the front troops for the period from 161 to 20.12.1941

19.0053 - Map of the position of the front forces for the period from 21 to 25.12.1941

20.0054 - Map of the position of the front forces for the period from 26 to 31.12.1941

Kalinin front It was formed on October 19, 1941 in the western direction on the basis of the Supreme Command Headquarters directive of October 17, 1941 from the troops of the right wing of the Western Front (22, 29, 30 and 31 armies), covering Moscow from the north-west. Later, the 20, 31, 39, 41, 43, 58, 3rd and 4th shock, 3rd air armies were part of the Kalinin Front.

In the fall of 1941, the troops of the front carried out the Kalinin defensive operation, which was an integral part of the Moscow strategic defensive operation, and during the offensive near Moscow in 1941-1942. - Kalinin operation, released Kalinin (December 16).

In the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation of 1942, carried out together with the Western Front, the troops of the Kalinin Front went to the rear of the Rzhev-Sychevsk enemy grouping.

From January 22, the troops of the right wing of the front took part in the Toropetsko-Kholmsk operation. In the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation, the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front broke through the previously prepared deeply echeloned enemy defenses near Rzhev, eliminated the enemy bridgehead on the left bank of the Volga in the Rzhev region and, together with the troops of the right wing of the Western Front, pinned down large forces of Army Group Center, thereby disrupting the transfer of its troops to Stalingrad.

During the Velikie Luki operation of 1942-1943. the troops of the Kalinin Front broke through the enemy defenses and liberated Velikiye Luki (January 17).

In the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation of 1943, the troops of the Kalinin Front, together with the troops of the Western Front, advanced 130-160 km, liberated Bely (March 10). The operation began on January 8 with a breakthrough of the 39th A of the enemy's defense west of Rzhev (see Sychevsko-Vyazmskaya operation 1942). On January 9, the 3rd and 4th Shock A North-West went over to the offensive. front (see Toropetsko-Kholmskaya operation 1942). On January 22, these armies were transferred to Kalin, the front. To the end. In January, front troops reached the approaches to Vitebsk, Smolensk, and Yartsev, deeply engulfing Army Group Center from the northwest, and also broke through to Vyazma and surrounded about 7 enemy divisions in the Olenino region. Troops lion. the wings of the Western Front (43rd, 49th and 50th A) by January 10 bypassed the Yukhnovskaya grouping of the enemy from the North and South, which allowed the 33rd A north of Yukhnov, and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps south of him to break through to the rear enemy, develop a blow to Vyazma. 10th A reached the approaches to the cities of Kirov and Lodinovo. On January 10-20, the troops are right. front wings (1st Shock, 20th, 16th and 5th A, 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps) broke through the enemy's defenses and liberated Lotoshino, Shakhovskaya and Mozhaisk. On January 16-22 and 27, the first airborne assault forces landed in the Vyazma region. On February 1, the forward units of the 33rd A engaged in battles for Vyazma, and on February 2, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps broke through to the city from the southwest. To prevent the defeat of Army Group Center, the enemy hastily deployed 12 divisions and 2 brigades from Western Europe, struck several counterattacks on the troops of the 33rd A and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, and on February 2 - 3 cut their communications north and south of Yukhnov ... Formations of the 43rd, 49th and 50th A by the beginning of March defeated the Yukhnov grouping of the enemy and liberated Yukhnov, but could not restore communication with the 33rd A. Subsequent attempts to break the resistance of Mgraga, undertaken by the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts, were unsuccessful. In connection with the weakening, they will attack. opportunities and the beginning of the spring thaw, these fronts on April 20, by order of the Headquarters, went on the defensive. Troops fighting behind the front line were ordered to link up with the main forces. Thus, owls. the command was not able to fully implement its plan, which means that the extent was due to the lack of forces (mainly tank and mech. formations). As a result, R.-V.o. the troops of the North-Western, Kalinin, and Western, fronts threw back the enemy in the western direction by 80 - 250 km, completed the liberation of the Moscow and Tula regions, liberated a number of districts of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions. , inflicted a heavy defeat on Army Group Center (16 divisions and 1 brigade were put out of action, from January 1 to March 30 the enemy lost over 330 thousand people).

In the 1943 Nevelskoy operation. Front troops liberated Nevel (October 6) and in October reached the eastern borders of Belarus.

On October 20, 1943, on the basis of the order of the Supreme Command Headquarters of October 16, 1943, the Kalinin Front was renamed the 1st Baltic Front .......

The fighting in the Kalinin direction in the fall and winter of 1941, being an integral part of the great battle for Moscow, had a huge impact on its outcome.

The Kalinin operational direction as part of the Moscow strategic direction was formed on October 7, when at a meeting of the German command in the city of Orsha it was decided to change the direction of actions of the 3rd Panzer Group and the 9th Army. The goals that were to be achieved at the same time: to dismember the troops of the Western Front, to encircle and eliminate the armies located on the right flank of the Western Front (22nd, 29th, 30th, 31st), and thereby organize the gap between troops of the North-Western and Western Fronts, as well as to go from the north to Moscow and get the opportunity to enter the rear of the troops of the North-Western Front. All this would greatly complicate the general situation near Leningrad.

The initial successes of the German troops in the Kalinin direction are due to the presence of a gap up to 80 km wide in the defense of the Western Front (on the Sychevka - Gzhatsk line), which was formed as a result of the transfer of the 49th army near Kaluga from October 5, as well as the high mobility of German tank and motorized formations , which allowed them to make such a deep breakthrough in a short time.

By October 10, the troops of the right wing (22nd, 29th and 31st armies) of the Western Front withdrew to the Peno Lake - east of Nelidov - Sychevka line. On the same day, the German 3rd Panzer Group and the 9th Army launched an offensive against Kalinin and, despite the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, entered the city on October 14. At the same time, the 5th and 256th rifle divisions and the Kalinin detachment of the people's militia, transferred by the decision of the General Staff, withdrew fierce resistance to the outskirts of the city.

An attempt by German troops on October 16 to develop an offensive on Torzhok and break through to the flank and rear of the North-Western Front by the forces of the 41st Mechanized Corps was suppressed, the troops were cut off and largely destroyed by the forces of the operational group of General N.F. Vatutin.

On October 17, under the command of Colonel-General I.S.Konev, the Kalinin Front was created on the basis of the troops of the right wing of the Western Front (22nd, 29th, 30th and 31st armies), which, in addition to four armies, included the 183rd , 185th, 246th rifle divisions, 46th and 54th cavalry divisions, 46th motorcycle regiment, 8th and 21st tank brigades of the North-Western Front. Nevertheless, the German troops had a numerical superiority in the infantry by 1.9 times, in tanks by 3.5 times, in guns by 3.3 times, in machine guns by 3.2 times.

To build up efforts in the Kalinin direction, the enemy deployed the 9th Army in the northern direction to solve the following tasks: to destroy the troops of the Kalinin Front in the Staritsa - Rzhev - Zubtsov area, then to develop an offensive in the general direction to Vyshny Volochek, and with the right flank to the Kalinin area. Subsequently, the 3rd Panzer Group was to strike in the direction of Vyshniy Volochek and, in cooperation with the 9th Army, cut off the withdrawal routes of the main forces of the Kalinin and North-Western Fronts.

During October 22-24, the 29th army transported its strike grouping of the 246th and 119th rifle divisions to the right bank of the Volga, which in the following days, overcoming enemy resistance, slowly moved towards the village of Danilovskoye. This group and the 46th Cavalry Division of the 29th Army, which crossed the Volga on October 26, created a bridgehead on the right bank, cut the Staritsa-Kalinin highway, disrupting one of the important communications of German troops. But all attempts of the 29th Army to connect with the 31st Army and completely encircle the enemy's Kalinin grouping failed.

On October 24, the 9th German army with two motorized divisions of the 56th mechanized corps began an offensive from the Rzhev-Staritsa line to Torzhok. But they could not overcome the resistance of the 22nd and 29th armies, at the end of October they were stopped at the boundary of the Bolshaya Kosh and T'ma rivers and went over to the defensive at the achieved lines.

Front troops, supported by aviation, attacked the Germans daily in the Kalinin area. As a result of these actions, on October 23, von Bock's directive was followed to suspend the offensive through Kalinin. Thus, the energetic strikes in the Kalinin area, although they did not lead to the capture of the city, but thwarted the fulfillment of the main task for which the 3rd Panzer Group was deployed from Moscow to the north.

Since the beginning of November, the front in the Kalinin direction has stabilized at the line Selizharovo - the Bolshaya Kosh river - the T'ma river - the northern and eastern outskirts of the city of Kalinin - the western coast of the Volga reservoir. Offensive actions of the troops of both sides in the defense zone of the Kalinin Front in November had no territorial success. The attack on the flank and rear of the North-Western Front, envisaged by the enemy's plan, was thwarted, and the participation of the 9th Army in the offensive on Moscow was ruled out.

Soviet troops with active defense and offensive actions undertaken at the end of November pinned down 13 infantry divisions of Army Group Center, not allowing them to be transferred to Moscow, where decisive battles unfolded. The troops of the Kalinin Front, occupying an enveloping position in relation to the northern flank of Army Group Center, thwarted the attempts of German troops to break through to the Torzhok - Vyshny Volochek line in order to encircle the troops of the Western and Northwestern Fronts.

However, in the command and control of the troops on the part of the command and headquarters of the Kalinin Front, mistakes were made in assessing the capabilities of the enemy and their troops. This led to the failure of the front forces to fulfill the plan of the main command. The front did not manage to encircle the enemy grouping in Kalinin in October, nor to cover the Moscow direction in mid-November 1941.

In the second period of hostilities in the Kalinin direction (December 5, 1941 - January 7, 1942), the troops of the Kalinin front, occupying an advantageous flank position in relation to the main forces of the German troops in the Moscow direction, carried out the Kalinin offensive operation. This operation is part of a strategic counteroffensive near Moscow.

On December 1, 1941, an order was received for the troops of the Kalinin Front, according to which the 31st Army, reinforced with rifle divisions and regiments of heavy artillery, regrouped for an offensive on Kalinin.

On December 5-20, the troops of the Kalinin Front launched an offensive in the Kalinin region and defended themselves in the remaining sectors of the front. The offensive of the troops on December 5, 1941, east and west of Kalinin, marked the beginning of a general counteroffensive near Moscow. When parts of the 31st army reached the Volokolamskoe highway, and units of the 29th army intensified their attempts to break through to the Kalinin-Staritsa road, the threat of encirclement arose over the German group in Kalinin and the German command decided to leave the city. Overcoming the resistance of the enemy rearguards, on December 16, 1941, units of the 243rd Infantry Division of the 29th Army liberated the northern and central part of the city, units of the 256th entered the city from the southeast, and units of the 250th Infantry Division approached the city from the south. divisions of the 31st army.

During the fighting on December 21 - January 7, the troops of the Kalinin Front threw the enemy back to the Vysokoye - Ivanishi - Lotoshino line, broke through the enemy's defenses on a wide front from Chernogubovo to Volkovo and, pursuing enemy troops in the direction of Rzhev, approached the Rzhev defensive line, breaking the Volga across the ice on the Solomino - Gnezdovo section and seizing a bridgehead on the right bank of the river.

On December 22, the 39th Army was transferred to the Kalinin Front from the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters. Fighting intense battles, the troops of the Kalinin Front reached the line 4 km east of Yelets - the left bank of the Volga northwest of Rzhev by January 7, where they were stopped. As a result of the operation, the forces of the front inflicted a serious defeat on the 9th Army and advanced 60-120 km. As a result of the liberation of the city of Kalinin, a direct connection was restored between the Western and North-Western strategic directions and interaction of the Kalinin, Western and North-Western fronts was ensured.

Kalinin front formed on October 19, 1941 in the western direction of the Soviet-German front on the basis of a directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters of October 17, 1941 from the troops of the right flank of the Western Front (22, 29, 30 and 31 armies), covering Moscow from the north west. Subsequently, the Kalinin Front included the 3rd and 4th shock troops, the 20th, 31st, 39, 41, 43rd and 58th armies, and the 3rd air army.

October 10 - December 4, 1941, the troops of the front carried out the Kalinin defensive operation, which was an integral part of the Moscow strategic defensive operation (September 30 - December 5, 1941). During the offensive near Moscow (December 5, 1941 - April 20, 1942), they carried out the Kalinin operation (December 5, 1941 - January 7, 1942), liberated Kalinin (December 16).

In the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation (January 8 - April 20, 1942), carried out together with the Western Front, the troops of the Kalinin Front went to the rear of the Rzhev-Sychevsk enemy grouping.

From January 22, 1942, the troops of the right wing of the front took part in the Toropetsko-Kholmsk operation (January 9 - February 6, 1942).

In the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation (July 30 - August 23, 1942), the troops of the left wing of the front broke through the previously prepared in-depth enemy defenses near Rzhev.

In the course of the further offensive, they eliminated the enemy bridgehead on the left bank of the Volga in the Rzhev region and together with the troops of the right wing of the Western Front pinned down large forces of the German Army Group Center, thereby disrupting the transfer of its troops to Stalingrad.

During the Velikiye Luki operation (November 24, 1942 - January 20, 1943), the front troops broke through the enemy's defenses and liberated Velikiye Luki (January 17).

In the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation of 1943, the troops of the front, together with the troops of the Western Front, advanced 130-160 km, liberated the city of Bely (March 10).

Taking part in the Smolensk operation of 1943 (August 7 - October 2), the troops of the Kalinin Front on September 14 - October 2 conducted the Dukhovshchinsk-Demidov operation, as a result of which Dukhovshchina was liberated (September 19), Demidov (September 22), Rudnya (September 29) ...

During the Nevel operation (October 6-10, 1943), the front troops liberated Nevel (October 6) and in October reached the eastern borders of Belarus.

On October 20, 1943, on the basis of the order of the Supreme Command Headquarters dated October 16, 1943, the Kalinin Front was renamed to.

Front commanders: Colonel-General Konev I.S. (October 1941 - August 1942); Lieutenant General, since November 1942 - Colonel General Purkaev M.A. (August 1942 - April 1943); Colonel General, since August 1943 - General of the Army A.I. Eremenko (April-October 1943)

Member of the Front Military Council - corps commissar, since December 1942 - Lieutenant General Leonov D.S. (October 1941 - October 1943)

Chiefs of staff of the front: Major General Ivanov I. I. (October-November 1941); Major General Zhuravlev E.P. (November 1941), Colonel A. Katsnelson (November-December 1941); Major General, from May 1942 - Lieutenant General M.V. Zakharov (January 1942 - April 1943); Lieutenant General Kurasov V.V. (April-October 1943)

In Turginov, the brigade was again reassigned to the 30th Army by order of the commander of the Western Front, the commander of which clarified its task. It consisted in the fact that, moving along the Volokolamskoe highway, destroy the enemy's reserves in the area of ​​the villages of Krivtsovo, Nikulino, Mamulino and, together with units of the 5th rifle division, capture Kalinin.

On the morning of October 17, the brigade's tank regiment of 27 T-34 tanks and eight T-60 tanks headed for Kalinin. The tankers met stubborn resistance from the enemy in Efremov and Pushkin. Along the entire route from Pushkin to Kalinin, tanks were subjected to continuous bombardment from the air, and when approaching Troyanov and Kalinin, they were met by powerful anti-tank gun fire. Only eight tanks managed to reach the southern outskirts of Kalinin, and only one T-34 tank (commanded by senior sergeant S. Kh. Gorobets) broke into the city and made a heroic raid on it. The rest of the surviving tanks entered the Pokrovskoye area on the Turginovskoye highway.

The brigade inflicted some damage on the enemy, sowed panic. But the task assigned to the brigade turned out to be impossible. In the Kalinin area, the Germans had two tank divisions, one motorized division and one motorized brigade. Our tank regiment was thrown into battle without infantry support or air cover. The territory captured by the tankers was not consolidated by the infantry. In addition, the brigade's offensive was not supported by the active actions of other formations of the 30th army. The operational summary of the army headquarters at 17.00 on October 17 indicated that the 5th rifle division was still regrouping its forces during the day. In this battle, the brigade lost 11 T-34 tanks and 35 people killed and wounded. The commander of the regiment, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major M. A. Lukin, and the commander of the tank battalion, Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain M. P. Agibalov, were killed.

Attaching the utmost importance to the Kalinin operational direction, the Supreme Command Headquarters on October 17 decides to create the Kalinin Front.

RATE DIRECTIVE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KALININSKY FRONT
Commander of the North-Western, Western Fronts
Deputy Commander of the Western Front, Comrade KONEVU
October 17, 41, 18:00 30 minutes.
For the convenience of commanding the forces of the Kalinin sector, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:
1. The troops operating in the Ostashkovsky, Rzhevsky directions and in the Kalinin area should be assigned to an independent Kalinin Front with direct subordination to it to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
2. Include 22, 29 and 30 A Zap in the composition of the troops of the Kalinin Front. fr., 183, 185 and 246 rifle divisions, 46 and 54 cd, 46 motorcycle regiment and 8 tank brigades North-West. front.
3. To appoint Colonel-General Konev as the commander of the Kalinin Front. To reinforce the front headquarters to turn the headquarters of the 10th army. The front headquarters should be deployed in the Bezhetsk area.
4. Expansion lines: from the North-West. fr. - Poshekhonye - Volodarsk, st. Ostolopovo, Art. Academic, lake. Istochino, everything for the Kalinin Front inclusive; with Zap. front - Art. Berendeevo, st. Verbilki, Art. Reshetnikov, Art. Knyazhye Gory, Sychevka, everything for Zap. fr. inclusive.
5. The next task of the front is to clear the Kalinin area of ​​enemy troops and eliminate, in cooperation with the West and North-West. fronts of the enemy's attempts to bypass Moscow from the north.
Headquarters of the Supreme Command
Stalin
Vasilevsky

In total, the front consisted of 16 rifle and two cavalry divisions, one motorized rifle and two tank brigades. The front's troops operated in a strip of 220 km. By October 17, the superiority in forces was on the side of the enemy: in infantry - by 1.9 times, by tanks - by 2.8 times, by guns - by 3.3 times, by machine guns - by 3.2 times.

The creation of the Kalinin Front was timely and responded to the prevailing situation. This made it possible to reliably strengthen the central sector of our strategic front, firmly linking it with the northwestern direction.

The Kalinin Front did not receive aviation. The aviation support requests were to be fulfilled by the aviation of the North-Western Front. Significant difficulties arose due to the fact that at first the front did not have its own rear. In this extremely difficult situation, the local Soviet and party organs, and above all the regional party committee, headed by First Secretary IP Boytsov, rendered tremendous assistance to the front troops.

Simultaneously with the creation of the Kalinin Front, it was decided to restore the field control of the 31st Army to unite the command and control of the troops operating in the Torzhok and Kalinin axes. Major General V.A.Yushkevich was appointed commander of the army. It included the formations of the operational group of General Vatutin, as well as the 119th and 133rd rifle divisions. However, in the following days, part of the task force's formations was transferred to the 29th and 30th armies and withdrawn to the front reserve.

In this regard, it should be noted that the command of the Kalinin Front made a mistake in disbanding General Vatutin's operational group at a crucial moment in the defensive operation. It was a real impact force of five compounds. The transfer of these formations to the armies violated the well-established management. The opportunity for immediate action to liberate the city of Kalinin was missed.

Here is how General Vatutin pointed out this in the report on the combat actions of the task force:

“On October 17, 1941, the Kalinin Front was created. The troops of the operational group are included in the forces of the Kalinin Front. 18.10 Colonel-General Konev issues combat order No. 00122, which sets the troops the task of encircling and destroying the enemy's Kalinin grouping.
The main blow was to be delivered by the troops of the operational group of the North-Western Front, with the forcing of the Volga River and actions in the general directions: Mednoe - Kalinin; Stanishino, Danilovskoe, Kalinin. However, this order arrived at the group late and without taking into account the element of time for the elimination of the enemy's Mednovsk grouping and the concentration of troops. Despite this, the situation in the Kalinin area still favored the implementation of this order. The enemy has not yet brought up fresh reserves to the area of ​​the proposed crossings of the operational group of the North-Western Front.
On the most crucial days, the troops of the task force were transferred to the 31st Army, which could not quickly establish communication with the troops. In the following days, new orders follow from the Kalinin Front for the army, according to which the entire grouping of forces of the operational group is distributed among the armies and part of the divisions is withdrawn to the front reserve ...
Thus, the troops of the operational group of the North-Western Front, as a single organism, disappeared. The only striking force in the Kalinin area was dispersed among the armies.
This was a mistake of the command of the Kalinin Front, since while the divisions were regrouping in armies, the enemy, anticipating a possible crossing of our troops at Nesterov and Akishev, throws a fresh 6th Infantry Division here, preempts us and disrupts the planned active actions of the 46th, 54th 1st Cavalry and 183rd Infantry Divisions ".

The 20th of October the front commander gives the troops a directive in which the armies are tasked with encircling the enemy grouping in the Kalinin area. 22nd Army - to firmly defend the line of the lake. Seliger - b. Volga to Staritsa, preventing the enemy from breaking through to Torzhok from the south and southwest. Of the 29th Army, defending on the right flank in the Staritsa, Akishev area, on the night of October 20-21 with the main forces to force the Volga in the Izbrizhie, Danilovskoye sector. By the end of the day, capture Nekrasov, Danilovsky, cut off the enemy's escape routes to the south-west, establish interaction with the 21st Tank Brigade (30th Army) in the Negotino area. The 31st Army should advance from the northwest and north to Kalinin and, in cooperation with the 30th Army, by the end of October 21, capture the northwestern and southern parts of the city of Kalinin. 30th Army to advance from the northeast and southeast to Kalinin and by the end of October 21 to capture the southern and northeastern part of the city, preventing the enemy from retreating to the south and southeast.

In view of the fact that part of the formations of the 29th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov) fought fierce battles with the enemy group retreating from the Maryino-Mednoye area, the task set in the directive of the front commander of October 20 was not it within the specified period completed. Only 22 of October The 246th rifle division of this army crossed the Volga in the Hvastovo, Chapaevka sector and seized a bridgehead on the right bank in the Putilov area. Within two days, units of the 246th and 119th rifle divisions were transferred here. By October 25 they managed to significantly expand the bridgehead and cut the main transport route of the enemy Staritsa - Kalinin in the Talutin and Danilovsky area. A real threat was created to encircle the enemy's Kalinin grouping.

To eliminate the bridgehead, the fascist command had to transfer two new divisions (the 14th motorized and 161st infantry divisions) to the area. At the same time, the Nazi troops began a new operation to capture Torzhok with the further development of the offensive on Vyshny Volochek. To carry it out, the 23rd and 6th Army Corps of the 9th Army were involved, reinforced by two motorized divisions of the 3rd Panzer Group.

October 24 the enemy managed to cross to the left bank of the Volga in the Staritsa - Brody sector and launch an offensive on Struzhnya - Torzhok.

Through the efforts of the troops of the 22nd and 29th armies, the enemy's offensive by the end of October was stopped. But at the same time, the 29th Army had to leave the bridgehead in the area of ​​Putilov, Talutin, Danilovsky and retreat to the line of the r. Darkness.

In the offensive zone of the 31st Army, the battles took on a stubborn and intense character. Parts of the 133rd Infantry Division liberated the village of Kiselevo (0.5 km north of Kalinin) and captured several blocks on the northern outskirts of the city.

The formations of the 30th Army were the first to enter the battle for Kalinin. In five days (from 14 to 19 October), they lost over 1600 people and 25 tanks. In the 256th rifle division, 400 people were killed and wounded, in the 5th rifle division - 525 people, the 21st tank brigade lost 450 people, 21 T-34 tanks, three BT tanks and one T-60 tank. Ho, despite this, the army fought fierce battles on the eastern and southeastern outskirts of the city. Big and Small Peremerki, Elevator, Koltsovo, Vlasyevo passed from hand to hand several times.

The hostilities at the end of October did not bring victory to our troops, but in the end the enemy abandoned attempts to attack and was forced to go on the defensive. In the Kalinin area, the front stabilized.

An interesting statement by the former commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, General G. Goth:

“The 3rd Panzer Group, due to lack of fuel, stretched out between Vyazma and Kalinin and got stuck in this area, getting involved in heavy battles near Kalinin, and was already experiencing a shortage of ammunition. Large in numbers, combat-ready enemy forces, concentrated on the left bank of the Volga and northwest of Rzhev, hung over its flank. Thus, the chances of bypassing Moscow simultaneously from the north and south were very slim. "

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief JV Stalin was especially concerned about the bridges across the Volga in Kalinin, which were not destroyed during the retreat. He demanded from Konev:

"To destroy the railway and highway bridges in the city of Kalinin by means of aviation."

At that time, the Kalinin Front did not yet have its own aviation, and this task was entrusted to long-range aviation.

Here is what the former commander of the 12th Guards Bomber Aviation Regiment of Long-Range Aviation Nikolai Bogdanov writes about in the book "In the Sky, Guards Gatchinsky":

“The most difficult task for us was the destruction of the Kalinin railway and highway bridges. And not only for us. They turned out to be a tough nut to crack, which the crews of other units were unable to crack either. "

The Nazis reliably covered the approaches to the bridges, concentrated on both banks of the river a large number of anti-aircraft artillery of various calibers and anti-aircraft machine guns. In addition, fighter aircraft were also involved to protect the bridges.

Starting from October 16, 1941, our pilots regularly bombed the bridges. A variety of bombing methods were used. However, the bridges remained intact.

It should be noted that at the beginning of the war, bridges were usually bombed with 100-kilogram high-explosive bombs. Some of them flew through the openwork trusses of the railway bridge and burst in the water without causing any harm. In one of the raids on the railway bridge, the crew of Lieutenant Koryakin's plane repeated the feat of Captain Gastello. In the book "Guards Gatchinsky in the Sky" Nikolai Bogdanov writes:

“On the day of departure for the mission, November 12, the weather was cloudy ... The flight promised to be difficult. At the target, enemy anti-aircraft artillery and machine guns met us with hurricane fire. I concentrate all my attention on precisely keeping the course set by the navigator. Due to the dense anti-aircraft fire, it was very difficult to do this. Finally, out of the gloom, behind the bright bursts of exploding anti-aircraft shells, a bridge appeared large, at an acute angle, as if rushing towards us, for a few more seconds, and bombs flew at it from a height of six hundred meters from the hatches of our cars.
At this time, Koryakin's plane caught fire on my right. The shells apparently hit the cockpit and gas tanks. In a fraction of a second, the entire plane was engulfed in flames. I had time to see only the pilot's head bent to the dashboard; I could not see the gunner-radio operator because of the thick black smoke that enveloped the fuselage.
The plane went into a dive. But this was not an arbitrary fall, it was clear that the pilot's hand was still in control of the machine. Obeying her, the plane turned sharply towards the group of guns, which were still spitting out tongues of flame with their long vents, and, as if covering us with a sprawled steel body from their destructive shells, fell on the battery and at the same moment exploded, blazing up a huge bonfire. This is how our young comrades - the crew commander Koryakin, the navigator Belov, the gunner-radio operator Shilenko and the gunner Vishnevsky - perished by the death of heroes. "

It was decided to destroy the Kalininsky railway bridge using the radio guidance system of an aircraft filled with explosives. For this, a design bureau was involved, developing a radio control system for unmanned aircraft.

Two bombers were allocated for the experiment: TB-3, intended to be a torpedo plane, and DB-ZF, from which they were supposed to control it by radio. While the test flights were underway, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive near Moscow, liberated Kalinin, and the need to destroy bridges was no longer needed.

Having occupied Kalinin, the Nazi troops turned it into a major stronghold. They have concentrated a large amount of equipment and manpower here. All measures were taken to keep the city. From here, the Nazis supported their hordes advancing on Moscow, guarding their left flank. Here on warm apartments, they hoped to restore the strength of their divisions exhausted in battles.

By the end of October, the front had stabilized. and passed along the line: Selizharovo, the Bolshaya Kosh and T'ma rivers, the northern and eastern outskirts of Kalinin, Malye Peremerki, Vishenki, Turginovo, Dorino, Sintsovo. The total length of the front line reached 270 km.

In October, the Kalinin Front managed to solve the tasks: to repel the enemy's offensive on Torzhok, Vyshny Volochek and prevent him from advancing around Moscow from the north-west.

At the end of October, the front commander issues a directive on the transition to defense and on the construction of the front-line rear and intermediate army defense lines.

The weakest was the defense zone of the 30th Army, which covered the Klin-Solnechnogorsk direction. By mid-November, it included a rifle and motorized rifle division, a tank brigade, a motorized and reserve regiment. With these forces, the army defended itself on a front of about 70 km. There were no second echelons and reserves. The defense was focal in nature, the intervals between the strongholds reached four kilometers.

Back in late October, the commander of the 30th Army reported to the front commander that "the army does not have a sufficient number of combat personnel and equipment, there are few means of mining ... The left flank of the army is a particularly weak spot." At the same time, according to information received from local residents and from a survey of prisoners, it was already known that the fascist command was concentrating troops and preparing a new offensive against Moscow in the 30th Army's defense zone.

Reliable defense and preventing the breakthrough of enemy troops to Moscow from the north-west, according to the plan of the Supreme Command Headquarters, was one of the main tasks of the forces of the Kalinin Front. However, the commander and his staff did not take the necessary measures to strengthen the combat strength of the 30th Army and strengthen its defenses. It was on her that the German fascist troops struck the main blow in November 1941.

By mid-November against the left flank of the 30th Army, the fascist command concentrated the strike grouping as part of the 27th Army Corps of the 9th Army and parts of the forces of the 41st and 56th Motorized Corps of the 3rd Panzer Group.

The Kalinin Front is an operational formation of the Soviet armed forces during the Great Patriotic War, operated in 1941-1943, created on October 19, 1941 from the right wing of the Western Front. Initially, the 22nd, 29th, 30th, 31st armies were included in the Kalinin Front. The command of the front was taken over by Colonel-General I.S. Konev, a member of the military council during the entire period of the existence of the front was the corps commissar D.S. Leonov (since December 1942, Lieutenant General). The first chief of staff of the Kalinin Front was Major General I.I. Ivanov, who was replaced in November 1941 by Major General E.P. Zhuravlev.

During the Moscow Battle, the Kalinin Front led fighting against the forces of the German Army Group "Center", covering the north-western approaches to the capital of the USSR. The troops of the front did not manage to keep Kalinin, but they stopped the further advance of the enemy, in particular, defeated the enemy group that had broken through from Kalinin in the direction of Torzhok. In November-December 1941, the headquarters of the Kalinin Front was headed by Colonel A.A. Katsnelson, in January 1942 he was replaced by Major General M.V. Zakharov (from May 1942 - Lieutenant General).

During the counteroffensive near Moscow, the troops of the Kalinin Front carried out the Kalinin operation; on December 16, 1941, the city of Kalinin was liberated. On January 22, 1942, the troops of the right wing of the front took part in the Toropetsko-Kholmsk operation. After the end of the Moscow battle during 1942, the Kalinin Front took part in the Battle of Rzhev: two offensive operations: the First Rzhev-Sychevsk operation (July 30 - October 1, 1942) and the Second Rzhev-Sychevsk operation (November 25 - December 20, 1942). In cooperation with the Western Front, the troops of the Kalinin Front were to defeat the German 9th Army and eliminate the Rzhev salient. Both operations failed. On August 26, 1942, Lieutenant General M.A. Purkaev (from November 18, 1942 - Colonel General).

Simultaneously with the Second Rzhev-Sychevsk operation on November 25, 1942, the troops of the Kalinin Front began the Velikie Luki operation, by December 10 they reached Novosokolniki and cut the railway in two sections connecting the German army groups "North" and "Center". On January 17, 1943, Soviet troops liberated the city of Velikiye Luki. In the spring of 1943, the Battle of Rzhev ended: during the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation, the troops of the Kalinin Front, together with the troops of the Western Front, eliminated the Rzhev salient, advanced 130-160 km, and liberated the city of Bely on March 10, 1943. In April 1943, the command of the Kalinin Front was changed: Colonel-General A.I. Eremenko (from August 27, 1943 - General of the Army), and Chief of Staff - Lieutenant General V.V. Kurasov.

In the fall of 1943, the Kalinin Front took part in the Smolensk offensive operation. On September 14, 1943, the front troops launched an offensive against the Dukhovschinsko-Demidov grouping of the enemy (the Dukhovshchinsko-Demidov operation). During four days of fighting, the German defenses were broken through to the full depth. September 19, 1943 was liberated city Dukhovshchina, September 21 - Demidov, September 29 - Rudnya. In October 1943, the Kalinin Front conducted the Nevelsk operation, crushed the German defenses in the Nevel, Novosokolniki, Velikie Luki areas, and liberated the city of Nevel. On October 20, 1943, the Kalinin Front was renamed the First Baltic Front.

V different time the front consisted of: 22nd Army (October 19, 1941 - April 21, 1943), 29th Army (October 19, 1941 - August 31, 1942), 30th Army (October 19, 1941 - August 31, 1942), 31st Army (October 21, 1941 - July 23, 1942), 39th Army (December 22, 1941 - July 27, 1942), 3rd Shock Army (January 21, 1942 - October 13, 1943), 4th Shock Army (from January 22, 1942 ), 41st Army (May 16, 1942 - March 20, 1943), 58th Army (June 25, 1942 - July 20, 1942), 43rd Army (from October 1, 1942), 20th Army (August 10, 1942 - September 1, 1942), 3rd Air Army (from May 16, 1942).