The troops of the front carried out their tasks in close cooperation with the partisans of Belarus. Hearing the gunfire of the advancing Red Army, they significantly increased their combat activity. If at the beginning of the year the partisans struck at sixteen large railway sections and sections, then in September - already at forty-six. From September 19, 1943 to January 19, 1944, 77,684 rails were blown up on enemy railways.

The scope of the struggle that unfolded on the communications of the German Army Group "Center" can be judged by the operation carried out by the "Flame" partisan brigade. In just one day on August 13, its soldiers blew up 400 rails on the Krichev-Unecha railway section. Having entered into a fierce battle with the enemy garrison guarding the Kommunar station, the people's avengers destroyed 86 guards, suppressed three bunkers, and disabled the station's equipment. At the same time, operations were carried out on highways and dirt roads, which made it much more difficult for the Germans to transport ammunition, fuel, and reserves.

In the first half of October, the troops Kalinin front(from October 20, 1943, the Kalinin Front began to be called the 1st Baltic Front, the Central - the Belorussian Front. - Note. ed.) in cooperation with the troops of the Baltic Front (at the beginning of October 1943, the Headquarters abolished the Bryansk Front, its three armies: 50th General I.V. Boldin, 3rd General A.V. Gorbatov, 63rd General V. Ya. Kolpakchi and the cavalry corps were transferred to the Central Front, and the rest of the forces and command were transferred to the north to deploy the Baltic Front. Note. ed.) went on the offensive in the Vitebsk direction, aiming to cover the enemy grouping in Belarus from the north. From the east to Orsha and Mogilev, the troops of the Western Front struck, from the south in the direction of Gomel, Bobruisk - the troops of the Central Front. Fierce battles in the western direction unfolded on October 6 on the front from Nevel to the Ustye of Pripyat, in a zone over 550 km.

The German command was clearly aware that allowing the Red Army over the line of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev would open the way for it to Poland and East Prussia. Therefore, it continued to hold large forces here. All probable directions of the offensive operations of the Soviet troops were firmly covered by a powerful system of fortifications. In total, at the beginning of October 1944, Army Group Center had up to 70 different divisions, and another 5 divisions of the 16th Army of Army Group North were defended in the Nevel area.

The fight against the enemy was stubborn and difficult. On the main axis, the forces of the 10th Guards, 21st and 33rd armies carried out powerful strikes against the enemy defense.

On the eve of the liberation of Poland, the Soviet government was preparing an armed force on which the allied USSR leadership of the new country could rely. Instead of the Anders army evacuated from the Soviet Union, which was subordinate to the London émigré government, the 1st Polish Infantry Division named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko (commanded by Brigadier General Zygmunt Berling) was created from Polish communists, Soviet Poles and soldiers of the Red Army.

She entered the Western Front on September 4, 1943. The military council of the front made sure that the first battles of the Polish formation against the German troops were crowned with at least some kind of military success. Before reaching the front line, the personnel of the division, who had not yet been in combat, underwent the necessary training. Units and subunits learned to quickly rebuild for action in a new direction, to repel counterattacks by enemy infantry and tanks, to consolidate the captured lines, to advance and decisively storm enemy positions.

At dawn on October 12, before the start of the attack, the order of the division commander was announced in all companies and batteries. “In cold blood and with calculation,” it said, “we will strike. This task is great and difficult. We must and will fulfill this task. Let's fight our way to Poland and bring it freedom and independence. "

By the end of the day, the Germans were driven out of the villages of Polzukhi and Tregubovo. The formations of the 33rd Army and the 1st Polish Division advanced 4 kilometers into the depth of the enemy defense.

The Polish units took part in heavy battles for almost two days, successfully repelling several enemy counterattacks. The division suffered significant losses (about 25% of the personnel were out of order). In this regard, by order of General of the Army V.D.Sokolovsky, on the night of October 14, she was withdrawn to the reserve of the 33rd Army.

The Soviet government highly appreciated the military exploits of the Polish soldiers. 243 participants in the battles of Lenino were awarded orders and medals of the USSR, and Captain Vladislav Vysotsky, Captain Juliusz Hibner and submachine gunner Anela Kshivon, whose courage and fearlessness were of outstanding character, became Heroes of the Soviet Union. Among Soviet soldiers, who helped the Poles, was posthumously awarded this title, Lieutenant GR Lakhin, battery commander of the 33rd Army anti-tank regiment. Meanwhile, the Soviet offensive began to yield results. Overcoming enemy resistance, the troops of the Kalinin Front liberated Nevel on October 7, and in four days, in difficult conditions of wooded and swampy terrain, advanced 25-30 km. To stop the offensive, the enemy deployed an additional five infantry and one tank division from the Gomel region and two infantry divisions from Leningrad to the area. Until the end of the month, with continuous counterattacks, he tried to restore the situation, but to no avail.

Heavy battles were fought in the Orsha direction. The enemy resisted with desperate stubbornness, striving at all costs to stop our advance. The fighters and commanders of the 29th Guards Rifle Division of the 10th Guards Army showed high examples of courage and dedication here. A fierce battle broke out near Novy Selo, 13 kilometers west of Orsha. At the most tense moment, Major I.M. Tretyak, the battalion commander of the 93rd Guards Regiment, raised his soldiers to attack. During the battle, the brave officer was wounded. This was the fifth wound he received in offensive battles from the Moscow region to Orsha.

As a result of heavy fighting, the troops of the 10th Guards, 21st and 33rd armies managed to advance from 10 to 40 kilometers in a number of places.

The population everywhere warmly and joyfully greeted the soldiers-liberators. Among the many meetings that took place at that time, one was particularly memorable. In the village of Anyutino, Cherikovsky District, Mogilev Region, an old collective farmer D.N. Tyapin approached the head of the political department of the 38th Rifle Corps of the 10th Guards Army, Colonel M.I.

“Comrade Colonel! A soldier of the old Russian army of the 8th company of the 301st Bobruisk infantry regiment Dmitry Tyapin preserved the military banner during the German occupation! .. "

And he told how it was.

On August 6, 1941, three soldiers of the Red Army tried to cross the Sozh near the village of Anyutino in order to unite with their unit. But they did not succeed. They all died in a battle with the Germans. At night, Dmitry Tyapin, risking his life, picked up the bodies of the dead and transferred them to the cemetery. One of the killed in a duffel bag had the banner of a military unit. D.N. Tyapin buried the dead and marked him alone famous sign unmarked grave. Now he was ready to show where the ashes of the soldiers rest. The head of the political department of the corps and DN Tyapin, together with a group of Red Army men, immediately went to the cemetery and dug up the grave. Indeed, in the still-preserved duffel bag lay the banner of the 24th Rifle Samara-Ulyanovsk Iron Division.

Here, at the cemetery, a meeting was held. Soldiers who died in the terrible days of 1941 were given military honors. The whole front soon became aware of the feat of the collective farmer D. N. Tyapin. In the issued on this occasion the order of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky said: Berdichevskaya, Samara-Ulyanovskaya, twice Red Banner Iron Divisions and submit for rewarding with the Order of the Red Banner ... "

The battles in November and December did little to change the position of the parties. The front command tried several times to resume offensive operations in the Orsha and Vitebsk directions. But the results weren't great. Only the formations of the 33rd Army were able, at the cost of great efforts, to advance 12 kilometers and cut the Vitebsk-Orsha highway.

In those days, the high moral and combat qualities of Russian soldiers were revealed to the fullest. The commander of the command platoon of the 308th artillery regiment of the 144th rifle division, Lieutenant I.A. Thanks to him successful work the gunners destroyed two and suppressed three machine-gun points, incapacitating up to 100 enemy soldiers and officers. Subsequently, when repelling a counterattack of two infantry battalions with 12 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, Lieutenant Bukanov, together with senior lieutenant Stanayev and sergeant Ashimkhin, captured the enemy's 105-mm cannon and opened fire from it. Ashimkhin was wounded by a shell fragment, and Stanayev was killed. Bukanov, left alone in position, continued to fire at the Germans until the shells ran out. After that, he blew up the cannon, lifted his killed friend on his shoulders and, supporting the wounded Ashimkhin, went to the location of our troops.

The brave artilleryman was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. This high rank was also awarded to the gunners of the guns of the 1330th anti-tank fighter regiment Sergeant A.G. Makhnev, Lance corporal G.P. Vetchinkin, the commander of the rifle battalion of the 222nd rifle division, senior lieutenant A.A. Kazakov.

Simultaneously with the troops of the Western Front, units and formations of the 1st Baltic Front under the command of Lieutenant General I. Kh.Bagramyan (chief of staff Lieutenant General V.V. Kurasov, member of the Military Council Lieutenant General D. S. Leonov). In November, the most active fighting led by the 4th Shock Army, but did not achieve much success. In December, the troops of the right wing of the 1st Baltic Front broke through the heavily fortified enemy defensive zone south of Nevel and defeated the 129th, 211st infantry and 20th tank divisions of the Wehrmacht. In five days of fighting - from December 15 to December 20 - the attackers advanced 30 kilometers into the depth of the enemy defense, liberated more than 500 settlements and reached the approaches to Gorodok. On December 24, the formations of the 11th Guards Army under the command of Lieutenant General K. N. Galitsky captured this heavily fortified center of resistance, which covered the road to Vitebsk, and cut the Vitebsk-Polotsk railway.

In the battles for the town of Gorodok, the command of the 1st Baltic Front actively used tank forces, in particular, the 5th Panzer Corps of the Red Army.

By November 13, 1943, the situation on this sector of the front was as follows. The enemy, holding the lines directly north and west of the city of Nevel and north of the n / p Gorodok, was building up his grouping in the area of ​​Gorodok. The plan of the German command was aimed at closing the encirclement ring around the group of forces of the 1st Baltic Front, which was in a breakthrough between the cities of Nevel and Yezerishche.

Under these conditions, the commander of the 1st Baltic Front assigned the 4th Shock Army, together with the 5th Panzer Corps, to capture Gorodok, cut the communications of the enemy's Gorodok grouping and further advance on Vitebsk.

On November 13 (data for the evening), the 5th Panzer Corps had 203 medium tanks T-34-76 (24 tbr - 64, 41 tbr - 61, 70 tbr - 63, 92nd separate motorcycle battalion - 10, 704th separate communications battalion - 5). Also in the corps were parts of self-propelled artillery: 1546 tsap - one KV tank and 12 self-propelled guns SU-152, 161 osap - one tank T-34-76 and 15 self-propelled guns SU-85, 1515 hp-11 self-propelled guns SU-76. A total of 205 tanks and 38 self-propelled guns.

On the evening of November 13, 5th Panzer Corps began to move towards the concentration area along two routes. The existing roads were completely broken, and attempts to detour were hampered by wooded and swampy areas of the terrain, completely impassable or impassable for tanks. In addition, at the moment of movement there was a thaw and there were continuous rains with snow. The weather made some roads completely impassable. The corps' own funds for repairing the tracks (movement) were not enough, and two army sapper battalions did not arrive at the starting area by the time the corps began to move. But the order had to be carried out and the march continued. Any attempt to bypass difficult places led to the fact that tanks and vehicles got stuck in the swamp and to pull them out required equipment of flooring. These structures (flooring), hastily put together, quickly collapsed and subsequently became an insurmountable obstacle not only for cars, but also for tanks. For "pulling up the rear" all tractors and sapper means were abandoned, with the exception of one engineering company, which was entrusted with the construction of bridges. However, despite all efforts, only radio stations and part of special vehicles, which were towed by tractors and tanks, reached the starting area. The rest of the hull's vehicle fleet got stuck along the way. The fuel consumption increased 2–3 times, and it was impossible to count on its speedy delivery.

In the time appointed by the command on November 15, the 5th shopping mall did not go to the original area. By the morning of November 15, only the head tanks of the 24th and 41st tank brigades, as well as part of the infantry of the 5th motorized rifle brigade, arrived, and even then on foot. Only on the night of November 15-16 was the bulk of tanks, infantry and artillery concentrated in the initial area.

731 iptad, 92 omtsb, 704 obs, 1708 zap, the entire headquarters and rear vehicle fleet, as well as 30% of the tanks of the 24th and 41st tank brigades were stuck on the way for 40 km.

By the morning of November 16, 70 tbr was on its way from the area south of Nevel, where it held defense until 13.00 on November 15, 1943.

In the original area, the corps had the following security:

1. ammunition: for tanks - 1.5 b / c, for artillery - 1.5 b / c, for small arms - 1.0 b / c;

3. food: for 4 days of delivery.

The vehicle stuck on the way had 0.5 refueling diesel fuel and 0.5 ammunition of ammunition. About 1 ammunition load and part of the diesel fuel were at the unloading station at a distance of 150-180 km from the original area.

Thus, it took two days to complete the 50 km march in off-road and muddy conditions of 5 mk. The corps arrived in the initial area without rear services, 30% of combat vehicles, command and control units and vehicles.

Of course, in this state, the 5th Panzer Corps was not ready for combat operations at great depths. It took at least 3-5 days to pull up the rear and supply fuel. The real state of affairs in 5 TC was reported to the commander of the 4th Shock Army, however, Lieutenant General V.I.Shvetsov ordered the start of hostilities in accordance with the plan - on the morning of November 16, 1943.

The tank corps moved through the terrain, built in two echelons. In the first echelon there were 2 tank and one motorized rifle brigade, 2 self-propelled artillery regiments and one mortar regiment. A tank brigade, a self-propelled artillery regiment and a motorcycle battalion moved in the second echelon.

Reconnaissance groups moved ahead of the first echelon (along each of the three selected routes), followed by reinforced forward groups, which included tanks, self-propelled guns, motorized infantry and sapper units.

The task force of the corps headquarters moved along the middle route behind the brigade of the first echelon, and anti-aircraft artillery was located on the flank routes of the movement of 5 tk.

The place of the breakthrough in the area of ​​the villages of Bolshie Suravniv, Kroshki was also chosen quite well. Only two construction battalions of the Germans defended there: the 731st and 213rd.

At 13.0016 November 1943, after a 15-minute artillery attack, to which all the artillery of the corps and brigades was involved, the advanced tank detachments and two battalions of the 5th mechanized brigade went on the offensive. The enemy, having lost more than 120 people, began to retreat to the southeast, and the pursuit began.

The off-road conditions were simply terrifying. Two days later, more than half of the corps' tanks were stuck or drowned in the swamps.

At 23.00 on November 18, 1943, the 24th tank brigade, consisting of 3 tanks and motorized infantry, broke into the town of Gorodok from the south-west, destroying about 25 vehicles and 2 enemy tanks on the move. However, no reinforcements followed. Tankers and infantrymen took up an unequal battle in the city. Almost all of our soldiers were killed, the only surviving tank and near a platoon of soldiers by 03:00 on November 19 withdrew to the area of ​​the Silki n / a, where the rest of the tanks had pulled up with great difficulties by that time.

The 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade also approached Gorodok, but the soldiers ran out of cartridges (0.5 b / c for a rifle). In addition, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 5th mechanized brigade lost up to 40% of their strength in the battles for the Syrovnya n / a. Due to these reasons, the brigade commander did not dare to storm Gorodok on the move.

The enemy, having divined the intentions of the Soviet command, wasted no time. Tanks of 20 TD, a division of assault guns, the 427th Infantry Regiment of the 129th Infantry Division, the 4th Railway Detachment, two construction battalions, and tank destroyer artillery units were moving along the highway to the Gorodok settlement. Thus, the moment for taking the n / a Gorodok from the west was completely lost.

Then the Soviet command decided to cut the communications Gorodok - Nevel and Gorodok - Vitebsk and seize Gorodok with concentric strikes from the north and south.

On 19–20 November, fierce fighting broke out again. 24 and 70 brigade, sequentially seizing the n / p Silki, Slobodka, Bvozdy, Duborezy, Kovali, due to the fierce resistance of the enemy, could not advance further and went on the defensive, being subjected to continuous counter-attacks by the Germans from the areas of Berezovka, Volkovo, Gorodok. In the sectors of the offensive of other troops of the 5th military corps of the Red Army, the situation was even worse. Therefore, by decision of the corps command, in order to preserve the conquered bridgeheads, Soviet troops went over to the defensive in this sector of the front. The corps performed this task until December 5, 1943, when, by decision of the commander of Army-4, it was withdrawn to the Selishche region - to the army reserve. By this time, the corps had 55 tanks and 21 self-propelled guns in service. Losses of 5 tk during the operation amounted to 148 tanks and 17 self-propelled guns.

The requirement of the commander of the 4th Shock Army to immediately join the battle after the march from another sector of the front, as well as the lack of evacuation equipment and sapper units to repair roadways, led to such an outright failure of the 5th military complex. And yet, as already mentioned, through heavy losses, Gorodok was taken on December 24, 1943, already by the troops of the 11th Guards Army.

Apparently, in the eyes of the opposing forces, n / a Gorodok turned into a "little Stalingrad". The only defending side were the Germans. They reinforced the Gorodok grouping with parts of the 252nd and 256th Infantry Divisions and gradually began to push the Soviet troops besieging the city. On December 13, the town of Gorodok was defended by 129, 87, 252, 211, 14, 256th infantry divisions, 20th tank division and three artillery divisions. The enemy had an excellent Gorodok - Nevel highway, a railway and "highways", which allowed him to carry out a wide maneuver with troops and reserves and to supply the grouping well.

Under these conditions, the command of the 1st Baltic Front decided to inflict concentric strikes from the south-west, north-west and north-east, to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping to the north. settlement A small town, and then by storm from the north to take the city.

Now Gorodok was to be taken by the 4th Shock and 11th Guards combined arms armies. The 4th Shock Army continued to be supported by the 5th Tank Corps (100 T-34 tanks and 21 self-propelled guns SU-152, SU-85, SU-76 on 12/12/1943), as well as the 34th Tank Brigade (9 T- 34 and 16 T-70 on 12.12.1943). The 11th Guards Combined Arms Army was supported by the 1st Tank Corps (as of 12/12/1943: 117 tbr - 21 T-34, 1 SU-76; 159 tbr - 27 T-34; 1437 OSAP - 12 SU-122, 1 T -34; 44 MSBR - without tanks), 10th separate guards tank brigade (on 12/12/1943, 33 T-34 and 4 T-60), 2nd separate guards tank breakthrough regiment (on 12/12/1943 - 16 KV and 1 T-34). The superiority over the 20th German Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht and the units attached to it was more than twofold. True, the Germans had 88-mm self-propelled guns "Nashorn", and our tank forces had to advance through rather swampy areas and off-road.

After the start of the offensive (December 13, 1943), Soviet troops barely managed to break through the German positions, and on December 16, the 5th and 1st tank corps united in the area of ​​Bychikha station. The German command first tried to free up communications so that the 129th, 87th, 211st Infantry and 20th Panzer Divisions would break out of the encirclement. And on December 17, the Germans began to panic - abandoning equipment and carts, they began to retreat in a southerly direction directly through the battle formations of the Soviet troops. The outcome of the battle became more and more obvious, and on December 24, the "conspired" Gorodok was finally liberated by Soviet troops. However, the losses of the Red Army were very significant. During the entire operation (from 13 to 24 December), all tank units lost 156 tanks and 27 self-propelled guns, of which 65 tanks and 17 self-propelled guns irrevocably.

Further attempts by Soviet troops to advance towards Vitebsk were unsuccessful. The enemy was firmly entrenched on advantageous lines and put up strong opposition. The front in this direction stabilized until the summer of 1944.

Successful battles on Belarusian soil were fought in the fall of 1943 by the troops of the Belorussian Front under the command of General of the Army K. K. Rokossovsky (chief of staff Colonel General M. S. Malinin, member of the Military Council Lieutenant General K. F. Telegin). “The people did not need to be urged on,” the famous commander recalled in his memoirs, “everyone fought selflessly, trying to quickly sweep the fascist invaders out of their native country.”

In the actions of the Belorussian Front, the main role was assigned to the 65th combined-arms army of General PI Batov, and this caused a certain jealousy of some generals.

The 3rd Army of General A.V. Gorbatov fought for the expansion of bridgeheads on the banks of the Sozh River. Prior to this, the troops of 3A with heavy battles overcame a long distance over difficult terrain. The people were tired, the units and formations were greatly thinned out, but their combat effectiveness was still high, and the successes achieved inspired the soldiers and commanders. The commander and his staff were at the height of their position. They understood that there was nothing to think about a respite in these conditions.

The commander of the 3rd Army, Alexander Vasilyevich Gorbatov, was a charismatic and courageous person. A passionate follower of Suvorov, he put surprise and swiftness above all in combat, throws over long distances with access to the flank and rear of the enemy. Gorbatov behaved like Suvorov in everyday life - he refused all conveniences, he ate from a soldier's cauldron.

Suvorov's principles helped him fight. But sometimes A.V. Gorbatov understood them too straightforwardly, without taking into account the changed conditions. During the Second World War, it was no longer so easy to get out to the enemy's flank (armies became massive, the fronts were solid - Note. ed.). To break through enemy positions, the forces of one army were no longer enough, it was necessary to resort to operations of a huge scale, in which several fronts participated simultaneously. And in Belarus, it was precisely such a wide operation that was carried out in which Gorbatov's army had a rather modest role to act in a secondary sector and to divert the enemy's forces onto itself when the main grouping would strike in a decisive direction.

Gorbatov - the old commander, having received the order to attack, did his best to complete the task. But the situation was developing in such a way that his efforts did not lead to the results that he would like to achieve. And then the army commander, with all his directness, declared that his army was being misused by the front commander. Komfronta K. K. Rokossovsky read his complaint and forwarded it to Headquarters. Since there was no response from Headquarters, Rokossovsky, who believed that the incident was provoked by a lack of information, decided, in violation of established practice, to reveal all the cards to the army commander and fully explain to him the role of his army in a specific situation. According to the memoirs of Rokossovsky, A.V. Gorbatov thanked him and assured that the task assigned to him would be completed the best way... The true reasons for this act of the commander are unlikely to be known, but the complaint of General A. V. Gorbatov had a positive result. Soon the Headquarters began to inform the commanders of the fronts and armies more fully about their plans and the place of the troops in the implementation of these plans.

In the second half of October, the troops of the 65th Army, led by General P.I.Batov, brilliantly made the crossing of the Dnieper in the Loy direction. On the morning of October 15, assault detachments of the 27th and 18th rifle corps, under cover of powerful artillery and mortar fire on fishing boats, rafts and other improvised means, rushed across the Dnieper. The first to enter the right bank were the scouts of Sergeant P. M. Pakhomov from the reconnaissance company of the 69th Infantry Division.

Here is what Sergeant P.M.Pakhomov, Hero of the Soviet Union, told about this combat episode:

“We sat in the bushes and waited for the signal. The boats were ready at the water's edge, the oars adjusted to the oarlocks. We talked about relatives, loved ones, about home ... Among us were Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Georgians. And we were all united and filled with one thing: to open the way for our 2nd rifle battalion, and then the entire 69th division across the Dnieper to the west and begin the liberation of the brotherly Belarusian land from the fascist invaders ...

As soon as the roar of artillery preparation was heard, we pushed the boat into the water, got into it and swam swiftly to the right bank. The water boiled from the explosions of enemy shells and mines. The right bank is already close ... Now seconds decide the success of the case.

Fire on the fascists! - I am in command, and with a shout of "hurray" I jump out of the boat, on the go I am scribbling from a machine gun. We throw grenades, we rush into enemy trenches. A hand-to-hand fight ensued. The soldiers of the 2nd battalion, led by the division's agitator Major B.T.Pishikevich, are rushing to our aid. It was soon over. With a bold throw, we managed to capture a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper. "

By 10:00 on October 15, four battalions of the 69th, 143rd and 106th rifle divisions had already been entrenched on the western bank of the Dnieper. In the first hours after the seizure of the beachhead, the success of the operation depended on the valor and skill of these advanced units.

The 193rd Infantry Division, commanded by Colonel A.G. Frolenkov, acted harmoniously and energetically when crossing the river and on the bridgehead. She deservedly received the proud name "Dneprovskaya".

Among the first airborne units, a platoon of junior lieutenant P.A.Akutsionka crossed the Dnieper. The raft was already in the middle of the river, when the burst of an enemy shell scattered the logs. But even when they were in the water, under enemy fire, the brave men did not flinch. At the command of P.A.Akutsionka, they swam over the rest of the way to the opposite shore. The enemy met the soldiers with fierce fire. Having a significant superiority in forces, he tried to drop the landing force into the river. The critical moment came when it was required to inspire people by personal example of courage and courage, to carry them along. And at this decisive moment, Petr Akutsionok rose to his full height. With an exclamation "For the Motherland!" he rushed at the enemy. The young commander was followed by the soldiers of his platoon. With a united onslaught, the arrows broke the resistance of the Germans, thereby ensuring the crossing of the Dnieper for the main forces of the regiment. The brave officer died in this battle. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR posthumously awarded him the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. He is forever enlisted in the lists of the first company of one of the units of his native division. A street in the village of Shumilino near Vitebsk is named after the hero.

Breaking the enemy's resistance, repeatedly repelling his strong counterattacks, units of the 65th Army captured the city of Loev and, as a result of five-day battles, expanded the bridgehead to 18 kilometers along the front and 13 kilometers in depth. During this time, all formations of the army crossed the Dnieper and fought on the right bank. Here they approached the second zone of the previously prepared German defense. On October 20, General K. K. Rokossovsky ordered to stop the offensive and firmly gain a foothold on the bridgehead.

183 soldiers of the 65th Army were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for their courage, courage and heroism during the crossing of the Dnieper. With the highest award of the Motherland, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR noted the military activity and personal courage of a large group of military leaders - Lieutenant General P.I.Batov, Major General I.I. Ivanov, Major General F.M. Cherokmanov, Major General I.A. Kuzovikov, colonels MM Vlasov, AG Frolenkov and others.

For three weeks, the front command transferred to the captured bridgehead the 1st Don Tank Corps (commanded by General M.F. Panov), the 9th Tank Corps (commanded by General V.S.Bakharov), the 2nd Guards and 19th cavalry corps of generals V.V.Kryukov and M.P. Konstantinov, 4th artillery corps (commander - General N.V. Ignatov). From here a new blow to the enemy was being prepared - through Rechitsa to the rear of the Gomel group of Germans.

Members of the Military Council P.K.Ponomarenko, K.F. Telegin, chief of staff of the front Colonel-General M.S. V. I. Kuznetsov, G. N. Orel, A. I. Proshlyakov, P. Ya. Maksimenko, N. A. Antipenko.

On November 10, the troops of the (left wing) of the Belorussian Front began to attack again. On the very first day, the enemy's defenses were broken. The main blow was delivered from a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper, south of Loyev. Having broken through the enemy defenses, they advanced in the northwest direction. The next day, tank and cavalry formations entered the breakthrough. Closely interacting with each other, they rapidly moved forward, destroying enemy units that were trying to counter in some areas. The "Eastern Wall" was cracking at all the seams.

Seeing that the offensive was developing successfully, General P.I.Batov made a bold decision: two brigades of the 1st Don Guards Tank Corps, which had escaped far to the west, together with the 37th Guards and 162nd Siberian Rifle Divisions, to turn to the rear of the Germans who were defending in Rechitsa. Units of the 48th Army approached the city from the east.

“We took possession of Rechitsa,” writes PI Batov in his memoirs, “with almost no losses (Rechitsa was liberated by the troops on November 17th. - Note. ed.), did not allow the enemy to destroy the city, captured rich trophies and many prisoners. The battle for Rechitsa is one example of organizing interaction between the troops of the two armies. "

Eight divisions after these successful battles began to be called "Rechitsa". Moscow saluted the front troops.

Units and formations of the people's avengers actively interacted with the regular troops of the Red Army in the course of this and a number of other operations. The partisans of the Gomel unit inflicted great losses on the invaders. They seized the town of Gorval by storm and held it for five days until the approach of the Red Army.

For three days without interruption, the Zhuravichi partisan brigade fought with the enemy, thwarting the attempts of the Germans to cross the Sozh River. The people's avengers established close cooperation with units of the 17th Infantry Division and together with them successfully routed the enemy in the area of ​​the village of Lozovitsa.

While the front shock group, having captured Rechitsa and Vasilevichy, covered the enemy troops defending in Gomel from the south, divisions of the front's right wing reached the Dnieper in the Novy Bykhov area, hanging over the enemy from the north. This forced the Germans to start retreating from the border of the Sozh River to the west. On November 25, Soviet formations crossed the Berezina River and seized a bridgehead south of Zhlobin. On November 26, the troops of the 11th and 48th armies completely liberated Gomel, a large regional center of Belarus. By the beginning of December, the formations of the Belorussian Front, pursuing the enemy, reached the Petukhovka, Novy Bykhov line, east of Zhlobin, east of the Mozyr n / p, and here they gained a foothold.

Thus, in the fall and winter of 1943, Soviet troops operating in the western direction liberated the entire Smolensk region, a number of eastern regions of Belarus. By their active actions, they pinned down significant forces and means of the enemy. Army Group Center suffered serious damage. This created favorable conditions for the liberation of all of Belarus. However, it was not possible to fully master the Smolensk Gate. The western regions of this area, key positions at Vitebsk and Orsha, were still in the hands of the enemy.

In conclusion, it should be said that the opposing sides actively used technical and tactical innovations in battles.

The Germans in increasing numbers used cumulative shells and magnetic cumulative mines to fight Soviet tanks. So, according to the reports of the BT and MV of the Belorussian Front in the area of ​​the Rechitsa River (December 1943), 14 tanks abandoned by the Germans were examined, of which 11 were Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.G and 3 Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf.N. The ammunition load of the Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks consisted of 40-45% high-explosive fragmentation grenades, 20-30% armor-piercing tracer shells and 25-35% cumulative shells. Ammunition "triplets" consisted of 60% high-explosive grenades and 40% cumulative shells.

In the same area, Soviet specialists discovered many German H-3 magnetic cumulative mines. Mina (sometimes they were called grenades. - Note. ed.) consisted of a body in the shape of a hollow cone made of millimeter iron. Inside the case, about 1 kg of explosive is placed. 3 permanent magnets were attached to the base of the cone. A detonator was fixed at the top of the conical body, causing an explosive explosion. In the upper part of the detonator there was a fuse, structurally similar to the fuses of German grenades, but with a large deceleration (4.5–7 s). A tension cord was attached to the fuse. The mine was thrown from a trench or from behind a shelter and held onto the armor by magnets. The pull of the tension cord caused the fuse to ignite, and then, within 4.5-7 seconds, the detonator and the main explosive charge exploded. The blast wave formed as a result of the explosion had a large directional destructive force (due to the conical shape of the mine body), pierced armor up to 140 mm thick and caused detonation of ammunition (if it hit the fighting compartment), fuel explosion and destruction of all tank mechanisms. Since all the hatches of the tank in battle are tightly closed, the gases formed during the explosion of the ammunition destroyed the hull and turret of the tank. There were cases when pieces of the tower, armor plates, and individual parts of the tank were thrown 50-200 meters away by the force of the explosion. In general, the action of such a mine-grenade, according to Soviet experts, was much more effective than the action of German cumulative shells.

The Germans themselves, suggesting that such a cumulative weapon could appear in the countries of the Anti-Hitler coalition, introduced two protective systems: screens made of sheet iron 3-4 mm thick and a protective cement-like anti-magnetic coating - zimmerite. The first forced the cumulative ammunition to throw out a fiery jet even before it came into contact with the main armor of the BTT, the second - protected from the action of magnetic cumulative mines that were not kept on its surface.

Engineers of the Red Army have established that the main component of zimmerite is ground clay in boiled butter. By the method of experiment, an own anti-magnetic coating was developed in winter conditions... After cleaning from oil (gasoline or caustic soda), a layer of clay mixed with water was applied to the tower, inclined side sheets, frontal sheet and bottom and frozen. Thus, a completely satisfactory coating strength was achieved. The best defense against such magnetic mines was the assault of machine gunners on the armor of the tank.

In the formations of the Red Army there were quite a few armored personnel carriers (mainly of American or British production), therefore, in battle, an assault force of 4 machine gunners was "seated" on the main T-34 tank. The tanks were advancing in small groups - 5–8 vehicles each, and only in the third echelon were KV tanks used, as well as self-propelled guns of various types - SU-152, SU-122, SU-76. If our tank or self-propelled guns received damage on the battlefield or stopped due to technical malfunctions, then the tankers, as a rule, used an RDG smoke grenade. The enemy quite often, when using the RDG, ceased fire on the tank, which made it possible to correct the damage or evacuate the BTT from the battlefield at nightfall.

The area in which the main battles took place was replete with many different streams and rivulets. To cross them quickly and without problems, our tankers went to various tricks. For example, in the 1st Guards Red Banner of the Order of Suvorov, the Don Corps successfully used drags loaded with logs 25-30 cm in diameter, which were towed by tanks. The logs were adjusted in advance and hewn in the form of roughly prepared separate elements of the crossing.

Tanks with drags moved "in the tail" of the columns and, if necessary, moved to the place of construction of the crossings, which were quickly built by a sapper platoon of the brigade or attached sappers. Very often, small streams and ditches were simply thrown with logs.

Sometimes Soviet tank crews tried to increase the ammunition load of the vehicles entrusted to them. Thus, the ammunition load of the SU-85 consisted of 48 rounds, which, according to many crews, was insufficient. To increase the ammunition capacity of the SU-85 in 237 glanders 1 Guards. mk used the following method: to the vertical rack for the installation of shells, located in front of the fighting compartment, additionally attached 6-8 shells, which were like the second row of ammunition. This measure brought the ammunition load of the SU-85 to 56 rounds.

Soviet tank crews interacted quite famously with the Air Force of the Red Army. Joint actions unfolded at the signal for the start of a tank attack. Attack aircraft suppressed strong points and artillery defense positions even when our tanks, having burst into these sectors, fought against defensive targets. In this case, the pilots stopped bombing and used only machine-gun fire.

Cannon fire was used in cases of complete confidence that their combat vehicles would not be hit.

The tankers, using the weakening of the enemy's anti-tank fire during the attack on his positions by our aviation, energetically advanced forward, breaking into the areas processed by the aviation, and completed the defeat of the enemy.

On the Central direction

In close connection with the hostilities in the Right-Bank Ukraine, the troops of the Red Army fought in the central direction of the Soviet-German front.

By the beginning of January 1944, three of our fronts were operating here - the 1st Baltic, Western and Belorussian (following the results of the hostilities in 1943, some changes took place in the command staff of these formations. - Note. ed.).

1st Baltic Front - Commander General of the Army I. Kh. Bagramyan, member of the Military Council Lieutenant General D.S. Leonov, Chief of Staff Lieutenant General V.V. Kurasov - in the 4th Shock, 11th Guards, 39, 43rd and 3rd air armies with the forces of their right wing, in the course of previous battles on December 24, 1943, captured a large stronghold on the approaches to Vitebsk - the settlement of Gorodok and approached railroad Vitebsk - Polotsk. The troops of the left wing of the front were located 15 km northeast and east of Vitebsk.

The Western Front - Commander General of the Army V.D.Sokolovsky, member of the Military Council Lieutenant General L.Z. Mekhlis, Chief of Staff Lieutenant General A.P. Pokrovsky - covered the enemy's grouping in the Orsha and Mogilev area in a wide half-arc. The front consisted of the 5th, 10th, 31st, 33rd, 49th and 1st Air Armies.

Further south, in the Bobruisk direction, the Belorussian Front operated - commander General of the Army K. K. Rokossovsky, member of the Military Council, Lieutenant General K. F. Telegin, chief of staff, Colonel General M. S. Malinin. It consisted of the 3rd, 48th, 50, 61, 63, 65th combined arms armies and the 16th air army.

In general, as part of three fronts in a strip 650 km wide from our side, it was deployed: 135 rifle and 9 cavalry divisions, 4 tank corps, 6 fortified areas, 6 rifle brigades, 17 separate tank brigades with a total of 1.5 million people, 23, 6 thousand guns and mortars (without 50-mm mortars), 1959 anti-aircraft guns, 824 tanks (including 230 light), 335 self-propelled guns, 2127 combat aircraft (without Po-2).

These fronts were opposed by Army Group Center under the command of General Field Marshal E. Bush, consisting of the 2nd, 4th, 9th field and 3rd tank armies. It was supported by the 6th Air Fleet. As part of the army group there were 63 divisions (of which 6 tank and 3 panzergrenadier) and an infantry brigade, 4 separate tank battalions, 12 assault gun divisions - 1,133 thousand people, 12.8 thousand guns and mortars (without anti-aircraft), 630 tanks and assault guns, 700 combat aircraft.

The German command set the task of holding the occupied line in front of the forces of Army Group "Center" at all costs. The enemy used every day for the all-round development and improvement of his defense. The main strip consisted of three positions to a depth of 5–6 km and was equipped with a developed system of trenches, wire and mine barriers. At 10-12 km from the first, a second line of defense was being prepared. Cities and large settlements, especially such as Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bykhov, Rogachev, Zhlobin, Kalinkovichi, Mozyr, Yelsk, were turned into strong centers of resistance with a circular defense. In the main directions of the probable offensive of our troops, the enemy created mobile reserves, consisting of tank and motorized units, reinforced by divisions of assault guns.

In the rear of Army Group Center, a large group of Soviet partisans operated, controlling vast areas and important road communications. To fight the partisans, the German command was forced to keep 8 divisions and a large number of various police and security formations in the rear areas.

The Soviet command, in terms of the 1944 winter campaign, set active tasks for the troops operating in the central sector. According to the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, they were to defeat the Vitebsk and Bobruisk groups of the enemy and reach the line Polotsk, Lepel, Mogilev, the Ptich River.

In accordance with the outlined plan, on January 18, 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued a directive in which it set "... the immediate task - by joint efforts of the 1st Baltic Front and the right wing of the Western Front, to defeat the enemy's Vitebsk grouping and capture the city of Vitebsk."

To accomplish this task, the 1st Baltic Front was ordered to concentrate the main grouping of forces and means of the front on the adjacent flanks of the 4th shock and 11th guards armies and strike in the general direction of Vitebsk from the northwest. According to the same directive, the Western Front with the forces of 39, 33, 5 armies was to strike in the general direction of Vitebsk from the southeast. The operation was ordered to begin no later than the end of January.

The Belorussian Front received an order from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, no later than January 8, to undertake an offensive with its left wing with the task of smashing the enemy's Mozyr grouping and by January 12 to capture Kalinkovichi and Mozyr, encompassing them from the north and south. In the future, attack, striking with the main forces of the front in the general direction of Bobruisk and Minsk. Part of the forces to act along the Pripyat River to Luninets.

All three fronts conducted intense offensive operations during the last months of 1943. Therefore, the troops and staffs had relatively little time to prepare new offensive operations. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command could not satisfy the needs of the fronts equally. The bulk of the replenishment in personnel and materiel was sent to the Ukrainian, as well as the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, which performed the most important tasks in this winter campaign. Significantly less funds were given to the 1st Baltic, Western and Belorussian fronts. Suffice it to point out that these fronts (including the 2nd Baltic) in January-March 1944 received 19.7% of marching reinforcements, 25.9% of all guns and mortars, and only 4.2% of tanks and self-propelled artillery installations. Insufficient replenishment of these fronts with personnel and equipment did not allow them to replenish the shortage, and therefore did not ensure the creation of strong shock groups that would be equipped the required amount equipment and a sufficient amount of ammunition.

Setting active tasks for the 1st Baltic, Western and Byelorussian Fronts, the Soviet High Command strove to intensify the actions of the Belarusian partisans behind enemy lines. The main efforts of the partisans were aimed at striking highways and railways and preventing the enemy troops from maneuvering.

After completing preparatory activities On February 3, 1944, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front launched an offensive with the immediate task, in cooperation with the troops of the right wing of the Western Front, to defeat the enemy grouping in the Vitebsk region and capture the city. The main blow was delivered by the adjacent flanks of the 4th Shock Army of Lieutenant General P.F. Malyshev and the 11th Guards Army of Lieutenant General K.N.

On the first day of the offensive, Soviet troops broke through the enemy's powerful defenses in a 12-kilometer sector and wedged into its location to a depth of 5-6 kilometers. The German command was seriously concerned about the situation in this sector, which was defended by the 53rd Army Corps of the 3rd Panzer Army of the Wehrmacht. On that day, the following entry appeared in the combat log of the 3rd Panzer Army: “The situation in the area of ​​the 53rd Army Corps, where the enemy broke through the front in a 12 km sector along the front and wedged in due to heavy losses and lack of sufficient reserves, was especially tense 5-6 km into the depth of our defense. It is still impossible to say whether it will be possible to create a continuous line of defense, since our infantry in this area is defeated. "

On the same day, the command of the 3rd Panzer Army issued a special order, in which it noted that “today's very difficult combat day, unfortunately, brought us a significant loss of territory,” and demanded “from all commanders and military units to selflessly fulfill their debt ". Not limiting themselves to these appeals, the command of the tank army and Army Group Center began hastily to draw up reserves to the breakthrough sector. Already during the first day, the 505th separate heavy tank battalion of the Wehrmacht (at least 40 Pz.Kpfw.VI (H ) "Tiger I"), 163rd grenadier regiment, battalion of the 187th grenadier regiment, battalion of the 51st airfield regiment, fighter company of the 53rd army corps, company of the 513th heavy anti-tank division (15 self-propelled guns "Nashorn"), battery of the 281st assault gun battalion (10 assault guns), a mortar regiment battalion (six-barreled mortars), 505th engineer battalion. In the middle of the day, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army ordered "to send construction units to the front in order to be able to change combat units in all other sectors of the front."

Subsequently, the enemy, continuing to build up forces in the breakthrough sector, pulled up the 95th infantry division from the reserve of the army group, the 21st tank battalion, the entire 281st assault gun division, the battalion of the 347th grenadier regiment, the 208th bridge building battalion and many other scattered parts. In short, the enemy command threw everything they could into battle, and did not reckon with any losses. Continuous mining was carried out in front of the leading edge of the defending troops.

Heavy fighting ensued. Each height, each section of the forest, the enemy defended with unusual tenacity. In these battles, our attacking units suffered heavy losses. In the following days, the troops of the strike group threw the enemy back 3-4 km, cut the highway and the Vitebsk-Polotsk railway, but could not further develop their success.

On February 3, simultaneously with the 1st Baltic Front, the troops of the Western Front went on the offensive, striking with the forces of the 39th Army of Lieutenant General N.E.Berzarin, the 33rd Army of Colonel General V.N. Gordov and the 5th Army Lieutenant General N.I. Krylov. The offensive of our troops in this direction on the first day had significant success. The enemy's defense was broken through in a 13-kilometer sector and to a depth of 4 km. The enemy's 206th, 131st and 299th Infantry Divisions located in the main attack sector suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment. On the first day, the 144th Rifle Division of Colonel A.A.Kaplun with the 26th Guards Tank Brigade of Colonel S.K. The division, with the support of a brigade, took possession of three strong points and at 23:00 on February 3, forward detachments crossed the Luchessa River, capturing a bridgehead there.

The offensive of our troops in this direction threatened to intercept the Vitebsk-Orsha railway, which deprived the German troops of the opportunity to carry out systematic supply of the entire Vitebsk grouping. Therefore, the German command immediately reacted to the events in the area. Already on the first day, all the reserves of the 6th Army Corps were sent here, in particular, the 11th Grenadier Regiment.

On February 6, the commander of Army Group Center, General-Field Marshal E. Bush, arrived at the headquarters of the 3rd Tank Army, who especially noted that “the outcome of the battle in the Vitebsk region is in direct proportion to the possibility of using the Vitebsk-Orsha railway”. He demanded that all measures to strengthen the defense in this sector be taken and, in turn, allocated a 5th tank battalion, a regiment from the 95th division, a 197th reconnaissance battalion and two construction battalions to reinforce the 6th Army Corps. The latter were intended for the construction of a new defensive line along the Luchesa River. Large forces of enemy aviation, including dive bombers, were sent to the same sector.

Grueling battles unfolded for each strong point. The enemy pulled up and brought in new forces - the 15th penal battalion, the 501st separate tank battalion (45 Pz.Kpfw.VI (H) "Tiger" tanks) and other units.

Our command also brought in the second echelons and reserves into the battle, but the troops could not achieve decisive success and were soon forced to stop the offensive 4-6 km from the Vitebsk-Orsha railway line.

Despite some territorial successes and the infliction of significant losses on the opposing enemy (according to German data, the 3rd Panzer Army lost 250 officers and 7,500 non-commissioned officers and privates in 10 days), our troops were unable to capture Vitebsk. Among the most important reasons should be mentioned, first of all, the insufficient staffing of the troops with personnel, equipment and ammunition (the number of rifle divisions was 4-5 thousand people, and rifle companies did not exceed 60 people). The 4th Shock and 11th Guards Armies, including the 5th and 1st Tank Corps subordinate to them, had only 249 serviceable tanks. The ammunition supply of these armies on February 2 was as follows: 76-mm divisional artillery - 1.5, 122-mm howitzers - 1.1-1.4, 82-mm mines - 2.2-2.7 and 120-mm mines 1.4-1.7 ammunition. The armies of the Western Front also had a very large shortage of personnel. The number of divisions was 4.4-5 thousand people. The 39th and 33rd armies, taking into account the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, had only 125 tanks. The provision of the troops of the Western Front with ammunition was the same, and in some types less than in the 1st Baltic Front.

The enemy, attaching great importance to Vitebsk as an important junction of highways and railways, concentrated large forces in this area, which in the first half of February were reinforced by additional regroupings from neighboring sectors. On a relatively small front around Vitebsk, there were virtually all the forces of the 3rd German Panzer Army - 15 divisions, 3 heavy tank battalions and 3 assault gun divisions. On the approaches to Vitebsk and on the outskirts of the city, the enemy equipped up to 6 defensive lines with trenches, barbed wire and other obstacles. The terrain with high hills, heavily crossed by ravines, rivers, streams, lakes, non-freezing swamps, made it difficult to conduct hostilities and at the same time made it easier for the enemy to organize defense and conduct defensive actions. In addition, the launched offensive of our troops coincided with a warming. Roads became impassable, off-road traffic became extremely difficult, fog and clouds limited the use of aviation and aimed fire of Soviet artillery.

During the hostilities, our troops suffered losses in personnel, military equipment, and used up the available ammunition. It was not necessary to count on the receipt of replenishment and material resources. Therefore, further offensive operations of the 1st Baltic and Western Fronts were stopped, and they were entrenched on the preparatory lines.

The troops of the Belorussian Front had somewhat greater success in January-February 1944, which carried out two operations during this time - Kalinkovichsko-Mozyr and Rogachev.

The Kalinkovichi-Mozyr operation was carried out by the 65th Army of Lieutenant General P.I.Batov and the 61st Army of Lieutenant General P.A.Belov with the participation of the 16th Air Army of Lieutenant General S.I. Rudenko. As part of the 65th Army, the 1st Guards Tank Corps, Major General of Tank Forces M.F. 1st Guards Cavalry Corps of Major General M.P. Konstantinov.

In front of the 65th and 61st armies, the troops of the 2nd and 9th German field armies, consisting of 11 divisions (of which two were tank), defended.

The idea of ​​the operation was to strike the 65th Army's left flank from the Kholodniki region (25 km north of Kalinkovichi) from the north and the 61st Army's right flank from the Glinnaya Sloboda region (25 km east of Kalinkovichi) in the general direction to Kalinkovichi, Mozyr and simultaneous coverage by forces of the 2nd and 7th guards corps of the Kalinkovichi, Mozyr region from the south-west to defeat the enemy troops in this area, capture the Kalinkovichi, Mozyr n / a, and then reach the line of the Ptich river.

On January 8, the troops of the 65th and 61st armies went on the offensive. Before the start of the offensive, the aviation of the 16th Air Army struck at the enemy's defenses, and during the offensive attacked his artillery, reserves, and railway echelons.

Our troops broke through the main position of the enemy's defense and on the first day advanced 2-6 km. Particularly great success was achieved on the left flank of the 61st Army, where the 2nd and 7th Guards and Cavalry Corps, in cooperation with units of the 415th Infantry Division, without encountering strong enemy resistance, advanced up to 15 km.

The successfully launched offensive continued in the following days. On January 11, the 1st Guards Tank Corps, which had 126 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, entered the zone of the 65th Army's strike grouping. The corps, in cooperation with the infantry troops, began to develop the success on Kalinkovichi from the north. At 0530 hours on January 14, units of the 1st Guards Tank Corps broke into Kalinkovichi. At the same time, formations of the 9th Guards Rifle Corps under the command of Major General A.A. Boreiko (12th, 76th and 77th Guards rifle divisions) in cooperation with the 81st and 356th rifle divisions and the 68th separate tank brigade of the 61st army. By 6 o'clock in the morning, the city was completely cleared of the enemy.

In the Mozyr area, the situation developed as follows. Our cavalry corps, bypassing the enemy's Mozyr grouping from the south, penetrated deeply into its location. The enemy, seeking to close the existing gap in the battle formations, put forward a special 1st ski brigade, which had just arrived from Germany, the Center cavalry regiment, which was previously in reserve, units of the 102nd infantry division and 5 security battalions, in this direction. The resistance of the enemy troops increased sharply. Nevertheless, our cavalry corps and the 1459 and 1816 lsap assigned to them on the SU-76 continued their successful offensive. On January 11, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Division of Major General M.D. Yagodin from the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps with a surprise attack captured the Skrygalovo n / a, located 30 km west of Mozyr on the southern bank of the Pripyat. Having lost up to 100 people, the remnants of the enemy garrison retreated to the northern bank of the Pripyat River, blowing up a bridge behind them. At this time, units of the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, turning sharply to the north, went directly to the approaches to Mozyr from the south. On January 12, the 14th Guards Cavalry Division of Colonel G.P. Koblov captured the village of Zagorina, reaching the southern bank of the Pripyat River 10 km north-west of Mozyr. The main withdrawal routes of the enemy's Mozyr grouping to the west along the southern coast of Pripyat were cut. The enemy began to hastily retreat along the northern bank of the river. At this time, our troops continued to push the enemy from the front. As early as January 11, the 415th Infantry Division of Colonel P.I. At this time, the 55th Infantry Division of Colonel N.N.Zayulyev was moving towards Mozyr along the northern bank of the river. By 6 o'clock on January 14, units of these divisions, in cooperation with the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, captured the city and the railway station Mozyr.

The Mozyr partisan brigade under the command of A.L. Zhilskiy took part in the liberation of the city.

On January 15, 1944, a salute of 224 guns thundered in Moscow, the capital of our Motherland, in honor of the troops of the Belorussian Front, who liberated Kalinkovichi and Mozyr. Thanks were announced to the troops participating in the liberation of these cities. 18 formations and units were named "Mozyr", and another 21 - "Kalinkovichi". A number of formations and units were awarded orders of the Soviet Union.

After the liberation of Kalinkovichi and Mozyr, the troops of the 65th and 61st armies and the cavalry corps regrouped their forces in order to resume the offensive on the morning of January 15th. At this stage, the 48th Army of Lieutenant General P.L. Romanenko was also involved in the operation. She launched an offensive on January 16, striking with the forces of two corps located on the right bank of the Berezina.

The offensive developed slowly. The enemy strengthened the resistance, and our troops, having suffered losses, could not create the necessary superiority in forces on the main axes. Affected by the lack of ammunition. Rough terrain and thaws, which caused a thaw, seriously hampered the offensive.

Only by January 30, our troops were able to push the enemy back to the line of Dubrov, Yurki, Kopatkevichi, the Ptich river, advancing from 20 to 50 km. The operation ended there.

As a result of the Kalinkovichi-Mozyr operation, the troops of the Belorussian Front achieved serious success on their left wing. The enemy was knocked out of the important junctions of the roads of Kalinkovichi and Mozyr, which were especially important in this wooded and swampy area. The enemy suffered heavy losses and was driven back 20–80 km to the west. Our troops swept even deeper from the south of the Bobruisk grouping of German troops, which was of great importance during the Belarusian operation in the summer of 1944.

It is interesting to note that the German troops, being inferior to the Red Army in total, constantly tried to apply new tactical schemes. During the hostilities of the 17th Guards Tank Oryol Red Banner Brigade, the enemy used the following technique for capturing the settlement of Gorokhovishchi (February 8-10, 1944).

Three enemy self-propelled guns openly went to the edge of the forest, which is a kilometer northwest of Gorokhovishchi, and opened fire on individual houses located along the road on the northeastern outskirts of this settlement. When our artillery and self-propelled guns transferred their fire to these targets, two vehicles took refuge in the forest, and the third remained in place. The crew opened the hatches and left the vehicle, giving the impression that the self-propelled gun had died.

With the onset of night, our tanks began to "pull up" in Gorokhovishchi. The night was moonlit, and the silhouettes of tanks were observed from a distance of 900-1000 meters.

As soon as the Soviet tank moved towards individual houses, the enemy's self-propelled guns, "abandoned" by the crew during the day, opened rapid fire on the tank and after 3-4 shots set it on fire. As it turned out later, all three enemy self-propelled guns moved to open firing positions for zeroing in and demonstrating damage to one of them, which was a pre-planned and quite successful trick, calculated to mislead the calculations of our ATOR.

With the onset of darkness, the crew returned to an imaginary destroyed self-propelled gun and, observing the silhouettes of our tanks, opened fire on them as soon as the tank "went out on target" with one of the separate houses. The fire was directed directly at the structure, and some shells, before hitting the tank, pierced the walls of the house.

Thus, 7 T-34 tanks were lost. In general, "shooting at home" brought the German self-propelled gunners the desired effect and was used by the enemy more than once. So, on February 8, 1944, 5 T-34 tanks of the 16th Guards Rechitsa Tank Brigade broke into the village of Chernyavka and hid behind houses before their infantry approached. The enemy began methodically to fire at the buildings, subjecting them to shelling one by one. The fire was carried out with incendiary shells and "blanks", which freely pierced the walls of houses, after which they retained sufficient penetrating ability. As a result, all 5 tanks were lost.

German tankers and self-propelled guns began to often use their self-propelled guns from ambushes, boldly going on risky actions.

The enemy, knocked out by our troops from Gorokhovishchi, left 4 camouflaged StuG III Ausf.Gs in the sheds, which let the infantry pass, stayed in its rear and opened sudden fire on our tanks, which were moving after the infantry.

Such daring actions, combined with the enemy's counterattack from the front, led the attackers to confusion, as a result of which Gorokhovishchi was abandoned. The Germans lost 2 self-propelled guns, which in comparison with the achieved result was not a heavy loss.

At the same time, quite a lot of new German anti-tank weapons appeared on the Soviet-German front. In the reports of the BT and MV of the Belorussian Front for February 1944, it was noted that the enemy had cumulative anti-tank rifle grenades fired with a mortar (which was a steel tube with internal grooves). For accuracy, an additional sighting device was put on the rifle's sight.

The throwing range at an elevation angle of 45 ° was 800–850 m. The actual range was 300–350 m. The best shooting results were achieved from a distance of 100–150 m, that is, at a direct shot distance. The initial speed of the grenade was 35–40 m / s (the grenade is visible in flight). Weight - about 550 grams. Such a grenade, when the main explosive charge exploded, formed a directed blast wave, capable of penetrating armor 30-50 mm thick at an encounter angle of 60–90 °, and, if it hit the area of ​​the fighting compartment, detonating the tank's ammunition.

The cumulative grenade was painted black, but the ammunition also contained yellow fragmentation grenades.

Such weapons were purely defensive and did not become widespread only because the German anti-tank grenade launchers Panzerfaust and Panzershrek, which appeared soon, were much easier to use and effective.

In the period from 21 to 24 February, the Rogachev operation was carried out, in which the 3rd Army of Lieutenant General A.V. Gorbatov took part with the assistance of the 50th Army of Lieutenant General P. L. Romanenko. The operation from the air was provided by the aviation of the 16th Air Army.

The main role in achieving success was assigned to the 3rd Army, which for this purpose was significantly strengthened. Three days before the start of the offensive, the sector and the troops of the 63rd Army were transferred to it, and the command of the latter was transferred to the front reserve. This made it possible to increase the composition of the 3rd Army to four rifle corps (eleven divisions and a fortified area), two tank and one self-propelled artillery regiments and artillery reinforcement units.

The troops of the 9th German army defended in the army zone.

The idea of ​​the operation was to seize this city with a blow from the 3rd army, bypassing Rogachev from the north, and develop an attack on Bobruisk. At the same time, the 48th Army was to strike in the direction of Parichi, Bobruisk along the right bank of the Berezina. The 50th Army was to seize the Bykhov area with a blow from the south.

A feature of the operation was that the 3rd Army had to cross the Dnieper on the ice with its strike force and break through the enemy's defenses on the opposite bank, which in this place is very high and steep. Therefore, it was important to ensure the surprise of the strike and to create a decisive preponderance of our forces in the narrow sector of the breakthrough. Extremely great difficulties arose due to the fact that warming reduced the ice thickness on the Dnieper to 8–12 cm, numerous ice holes formed, and in some places the ice moved away from the banks by 3–4 m. In this regard, the main forces of engineering army troops, who prepared material in advance for quickly building bridges and laying routes through difficult-to-pass areas. Parts of the chemical defense were preparing the smoke of the crossing areas.

At 23:00 on February 20, a combined detachment from the ski battalion of the 120th Guards Rifle Division of Colonel Ya. Ya. Vogel crossed to the western bank of the Dnieper. At the same time, the regiments of the first echelon began to occupy their initial position 150-200 m from the right bank of the river. At 0720 hours on February 21, artillery preparation began, followed by the infantry attacking. Along the icy cliffs of the right bank of the Dnieper, the attacking units rose higher and higher. It was a truly heroic onslaught of Soviet soldiers. Many of them died a heroic death under the hurricane fire of the enemy. But he could not withstand the blow. At 10 o'clock the front line of the defense was broken through. The soldiers of the 5th Rifle Division of Colonel PT Mikhalitsin, the 269th Rifle Division of Major General A.F. Kubasov and the 120th Guards Rifle Division especially distinguished themselves. By 11.30, the 36th tank regiment of Lieutenant Colonel MV Makarkin, which operated in conjunction with the 269th rifle division, also crossed over to the opposite bank of the Dnieper.

By the middle of the day, the combined detachment of the 120th Guards Rifle Division, passing through the rear of the enemy, intercepted the Rogachev-Novy Bykhov highway.

The next day, the offensive continued on the bridgehead beyond the Dnieper. On this day, units of the 5th Rifle Division were especially successful. Its 336th Rifle Regiment, having made a bold maneuver, broke into the depths of the enemy's position and went to the area of ​​Toshchitsa station (25 km north of Rogachev), where it established contact with the division's ski battalion, which had left on the night of February 22nd. Taking possession of the station meant intercepting the railway communication between Rogachev and Mogilev. Therefore, the arrival of our units here greatly alarmed the German command, which hastily pulled reinforcements to the station area. An enemy armored train approached here, from which an assault force of machine gunners, numbering up to 100 people, was landed. Our aircraft raided the station. Despite the fierce resistance of the enemy, on the night of February 23, the station was cleared of the enemy.

At this time, the regiments of the 120th Guards Rifle Division, moving westward, reached the approaches to Rogachev from the northeast, and the 169th Rifle Division of Colonel F.A.Verevkin, breaking through the enemy defenses southeast of Rogachev, approached the city from southeast, the enemy, to help the units of the 31st and 6th infantry divisions operating here, threw the 5th tank and part of the forces of the 4th tank division into the Rogachev area and, during February 23, launched a series of fierce counterattacks, supported by strong blows aviation. At the same time, the enemy hastily strengthened the defenses on the next line - along the Drut 'River. A detachment of Belarusian partisans of up to 500 people, who came from the enemy rear to the area of ​​Toshchitsa station, joined forces with the 5th rifle division. The partisans reported that columns of tanks and vehicles were moving along the roads from the north. As it was later established, this was the approach of the 20th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht, being transferred by the enemy from near Vitebsk.

February 24 was the final day of the operation. By the morning of that day, after a night assault, units of the 120th Guards and 169th Infantry Divisions liberated Rogachev. On this day, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, saluted the troops that liberated an important city on the Dnieper. Units and formations that distinguished themselves in the struggle for the city received the honorary name "Rogachevskys" or were awarded orders.

At this time, the troops of the 3rd Army, operating north of Rogachev, reached the line south of Novy Bykhov, Ozeranye, and further along the river. Drut. South of Rogachev, our troops, having eliminated the enemy bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnieper, reached the eastern bank of the river.

In the battles for the city of Rogachev, our troops captured a 105-mm self-propelled gun StuH 42, the first samples of which had just begun to appear in the German Wehrmacht. A similar assault howitzer, mounted on the chassis of a Pz.Kpfw.III tank, had a shielding of the cabin made of an armor plate 30 mm thick, welded to the main armor. Thus, the total thickness of the front plates of the installation was 80 mm. The front sheets of the fighting compartment on the sides of the gun mantlet were reinforced with reinforced concrete slabs installed outside the main armor. The total length of the reinforced concrete slabs was 150–200 mm. Inside the slabs, there was reinforcement made of 6 mm iron rods welded to the walls of the compartments. The sides of the ACS were protected by hinged screens made of 4-mm iron. The tracks of the self-propelled guns had additional anti-skid "spurs".

A 105-mm artillery system with a short barrel and a muzzle brake was mounted in the fighting compartment. The separate loading cannon had high-explosive and shaped charges (70% high-explosive, 30% shaped-charge) in the amount of 40 rounds. Machine-gun armament similar to the self-propelled guns did not have.

Firing an armor-piercing projectile into the front of the StuH 42 from the 76.2 mm ZiS-3 cannon was ineffective. Only firing an armor-piercing projectile on the sides of the installation put it out of action. The fire of the PTR was valid only on the stern sheets of the installation. The machine gun fire was valid only against the sighting and sighting devices of the installation. However, most Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns coped quite successfully with this German novelty.

In the Rogachev operation, the troops of the Belorussian Front achieved important results... Having eliminated the enemy bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnieper, they crossed the river and seized an operationally advantageous bridgehead 60 km wide and 20-30 km deep. Rogachev, an important stronghold and road junction on the Dnieper, was freed from the enemy. The enemy suffered heavy losses as a result of a surprise strike. To strengthen the position at Rogachev, he was forced to transfer two divisions from other directions.

In the Rogachev operation, the 48th and 49th aerosled battalions were actively used, which, respectively, were attached to the 50th and 3rd combined-arms armies.

Combat snowmobiles were used to evacuate the wounded across the floodplain of the Dnieper River to the nearest medical aid stations. Subsequently, the seriously wounded, requiring emergency surgical care, were transported by snowmobile to the city of Propoisk. On return flights, ammunition was delivered to the front line of active units. So, the 48th aerosanny battalion from February 22 to March 2, 1944 evacuated 2,104 wounded, delivered 72.2 tons of ammunition and 8.6 tons of food. But the use of aerosled transport was only profitable in off-road conditions. For example, the 1st company of the 48th aerosanny battalion, flying 50 km long, transported 443 wounded and 18.5 tons of ammunition, while using up 6.5 tons of fuel. A simple calculation shows that under normal conditions, three times less fuel is required to transport the same number of people and cargo by road.

On this, the active actions of our troops in the central direction ceased. Subsequent battles were of local importance, the goals of which were to pin down enemy forces, capture individual strongholds and improve the operational position. In mid-April, the troops of the 1st Baltic, Western and Belorussian Fronts received an order from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to go over to the defensive, consolidate on the occupied lines in order to prepare for summer operations.

During the positional defense, the now Soviet troops improved their tactics and actively modernized the materiel entrusted to them.

For example, in the defensive battles of the 3rd Army during March 1944 in the Gomel-Zhlobin sector, the 55th separate division of armored trains was used as part of the 664th and 698th armored trains. 55 ODBP was needed to suppress enemy firing points from closed positions. Guidance was carried out from the checkpoint and specially selected observation points (outside the railway) by phone. Armored trains fired no more than 40-50 minutes, constantly moving from one firing position to another.

In the 50th Army, for the SU-76 self-propelled guns, when towing anti-tank guns with crews, as well as for transporting troops, they developed special trailed benches-seats that can accommodate 4-5 people. Experiments were also carried out there on the installation of an increased ammunition load of 90 shells (for the SU-76M), of which 30 were to be consumed in the first place. Most likely, this was how the ammunition was packed in the light self-propelled artillery regiments attached to the 50th Army in the battles for Rogachev.

In general, the actions of our troops in the central direction in the winter of 1944 did not receive the proper scope. The tasks assigned to them were not fully completed. This was due to a number of reasons, the most important of which was the insufficient staffing of the troops with personnel and military equipment, especially tanks, as well as the poor provision of ammunition. As already indicated, the bulk of the resources of personnel, military equipment and materiel were transferred by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to those areas where the main tasks of the winter campaign were solved - near Leningrad and Novgorod, to the Right-Bank Ukraine and to the Crimea. The fronts operating in the central direction received all this in very limited quantities. It must also be said about the difficult conditions of the wooded and swampy terrain and muddy roads, which made it difficult for the advancing troops to maneuver. The nature and result of the operations were also affected by shortcomings in their organization, namely, insufficient massing of forces and means, weak reconnaissance of the enemy and, as a consequence, insufficiently effective suppression of his defense and suitable reserves. A number of shortcomings in the organization of operations were pointed out by the commission of the State Defense Committee (GKO), which examined the situation on the Western Front.

But, despite the incomplete fulfillment of the tasks, the actions of our troops in the central direction had a positive significance. The troops of the German Army Group Center for three months were pinned down and suffered significant losses. At the time of intense battles near Leningrad, Novgorod and in Ukraine, the enemy command was able to transfer only 3-4 divisions from Army Group Center to other sectors of the Soviet-German front.

Soviet troops liberated a significant part of the territory of the Byelorussian SSR with the cities of Rogachev, Kalinkovichi, Mozyr, and deeply covered Vitebsk on both sides. As a result, they occupied more advantageous lines, from which the great offensive of our troops began in the summer of 1944.

Simultaneously with the fighting in the central direction, an operation was carried out to liberate the southern part of Belarus.

Under Kovel

The successful implementation of the Lutsk-Rivne operation and the capture of the Lutsk region, Rivne created favorable conditions not only for the strike by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front on the flank of Army Group South in the direction of Chernivtsi, but also for the development of the offensive towards Kovel.

Since this direction was considered independent and very promising, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to organize an independent front here. On February 17, 1944, a directive was issued with the following content:

"1. Form a new front at the junction of the Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, which will be called the "2nd Belorussian Front".

2. In this regard, the existing Byelorussian Front will henceforth be called: "1st Belorussian Front".

3. Include in the composition of the 2nd Belorussian Front:

a) From the 1st Belorussian Front - 61 armies consisting of 9 Guards. sk, 89 sk, separate 55, 356 rifle divisions (eight rifle divisions in total), 2 guards. kk, 7 guards. kk, 68 brigade and reinforcement units available in the army, army rear units and institutions with cash reserves.

b) from the 1st Ukrainian Front - 77 sc (three rifle divisions) from the 13th army, command 47A with all army reinforcement units, rear units and institutions.

c) from the Stavka reserve - 125 sc (four rifle divisions), 70 army consisting of seven str. divisions, 6 air army consisting of: 3rd guards shad, 336th IAD, 242nd night bad, 72nd reconnaissance aviation regiment , 3rd Aviation Regiment of the Civil Air Fleet; Dnieper river flotilla leaving trawling tasks on it, 65th anti-aircraft artillery division, 32nd mortar brigade, 3rd iptabr, 48th engineer brigade.

4. As a front-line command, use the command of the former North-Western Front, which will be redeployed to the Rokitno region by February 20 ”.

The 2nd Belorussian Front was deployed in the zone: on the right - Vasilevichi, Malkovichi, Telekhany, Bereza Kartuzskaya, Pruzhany, Klescheli - all points, except Vasilevichi, for the 2nd Belorussian Front inclusive: on the left - Korosten, Gorodnitsa, Kostopol, Zofyuvka, Rozhische, Verba - all points, except for Korosten, for the 1st Ukrainian Front inclusive.

Colonel General P.A.Kurochkin was appointed commander of the front, Lieutenant General F.E.Bokov was a member of the Military Council, and Lieutenant General V. Ya. Kolpachki was appointed chief of staff.

"1. Prepare an offensive operation of the front, with the direction of the main attack on Kovel.

The immediate task is to master the line Lyubeshov, Kamen-Kashirsky, Kovel.

In the future, advance with the task of capturing Brest and reaching the r. Zap. Bug on the section Brest, Gorodlo (the last point is exclusive). At the same time, the right wing of the front to reach the line of the river. Pripyat and take Turov, David-Gorodok, Rubel, Stolin.

2. Start the offensive on 12–15.3 am, without waiting for the full concentration of all the front's troops. "

On March 6, the Military Council of the 2nd Belorussian Front presented to the Headquarters a plan for the upcoming operation.

For its implementation, the 70th Army of Lieutenant General I.F. Nikolaev and the 47th Army of Lieutenant General V.S. Polenov were involved with the support of the 6th Air Army of Lieutenant General F.P. Polynin.

The main blow was planned to be delivered by the forces of the 47th Army from the Borovno front, Bolshoy Obzyr bypassing Kovel from the north and at the same time a blow from the Navuz, Topilno front, bypassing Kovel from the south.

The 70th Army was supposed to strike from the front of Lyubeshov, Sedlishche, Rudka (from bridgeheads on the western bank of the Stokhod River) to Kamen-Kashirsky with the task of cutting the Brest-Kovel highway to prevent the enemy from attacking from the direction of Kobrin, Brest.

The 61st Army under the command of Lieutenant General P. A. Belov had the task of clearing the southern bank of the Pripyat River from the enemy, capturing the n / p Turov, David-Gorodok, Rubel, Stolin.

By March 15, in the front line from Stolin to Lutsk, the troops of the 2nd Field Army from Army Group Center were defending - the 7th Infantry Division, the Hanle and Agricola groups as part of the Center cavalry regiment and six infantry battalions; part of the forces of the 4th German Panzer Army from Army Group "South" - 213rd Security Division, parts of the SS Panzer Division "Viking" from the SS Combat Group under the command of Gille, Group "Goof", as well as police, security and construction units. Five Hungarian divisions were located in the immediate rear of the enemy: the 1st with headquarters in the Brest region, the 9th in Malorita, the 12th in Kobrin, the 19th in Lyuboml and the 23rd in Dorogochin.

From March 28, the dividing line between Army Groups South and Center was changed, and the troops of the 42nd Army Corps of the 4th German Panzer Army (SS Panzer Division Viking, 19th Hungarian Division and arrived from the reserve of the main command ground forces of the 131st infantry division) were transferred to the 2nd field army of the Wehrmacht.

During the first half of March, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front carried out a regrouping. The main forces of the divisions of the 47th and 70th armies were pulled up to the line of the Stokhod River, and their forward detachments, knocking down small enemy groups, crossed over to the western bank of the river and occupied bridgeheads in a number of places. The main forces were also directed at them.

On March 15, the troops of the front, without completing their concentration completely, launched an offensive with the forces of the 47th and 70th armies. On March 16, the main forces of the 61st Army went on the offensive in the Stolin direction.

Operating in the extremely difficult conditions of wooded and swampy terrain, the 47th and 70th armies had advanced 30-40 kilometers by March 18. Enemy troops were driven back to Kovel, and the garrison of the city, which the Germans declared a "fortress", was blocked by units of the 60th, 143th, 175th and 260th rifle divisions of the 47th army. In Kovel, units of the Bach consolidated group, the 177th regiment of the 213rd security division, the 17th police regiment, the 12th railway security battalion, the 19th and 9th Hungarian infantry divisions and the SS Viking tank division were surrounded.

The enemy took urgent measures to strengthen the defense in this direction. In the last decade of March - in early April, he additionally transferred to the zone of the 2nd Belorussian Front: 4th Panzer Division, 131, 211, 253rd Infantry Divisions, 5th Light Infantry Division, corps group "E" as part of combat groups of 86th, 137th and 251st infantry divisions, units of the 1st ski brigade, 190, 270, 904, 1005th and 1007th assault gun brigades and a division armed with 88-mm Rhino / Nashorn self-propelled guns ...

As these troops arrived, enemy resistance increased. Its defense was facilitated by a highly marshy area with big amount rivers flowing from north to south.

Beginning on March 23, the enemy launched several strong counterattacks, trying to release the encircled garrison of Kovel. At the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to break through to Kovel on April 4 and stabilize the situation in this sector of the front. The troops of the 47th Army were entrenched on the outskirts of the city; The 70th Army went over to the defensive on the approaches to Ratno.

On the right wing of the front, the 55th and 23rd Infantry Divisions of the 61st Army cleared the southern bank of the Pripyat River east of Stolin. Operating in the Stolin direction, the 9th Guards Rifle Corps (12th Guards, 212nd and 397th Rifle Divisions) pushed the enemy back and went directly to the approaches to the city.

On this, the Polesie operation of the 2nd Belorussian Front, carried out from March 15 to April 5, ended. It is characterized by the fact that it was carried out by the forces of the newly formed front-line formation in the newly opened operational direction. To ensure the deployment of those front forces that arrived from the headquarters reserve, the 61st Army from the Belorussian Front and the 77th Rifle Corps of the 13th Army from the 1st Ukrainian Front, which operated in the zone assigned to the front, were transferred to it. This ensured both the cover of the deployment from possible enemy strikes and the transfer of information to the arriving troops about the enemy, terrain and situation in the area of ​​impending operations.

The concentration of troops arriving from the headquarters reserve took place in very difficult conditions, along one railroad. They were unloaded in the Sarny area, from where they advanced in a marching order. In general, the front began the operation with only part of its forces (13 out of 25 divisions). Some of them approached and fought during the operation, but three divisions and three tank regiments never arrived until the end of the operation. By the time it was transferred to the 2nd Belorussian Front, the 61st Army had its main forces on the right flank, in the Mozyr area. Concentration of her forces to the left flank went by rail, also through Sarny, and until the end of the operation was not completely completed.

As a result of the operation, the troops of the Red Army, in extremely difficult conditions of wooded and swampy terrain and muddy roads, advanced 30–40 km to the west, crossed the Stokhod and Turya rivers and advanced to the approaches to the towns of Rotno, Kovel, Turiysk. Although the attack on Kovel and further on Brest did not receive its development, nevertheless, the advance of Soviet troops to Kovel created the conditions for our offensive in the Lublin direction in the summer of 1944.

On the right wing, the front forces cleared the southern coast of Pripyat from the enemy for a considerable distance. However, the enemy managed to keep in their hands the cities of Turov, Stolin, David-Gorodok.

During the operation, Soviet troops defeated the opposing enemy forces. To counteract the advance of the front's troops, the enemy was forced to transfer a tank, seven infantry divisions, a ski brigade and five brigades of assault guns to the Kovel direction. By pulling back these forces, the troops of the front contributed to the successful offensive of our troops in other directions, in particular, the strike of the 1st Ukrainian Front on Chernivtsi.

On April 5, 1944, the 2nd Belorussian Front was abolished, and its troops were transferred to the 1st Belorussian Front.

1. Documents of the national Russian archives and archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: RCKHIDNI, TsAMO RF, Archive of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces.

2. Collection of materials on the composition, grouping and regrouping of the ground forces of Nazi Germany and the troops of its former satellites on the Soviet-German front for the period 1941-1945, vol. 4.M., 1956.

3. Documents of the State Archives of the Republic of Belarus.

4. 50 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR. M., 1968.424 p.

5. Internal troops in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. M., 1968.332 p.

6. Belarusian Red Banner Military District. Minsk, Publishing House "Belarus", 1973. 674 p.

7. Order of Lenin Moscow Military District. M., Voenizdat, 1977.572 p.

8. Batov P.I. In campaigns and battles. M., Voenizdat, 1981.420 p.

9. Grylev A.N. Dnieper - Carpathians - Crimea (Liberation of Right-Bank Ukraine and Crimea in 1944). M., "Science", 1970. 352 p.

10. Rokossovsky K.K. Soldier's duty. M., Voenizdat, 1974.380 p.

11. Thomas L. Jentz. Panzertruppen 1942-1945. Schiffer Military History, 1996.297 p.

The offensive of Soviet troops in the central sector of the front (August-December 1943)

The offensive of the Belorussian Front in winter period 1944 year

Notes:

Carver M. Battle of El Alamein (defeat of Rommel's Panzer Army in North Africa). M., Tsentrpoligraf, 2003, p. 38.

Results of the Second World War. Collection of articles, A. Kesselring, War in the Mediterranean Basin, p. 95.

Buffetaut Yv. Operation "Supercharge" (La seconde bataille d "El Alamein). La guerre du desert (IV). Militaria Magazine No. 16. Paris, Historie and Collections, 1995, pp. 84, 85.

Karel P. Second front. Book IV. Africa 1941-1943. Normandy 1944. M., Eksmo, 2008, p. 295.

Ibid, p. 323.

Six MK IV Churchill III heavy infantry tanks arrived at the North African theater of operations for combat trials in desert conditions.

Ibid, f. 237, op. 2667, d. 4, ll. 18-21.

Ibid, f. 48-A, op. 1795, d.9, l. 162.

This division was defeated in the Korsun-Shevchensky area. The German command reinstated the division again, and on March 18 it was sent to the Kovel area.

Report card of the General Staff of the Land Forces of Nazi Germany for March 15, 1944.

TsAMO RF, f. 237, op. 2757, d. 29, ll. 126-157.

Ibid, l. 157.

Ibid, l. 162.

TsAMO RF, f. 237, op. 2757, d. 29, ll. 146-157.

• The zodiac symbol of people who were born on the day of 11/5/43> Scorpio (from October 24 to November 22).
• What is the year 1943 according to the Chinese calendar = ››› Black Water Sheep.
• Element of the zodiac sign of the horoscope of Scorpions, born on 5.11.43. ~ Water.
• The planet is the ruler of people who have a birthday on this day of the month - Mars, Pluto.
• This date fell on 45 weeks.
• According to the calendar, there are 30 days in the month.
• Today is daylight hours 5 November - 9 hours 02 minutes(the length of daylight hours is indicated according to the average European latitude of Moscow, Minsk, Kiev.).
• Orthodox Easter was> April 25th.
• According to the calendar, the period is autumn.
• According to the modern calendar, it is not a leap year.
• Best suited for the horoscope of colors, for people born November 5, 1943# ›Very dark greenish blue and Lilac.
• Trees suitable for the combination of the horoscope sign Scorpio and 1943 according to the eastern calendar of animals ›› Platan, Ficus and Viburnum.
• Stones are talismans for people who were born today = ››› Calcite, Sardonyx, Eudialyte, Vorobyovite.
• Especially suitable numbers for people born on November 5 43 years Five.
• The most suitable days of the week for people who were born on November 5, 1943 ›› Monday, Saturday and Friday.
• The main features of the soul, the sign of the horoscope of Scorpions, who were born in this number are unscrupulous, nervous and insensitive.

Information, according to the horoscope, about those men who were born on the day of November 5.

Whatever they do, men are born on November 5, 1943, with great zeal, mood and desire. You won't be able to put pressure on him, he does what he thinks is right. Himself very jealous, and your jealousy should be in a distant dark corner. Like a true Scorpio, he longs for victory. You think how naive and innocent this person looks like he cannot seduce anyone. The role of a tempting snake suits them perfectly, and their poisoned bites seem to be passionate kisses. Scorpio has an explosive temperament.

Description of women born today, 5/11/1943, Eastern year of the animal.

Being naturally dominant in a relationship with a man, a woman 5.11.43g. birth, can mask its strong character with expressive femininity and elegance. Better to ignore her attacks. A woman born on November 5, 1943, loves power and will donate a lot to get it, including money. She will feel her man immediately thanks to her highly developed intuition and will do everything possible to achieve his location.
Female November 5, 1943 year of birth, drown a man in love and passion, and then fray all nerves with jealousy and claims. Knows how to subjugate a person to his will and how to become successful. You should not expect from her a public display of feelings and quivering sighs. If this is a member of your family or a loved one, try to turn Scorpio's venom into a vital energy stimulant. Must be 100% sure that she is the only one waking up. To her future husband, a woman according to the Chinese zodiac of animals on November 5, 1943 - Black Water Sheep, presents high requirements... Can provide a sense of exceptional security, especially during difficult times, as it will provide calm and balanced support.

When I had a financial crisis, it helped me to attract good luck. Money Amulet... The Talisman of Good Luck activates the energy of prosperity in a person, the MAIN IMPORTANT is that he is tuned only to you. The amulet that helped, I ordered for official website.

Celebrities were born under the sign of the horoscope Scorpio:

Queen Marie Antoinette, politician Indira Gandhi, politician Charles de Gaulle, politician Robert Kennedy, Marie Curie, politician Robert Fulton, politician Theodore Roosevelt, preacher Martin Luther, Auguste Rodin, writer F. Dostoevsky, scientist Mikhail Lomonosov.

Monthly November 1943 calendar by day of the week
Mon	W	Wed	NS	Fri	Sat	Sun
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30

The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front (General of the Army N.F. Vatutin) liberated the capital of Ukraine, Kiev, from the Nazi invaders during the Kiev offensive operation. 65 of the most distinguished units and formations received the honorary title of Kiev.

MEMORIES OF KHRUSHCHOV

And so we lived up to the time when our troops again reached the middle reaches of the Dnieper and captured small bridgeheads on its right bank. Can you imagine what joy everyone had? Perhaps I am exaggerating, but I had a special joy: I was “responsible” for Ukraine, I was the secretary of its Central Committee of the Communist Party ... Vatutin and I were triumphant. Before the war, Vatutin was the chief of staff of the Kiev Special Military District, and he lived in Ukraine for a long time. We already dreamed with him Kiev-Pechersk Lavra over the Dnieper. Even now I happily recall the days when we drove out the Germans and approached the Dnieper ...

And here Chernyakhovsky demands that the offensive be postponed for three days, although the Headquarters ordered the advance on such and such a date. Vatutin boiled over and began to prove that the order must be respected and carried out. Well, I see that he simply does not listen to Chernyakhovsky, and I say: "Nikolai Fedorovich, let him report to us, why does he need three days?" And I see that Chernyakhovsky's eyes have already sparkled and that he, too, can show his character. “And here,” he replies, “why. My companies have such and such a number of soldiers. The reserve regiment is in such and such direction. Now he is on the march, he will arrive then. I can replenish the companies that will attack, literally in the evening on the eve of the attack. And in the morning - to attack. The company commanders will not get to know the people they will receive at all. The soldiers will not sniff among themselves, and the commander will not only not study the newcomers, but will not even get to know them. How can you attack like that? You can only lose people and not solve the problem. Give me three days. People will come. I will work with them and then I will be sure that I will solve the problem, break the resistance of the enemy who is in front of me, and develop an offensive in the direction indicated in the order "... In a word, they called Stalin and agreed without any resistance:" Okay, we allow to postpone the offensive for three days. "

KIEV OFFENSIVE OPERATION

The operation of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Great Patriotic War, carried out on November 3-13 (see the map at the bottom of the material). The purpose of the operation is to defeat the grouping of German fascist troops in the Kiev region and liberate the capital of Ukraine. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of General of the Army N.F. Vatutin, having seized bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnieper north and south of Kiev at the end of September 1943, twice (12-15 and 21-23 October) undertook an offensive in order to liberate Kiev. However, these operations did not achieve the desired result ... By the beginning of the operation, the front forces had a general insignificant superiority over the enemy, but in the direction of the main attack (in the zone of the 38th Army) they outnumbered the opposing forces of the fascist German forces (4th Panzer Army) in the infantry 3 times, artillery 4.5 times, tanks 9 times…. The offensive from the Bukrin bridgehead began on November 1. However, this time too, due to the stubborn resistance of the enemy, the Soviet troops failed to break through its defenses. On the morning of November 3, after an artillery preparation from the Lutezh bridgehead, the main grouping of the front struck. By the end of the day, the troops had advanced 5-12 kilometers. On November 4-5, the 3rd Guards Tank Army entered the battle. On November 5, after completing the breakthrough of the enemy defense, she cut the Kiev-Zhitomir highway. The fascist German command, fearing the encirclement of its troops in the Kiev region, began to hastily withdraw them. By the morning of November 6, the capital of Ukraine was liberated. Pursuing the enemy, Soviet troops liberated the city of Fastov on November 7, and Zhitomir on November 13. On November 12, Headquarters, having discovered the concentration of large enemy forces to the south of Kiev and preparing them for a counteroffensive, ordered the front troops in the sector from Zhitomir to the Dnieper to go over to the defensive. The goal of the Kiev offensive operation was fully achieved: the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front liberated Kiev and in its area on the right bank of the Dnieper formed a strategic bridgehead up to 150 kilometers deep. Soviet troops defeated 12 infantry, 2 tank and 1 motorized divisions of the enemy. About 1,200 guns and mortars, 600 tanks and assault guns, 90 aircraft, and about 2,000 vehicles were destroyed and captured.

The Kiev offensive operation is instructive in the concentration of large forces on a limited beachhead; covert regrouping in a difficult situation and in a short time, the mass of tanks and artillery from one bridgehead to another, which ensured the achievement of surprise strike; successful development of the offensive in several directions.

Literature: History of the Great Patriotic War Soviet Union. 1941-1945. T.3.M., 1964; A.A. Grechko Liberation of Kiev. A short military history sketch. M., 1973

SPECIAL MEANING

Political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations of formations and units carried out a large and meaningful work to mobilize all personnel to fulfill the extremely responsible task assigned to us. It was especially important that it coincided with preparations for the celebration of the 26th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. "Let's free Kiev by the 26th anniversary of the Great October Revolution" - this slogan became the basis of all political work in the army.

TAKE KIEV FOR THE ANNIVERSARY OF GREAT OCTOBER (FROM THE BOOK "WAR")

Stalin: When are you planning to take Kiev?

Antonov: Not earlier than the twentieth of November, Comrade Stalin.

Stalin: Too late! We need to take the sixth of November, the anniversary of the October Revolution.

Epic "Liberation"

Cinema cannot be 100% historically accurate. Cinema is an art, it is always conditional. The creators of a historical film solve their problems, often successfully - and no less successfully these films can bring academics to heart attacks. Moreover, any film, even an unsuccessful one, will be watched by more people than will read any book. And when it will be shown on TV ...

The grandiose epic "Liberation" renewed the Soviet mythology of war. As befits a movie, I straightened and simplified everything. For example, she left only one tank in the Red Army - the T-34, and in the Wehrmacht - only the Tigers. And the control over the making of the film by the chief ideologist of the Brezhnev USSR, M.A.Suslov, was reflected in the dialogue that was put into the epigraph.

According to Suslov, everything was harmonious and logical, in the ideological spirit of developed socialism. There is a heroic Soviet army. There is the city of Kiev - the capital of Soviet Ukraine. There is another anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution (VOSR). All this must be connected! And what? It would be foolish not to tie ...

This has always been done in the USSR (and not only) - different kinds of achievements were adjusted to different beautiful dates. Sometimes they slowed down, but usually they adjusted it. Actually, they do this now, only without the previous fanaticism and scope.

Unfortunately, Suslov's "harmonious logic" reinforced the long-running myth that, for the sake of "Danish" events, the military leaders made hasty decisions, which poured a lot of blood on the troops. A new argument in favor of the "absurdity of the soviet system" was found in the kitchens of the intelligentsia.

Myths never appear from scratch. The first conditionally positive order of the People's Commissar of Defense since the beginning of the war, announced to all fighters, was congratulations on February 23, 1942. Order No. 55, summing up the results of 8 months of fighting, asserted that the enemy's strength had been broken. As evidence, a list of liberated cities was cited: Kalinin, Klin, Sukhinichi, Andreapol, Toropets. And although these cities were taken by ours earlier, from the context it turned out that they were liberated just on the eve of the day of the Red Army. "Yeah, for the holiday" - remembered many.

Well, and Kiev, contrary to the imagination of the creators of "Osvobozhdenie", initially - no one was going to take in December. No one hastily moved an unprepared offensive to an earlier date - exactly so that on the eve of November 7 - "the red day of the calendar." On the contrary, several offensive attempts were made even earlier - in October, while it was dry, the roads were not washed out. When it didn't work out, they postponed it later - to the beginning

November. "Start the offensive of the right wing on 1-2.11.43, so that the 3rd Guards Tank Army began to operate on 3-4.11.43. The left wing should start the offensive no later than 2.11.43." (From the directive of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of October 24.)

The new offensive was dictated by the operational situation on the fronts, the successes of our troops south of Kiev and the concentration of German reserves. But when it turned out that November 7 would immediately take place - a pleasant coincidence - it was a sin for the commissars not to take advantage of this.

... Yes, by the way, also about the losses. About how stupidly and suicidal the commissars (Zhukov, Stalin, cruel commanders) drove the ignorant mass of people on the German machine guns on the occasion of November 7th.

Our irrecoverable losses during the Kiev strategic offensive operation amounted to less than 1 percent.

6491 people killed, missing, captured, died of wounds and diseases, with the total number of troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front at the beginning of the operation - 671,0001.

Birthday number 6 remains unbeatable. The nature is honest, frank, reliable. Views are progressive, but with a desire to create a name for themselves, to gain respect and favor from others, to maintain peace and tranquility among friends, to improve their living conditions.
You literally exude optimism and cheerfulness.

This number is considered one of the happiest, since it is the sum of its divisors: 6 = 1 + 2 + 3. People of the number 6 are harmonious and balanced, have confidence, although sometimes they are too stubborn. They are very romantic and amorous, their interests are usually focused on home and family. They have good taste, they are very disposed to themselves, they easily converge with other people.

The lucky day of the week for the number 6 is Friday.

Your planet is Venus.

Advice:

Justifying the job or position entrusted to you, you are satisfied with what you have achieved and do not strive for the heights of a career or fame. Complacency and complacency sometimes hinder you in this. The mask of impassivity does not suit you, since it does not cause much sympathy and gives rise to suspicion of hypocrisy.

Important:

Home, family; activities that require patience.
Six betrays a person who is inactive, inert, who loves home comfort. Harmonizes relations with the outside world, but can develop laziness and lack of principle, makes a person non-conflict, but at the same time makes him work hard and hard. The number patronizes physicians, laboratory workers, jewelers, designers, cartoonists, museum workers and collectors.

Love, sex.

These people are usually very sexy. However, they do not in any way enjoy universal love. Material considerations play a very important role in their choice of a partner. If there is no sexual compatibility between the spouses and mutual love- this will become a source of frustration and even a break in relations.

They should be more open in expressing their feelings and affection. Then they will more strongly attract partners who will actually love them as they are, and not as they appear.

Birth number for woman

Birth number 6 for a woman Outwardly, she seems imperturbable, coldish and even aloof, but underneath this hides sensuality and sexuality. In her youth, she is often naive, sentimental and shy. As an adult, she becomes reasonable. She is dreamy, has a rich imagination and high intuition. Can be soft, timid, modest or seductive, flirty, playful. Its unpredictability makes it especially attractive. Inclined to romantic relationships. Treasures every moment of love. With all my heart and soul, I give myself up to my feeling. She needs a sensitive and responsive partner, only such a person will make her happy. She does not tolerate half-heartedness in relationships: all or nothing. He wants to love and be loved, and to the end. Can be quick-tempered and touchy. She wants security, understanding and care. Although she herself is able to withstand any storms of life. When parting with a partner, he tries to maintain friendly relations. Marriage and children are top priorities. Chooses a husband who is equal in social status and with similar interests. Relationships with relatives are of paramount importance to her, and she gives them a lot of time and energy.

Birth number for a man

Birth number 6 for a man Such a man is obligatory, hardworking and reliable. Strives for a stable relationship. Loves, selflessly surrendering to feelings. Easily vulnerable, prefers to give more than take. He sees the advantages and disadvantages of both the partner himself and the prospects of his relationship with him. His emotions are most fully expressed in the field of relationships, and he seeks to find a faithful, understanding companion. He can be a sincere and deeply committed partner. His need for sensual love implies first of all the body, and then the soul. Knows how to adapt well to changing circumstances. If he is respected as a person, he feels confident, otherwise he changes his partner. He is very attached to his mother, and his wife has to win a place for herself in his life. Dislikes innovations, observes many conventions. Has a keen intuition. Home and family are the main things for him. A big problem in relationships is an increased sensitivity to criticism and judgment of others. Can be pedantic, demanding of others. He needs to forgive other people for their shortcomings, to value their merits more. It is better to find a companion with similar professional interests, of your circle, so that her friends would like her, but not rank higher in social status.

Birth number 5

People born on this day are mercantile: the acquisition and possession of money and business is the main goal of their life. They are dexterous, have tremendous business ability, their money affairs are flourishing: in a short time they collect large sums. Smart and resourceful. They think quickly and make decisions, are purposeful. For love of funds and impatience in purchasing, they can break the law.

It's easy to get along with them: they are consistent in speech, born diplomats. They quickly recover from the most difficult blows of fate, if it does not affect what they consider wealth. Intelligence, dexterity, tact, decisiveness, speed in the implementation of plans.

A strange feature of their life is that even their sexual desires and needs are colored by a love of money.
Unfortunately, despite their intelligence, they repeat their own mistakes. They are incorrigible players. These are extremely excitable people, they can lose their sense of proportion and fail.

They are not able to lead a beggarly life, they will go to any extremes in order to acquire wealth. Often victims of the law. They have a very shrewd mind, it is pleasant to deal with them if they are reasonable in their mercantile views.
They may have joint problems or mental distress.

Pythagoras square or psychomatrix

The qualities listed in the cells of the square can be strong, average, weak or absent, it all depends on the number of digits in the cell.

Deciphering the Pythagorean Square (square cells)

Character, willpower - 4

Energy, charisma - 1

Cognition, creativity - 1

Health, beauty - 3

Logic, intuition - 2

Diligence, skill - 1

Luck, luck - 0

Sense of Duty - 0

Memory, mind - 1

Deciphering the Pythagorean Square (lines, lines and diagonals of the square)

The higher the value, the more pronounced the quality.

Self-assessment (column "1-2-3") - 6

Making money (column "4-5-6") - 6

Talent potential (column "7-8-9") - 1

Purposefulness (line "1-4-7") - 7

Family (line "2-5-8") - 3

Stability (line "3-6-9") - 3

Spiritual potential (diagonal "1-5-9") - 7

Temperament (diagonal "3-5-7") - 3

Chinese zodiac sign Goat

Every 2 years there is a change of the Elements of the year (fire, earth, metal, water, wood). The Chinese astrological system divides years into active, stormy (Yang) and passive, calm (Yin).

You Goat Elements Water of the Year Yin

Birth clock

24 hours correspond to the twelve signs of the Chinese zodiac. Sign chinese horoscope birth, corresponding to the time of birth, therefore it is very important to know the exact time of birth, it has a strong impact on the character of a person. It is argued that according to the birth horoscope, you can accurately find out the features of your character.

The most striking manifestation of the qualities of the hour of birth will take place if the symbol of the hour of birth coincides with the symbol of the year. For example, a person born in the year and hour of the Horse will display the maximum qualities prescribed for this sign.

• Rat - 23:00 - 01:00
• Bull - 1:00 - 3:00
• Tiger - 3:00 - 5:00
• Rabbit - 5:00 - 7:00
• Dragon - 7:00 - 9:00
• Snake - 09:00 - 11:00
• Horse - 11:00 - 13:00
• Goat - 13:00 - 15:00
• Monkey - 15:00 - 17:00
• Rooster - 17:00 - 19:00
• Dog - 19:00 - 21:00
• Pig - 21:00 - 23:00

European zodiac sign Scorpio

Dates: 2013-10-24 -2013-11-22

The Four Elements and their Signs are distributed as follows: Fire(Aries, Leo and Sagittarius), Earth(Taurus, Virgo and Capricorn), Air(Gemini, Libra and Aquarius) and Water(Cancer, Scorpio and Pisces). Since the elements help to describe the main traits of a person's character, by including them in our horoscope, they help to form a more complete picture of a particular person.

The features of this element are cold and moisture, metaphysical sensitivity, feeling, perception. There are 3 signs of this quality in the Zodiac - a water trine (triangle): Cancer, Scorpio, Pisces. The trigon of water is considered to be the trigon of feelings and sensations. Principle: constancy of the internal with external variability. Water is emotions, inner peace, preservation, memory. She is plastic, changeable, secretive. Gives such qualities as uncertainty, dreaminess, imagery of thinking, softness of manifestation. In the body, it slows down the metabolism, manages fluids, the work of the endocrine glands.
People, in whose horoscopes the element of Water is expressed, have a phlegmatic temperament. These people are very sensitive, very receptive and impressionable, thinking, living more internal life than external. People of the trigon of Water are usually contemplative, think about both their own good and the good of their loved ones, however, at times they are indifferent, lethargic, lazy, with the exception of people of the Scorpio sign. The external manifestation of feelings in them is not as pronounced as in the representatives of the trigons of Fire or Air, but their internal feelings are experienced by them with great strength and depth.
In people of the trigon of Water, efficiency, practicality, sobriety of thought, objectivity are not strong point, but they do not have to take fantasy, they have a rich and vivid imagination, great internal and external strength, especially in Scorpios.
People of the water trigon, thanks to the richness of their inner world and the sophistication of perception, achieve the greatest success in professions related to the world of the arts, especially they shine as artists and musicians-performers. Water signs can also be excellent workers in service and food industries. And Scorpios are also great detectives due to their subtle intuition.
The plans and moods of people of the trigon of Water can change both from external circumstances and from internal state souls. An insignificant detail, sometimes not even tracked by consciousness, can radically change their state of mind, which can lead to a complete loss of interest either in the case or in a partner.
People of the element of Water have great spiritual sophistication, are kind, polite, courteous, very nice and attractive. They are usually not aggressive, with the exception of the Scorpio.
Of the signs of the trigone of Water, Scorpio is the strongest in body and spirit, the most meaningful, the most aggressive, not susceptible to unwanted outside influences and strong resistance to everything with which his soul does not agree. His patience, endurance, tenacity and perseverance are amazing.
The weakest of the zodiac signs of the trigon of Water is Pisces. The middle between hardness and instability is occupied by the third sign of this trigone - Cancer. Although his spiritual sphere is also very receptive and impressionable, he is distinguished by noticeable perseverance, endurance and purposefulness, therefore, of all water signs, it is Cancer who most often achieves success in life.
Feelings in all three signs of the trigon of Water are approximately equally strong and, as a rule, prevail over the mind. These people are always ready to make self-sacrifice for the good. dear person, as they always experience deep and pure feelings in relation to loved ones and loved ones. If they are not appreciated, they leave their partner forever, which is a real drama of life for them. They are looking for a partner who deserves them. Love and marriage are of paramount importance for them in life, especially for women.
An excessive inclination to daydreaming and fantasy, too vivid imagination can lead to an internal contradiction - the collision of their illusions with reality. If a person does not see a way out of this state, depression, dependence on alcohol, drugs, other stimulants, and even mental illness may occur.

Taurus, Leo, Scorpio, Aquarius. The fixed cross is the cross of evolution, stability and stability, accumulation, concentration of development. He uses the experience of the past. It gives stability, hardness, strength, durability, stability. A person in whose horoscope the Sun, Moon, or most of the personal planets are in fixed signs, is distinguished by conservatism, inner calmness, steadfastness, perseverance, perseverance, patience, endurance, prudence. He fiercely resists what they are trying to impose on him, and is able to rebuff anyone. Nothing annoys him as much as the need to change something, no matter what area of ​​life it may concern. He loves certainty, consistency, requires guarantees of reliability in order to be protected from any surprise.
Although he does not have sharp impulses, ease in making decisions, which are inherent in other signs, but he is distinguished by constancy of opinions, stability in his habits and life positions. He is attached to his work, he can work tirelessly, "until he drops." He is also constant in his attachments to friends and relatives, firmly and steadfastly clings to someone or to something, be it material value, social status, a faithful friend, a devoted like-minded person or a close and beloved person. People of the fixed cross are faithful, loyal and reliable, they are the knights of the word. You can always rely on their promises. But it is worth deceiving them only once, and their trust is lost, maybe even forever. People of the fixed cross have strong desires, passions, they act only from their own motives and always rely on their own instinct. Their feelings, likes and dislikes are unshakable, unshakable. Adversity, setbacks and blows of fate do not bend them, and any obstacle only enhances their perseverance and perseverance, as it gives them new strength to fight.

This is the last sign of the zone of stability, the sign of the element of Water, which is formed mainly under the vibrations of the planets Pluto and Mars. Elements Water is presented here in its most stable form.

You, as a rule, are closed on the inner level, suspicious, distrustful, constantly directed inward, jealous, often you delve into introspection and self-condemnation. Quite often, you tend to self-distill and latent self-destruction. For you, this can be a way of transforming yourself with subsequent restoration and turning into life, to restoration at a new, qualitatively different level. It should be noted that you have a very difficult transformation and severe deep self-destruction, typical for any representative of the Scorpio sign. But you are not afraid of these destruction - it is a means of development and realization for you.
It is good if this restoration after another destruction is used for the benefit of the evolution of one's soul and the souls of others. Because in the worst case, this destruction can be used to destroy your very personality and the people around you. In a sense, you are guided by the slogan: "The worse the better!" When you feel bad, then you have the energy and strength to deal with the circumstances, with the negative environment. For your development, you need constant shocks: if everything is calm, then you feel bad, you are engaged in devouring yourself. Therefore, you subconsciously strive for actions that are associated with risk, or you are drawn to the knowledge of the secret and occult, to magic.

In general, you are very constant and stable, because you are a fixed cross. You are stable in everything: in love and passion, in your attachments, as well as in hatred. You are very scary in your hatred. You can sacrifice yourself, easily destroy your life and the lives of those around you.
Among the terrible lower Scorpions we find the minister of propaganda of fascist Germany, Goebbels, the sadistic physician Mengele. However, there were many excellent psychologists and hypnotists among the Scorpios, people with abilities up to magical effects on people. This also applies to cases of strong manifestation of the sign of Scorpio. You come up with great ease and create schemes and clearly use your schemes, you know how to subtly influence others and subjugate them. A developed magical Scorpio is able to subdue a huge crowd to himself, to his magical influence.
In the lowest case, you are an individual who sees and notices only negative sides in others. You are not even a Scorpio anymore, but a spider, a tarantula. Then you are mainly engaged in self-criticism, and unconstructive and, of course, bite others.

What is your dynamics of development? To some extent, it is similar to the dynamics of development of Taurus, but in Taurus, development is slow, smooth: slow accumulation and transition to a new quality. You have a build-up of tension, and then an abrupt transition to another level, a flash, almost an explosion. No wonder all nuclear research connected with Pluto and, naturally, with Scorpio, where his home is. If we talk about your problems, then one of the most important problems is the sublimation of sexual energy. In a sense, Scorpios are the sexiest sign of the zodiac. At worst, this is expressed in perversions, at best - sexual energy is sublimated into various types of creativity.
I must say that the average Scorpios are very difficult to get along with each other. The life of two Scorpios was observed, which "lasted" only two years, that is, experience has shown that "average" Scorpios "in the same bank" do not get along for a long time, they bite themselves and each other to the point of insanity, and then creep in different directions. In evolutionary development, you definitely need to solve the problem of your subconscious, because literally Shakespeare's passions often rage there. One of the main problems is to organize passions and channel them into a constructive channel, use them “for peaceful purposes”. Your karmic task as a Scorpio is very responsible and somewhat unpleasant. It consists in the fact that you must karmically “bite” yourself and those around you, but these “bites” are aimed at cleansing yourself and those around you from impurity. You "bite" only those who are struck by the bad and you choose the most vulnerable and rotten place and there you put your stinging "bite". In the high case, you always know when, who, where and where to bite.

Scorpio countries - Afghanistan, Iran, Azerbaijan. The people and peoples of Scorpio are characterized by internal contradictions, from the overwhelming and tearing energy, internal conflict between the Spirit of the people and the ideology and religion imposed on it.
In the highest case, you are like an eagle flying above the ordinary and showing people the way to the higher spheres of spirituality. You are capable of self-denial, altruism and great enlightenment. Such was F.M. Dostoevsky, among whose heroes we also find many typical Scorpions (Raskolnikov, for example). These are often writers of a sarcastic type, very caustic thinkers - Voltaire, Rabelais, A. Bely. The clairvoyant Scorpio was the artist Hieronymus Bosch, as well as Camus, Picasso, John of Kronstadt. Trotsky can be named as a politician. Among the artists, the Scorpions was Arkady Raikin. Father Makhno was a rather bright Scorpio, the violinist Paganini was a magic Scorpio. The Scorpions were the famous occultist Papus, the founder of "magnetism" Mesmer.

Famous Scorpions: Abramovich, Viktyuk, Vishnevskaya, I. Gandhi, Herschel, Gates, Gurchenko, Goldanskaya, Whoopi Goldberg, Dassin, Delon, Dibrov, Dostoevsky, Erofeev, DiCaprio, Karachentsov, Columbus, Lombroso, Lomonosov, Magelland Maradona, Milyavskaya, Vanessa May, Demi Moore, Chris Norman, Paganini, Primakov, Plisetskaya, Picasso, Ryazanov, Ramazzotti, Raikin, Roden, J. Roberts, E. Rotterdam, Seleznev, Sisley, Talkov, Ted Turner, Trotsky, Tokareva Turgenev, Ulyanov, Peta Wilson, Khlebnikova.

Watch a video:

Scorpio | 13 signs of the zodiac | TV channel TV-3

The site provides concise information about the signs of the zodiac. Detailed information can be found on the respective websites.

Dear Joseph Vissarionovich!

Only extreme circumstances allow me to contact you. I wrote a book - "Before Sunrise".

This is an anti-fascist book. It is written in defense of reason and its rights.

In addition to the artistic description of life, the book contains a scientific topic about Pavlov's conditioned reflexes.

This theory has mainly been tested on animals. Apparently, I was able to prove its useful applicability to human life.

At the same time, Freud's gross idealistic mistakes were clearly revealed.

And this further proved the enormous truth and significance of Pavlov's theory - simple, accurate and reliable.

The editorial board of the magazine "October" more than once gave my book for review to Academician A.D. Speransky both during the period when I was writing this book and after the completion of my work. The scientist admitted that the book was written in accordance with the data of modern science and deserves printing and attention.

The book began to be printed. However, without waiting for the end, the critics reacted negatively to her. And the printing was stopped.

It seems to me unfair to evaluate the work according to the first half of it, because in the first half there is no solution to the issue. It contains only materials, tasks and partly shows the method. And only in the second half was the artistic and scientific part of the research deployed, and the corresponding conclusions were drawn.

Dear Joseph Vissarionovich, I would not dare to disturb you if I did not have a deep conviction that my book, proving the power of reason and its triumph over lower forces, is needed today. It may be needed by Soviet science as well.

For the sake of a scientific topic, I allowed myself to write, perhaps more frankly than is usually accepted. But this was necessary for my proofs. It seems to me that this frankness of mine only strengthened the satirical side - the book ridicules mendacity, vulgarity, immorality.

I take the liberty of asking you to familiarize yourself with my work, or give an order to check it in more detail and, in any case, check it in its entirety.

All the instructions that can be made in this case, I will take into account with gratitude.

I sincerely wish you good health.

Micah. Zoshchenko

Moscow, hotel "Moscow".