Which subdivisions of the Shimanovsky border detachment were in Afghanistan. The entry of the border troops of the kgb of the ussr into afghanistan (12/22/1981)
This material is posted with the permission of Nikolai Anatolyevich Salmin
(Director of the Museum of Memory of Soldiers-Internationalists "Shuravi")
ON. Salmin
Servicemen of bodies and troops
The State Security (KGB)
USSR in the "Afghan" war (1979 - 1989)
More than 28 years have passed since the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, but the echo Afghan wars still excite the minds and hearts of Russians. Interest in Afghanistan has grown even more in connection with the US anti-terrorist operation in this country.
In the years since the war in Afghanistan, many lips have left and "Silent seal"... Many books have already been written about the events of those years. But, despite this, to this day, many pages remain white spots in history. One of them is the participation in the war in Afghanistan of military personnel of the bodies and troops of the KGB of the USSR.
In this work, the author does not set himself the task of discovering something new in history. Afghan war. These notes are just an attempt to comprehend and understand the structure, tasks and role of the KGB bodies and troops in that long (9 years, 1 month and 18 days) war. In the course of this and his previous works, the author used the estimates of the wrong ones. "Who has not served, but knows", and those , "Who served, was, saw and knows", in this case - KGB officers and servicemen.
Background and itself Afghan war, as already noted, is sufficiently covered, their presentation is not the task of this work. Due to the fact that from the first days of this war, the KGB special forces became known - "Thunder", "Zenith", "Cascade" and others, it makes sense to briefly highlight the history of the creation of these units.
The first special units of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) were created during the Great Patriotic War. The most famous among them is OMSBON (separate motorized rifle brigade special purpose), which was part of the IV (partisan) Directorate of the NKVD, headed by Lieutenant General P.A. Sudoplatov. But after the end of the war, the brigade was disbanded.
The successor to the IV Directorate was the special department created in 1955 as part of the KGB PGU. This department included the so-called. « Separate brigade special purpose "- OBON, which was supposed to be deployed and used in wartime. The brigade was staffed with officers - operatives of the territorial bodies of the KGB.
As the deputy chief of the special department recalls (1979), the first commander "Cascade" A. I. Lazarenko “OBON was separated into an independent military unit and had a cropped character; the number of the brigade was about 4500 people. It was the KGB special reserve. The unit was subdivided into 6 operational regiments and 1 operational battalion, which were formed locally by the Directorates of the KGB of the Moscow and Leningrad regions, the Khabarovsk and Krasnodar territories, the KGB of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
The special department oversaw these bodies - formations, was engaged in the selection and training of a special reserve of foreign intelligence, organized courses, training camps, conducted exercises for fighters.
... The concept of OBON activities as a subdivision special purpose The KGB arose from an assessment of the degree of external danger for the country. It determined the structure, methods of recruitment, organization of training and education of personnel; issues of armament, equipment and equipment, as well as tactics of action in certain conditions.
In the 1960 -1970s, the brigade's special reserve personnel took part in various operational - military operations. The most characteristic were special measures to prepare for the entry of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968 and a set of special measures to neutralize counter-revolutionary forces in Afghanistan.
To train special reserve officers in 1969, as part of the Higher School of the KGB, under the operational subordination of foreign intelligence, advanced courses for officers (operational) personnel appeared - KUOS for training specialists in reconnaissance and sabotage activities. Graduates of these courses subsequently stormed Amin's palace, fought in Afghanistan and Chechnya, took part in special events inside the country, carried out advisory activities in Angola, Vietnam, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Cuba and other countries.
“The training program for the students of the KUOS included a set of disciplines aimed at training the commander of an operational-combat group, a comprehensively developed and professionally competent officer - the head of a subdivision. For 7 months, the students underwent special physical, fire, airborne and mountain training, mastered special tactics, mine explosives, topography, improved intelligence skills, studied the experience of partisan warfare and much more. "
In the mid-70s, the information and research structure of the KGB, tracking by operational means everything related to the special forces of the NATO countries, was a new department of the "C" Directorate of the PGU - the Eighth. The department trained special reservists in case of possible hostilities.
According to General Drozdov “The events in Afghanistan forced us to create in 1978-1980 and send there non-structural units such as“ Zenith ”and“ Cascade ”staffed with special reserves.
The first squad "Zenith"(about 50 people) ended up in Afghanistan on July 5, 1979 (although there is information that for the first time the group was sent to Afghanistan back in 1978 - to guard the Soviet embassy). The group was headed by one of the leaders of the KUOS, Colonel G. I. Boyarinov - a participant in the Great Patriotic War, an experienced intelligence officer, who spent almost two decades teaching and research work in the field of partisan and reconnaissance and sabotage activities, who participated in special events in Czechoslovakia (1968).
The main task "Zenith - 1" there was reconnaissance of large Afghan cities, primarily the capital of Afghanistan - Kabul, locations of state and government buildings, facilities of special services, army headquarters and barracks, their security and defense systems. Routes were also worked out in case of the evacuation of Soviet diplomats and specialists.
After completing their tasks Zenit - 1 returned to the Union, on October 20, 1979, he was replaced by Zenit - 2, which consisted of about 60 employees who passed the CMP. The group was headed by Major Ya. F. Semenov. For conspiracy purposes, it was announced that "Cascade" sent to guard the Soviet embassy in Kabul.
In early December 1979, at the request of Afghan leader Amin, the Politburo decided to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. Simultaneously with the introduction of troops, it was decided to remove Amin from power, whom the Soviet leadership did not trust.
On December 14, a special group arrived in the capital of Afghanistan "Thunder"(30 people), which was formed from the employees of the Group "A" 7th Directorate of the KGB. The commander "Thunder" was Major M. M. Romanov. To enhance Zenith together with the special forces, an additional 30 fighters arrived - special reserves of the KUOS. Colonel GI Boyarinov, who had just arrived in Afghanistan, took over the general leadership of both units.
4 days later - December 18 - representatives of the Office arrived "WITH" PGU Major General Yu.I. Drozdov and Captain II Rank E.G. Kozlov, who were supposed to organize the holding, jointly with the special forces of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (so-called. "Muslim battalion"), the operation to overthrow Amin. From the GRU, the operation was supervised by Colonel V.V. Kolesnik (deputy head of the GRU Special Intelligence Directorate).
The new arrivals, together with Lieutenant General V.A.Kirpichenko, First Deputy PSU Deputy Commander and Lieutenant General N.N.
In this work, the author does not set himself the task of presenting everything that is already known about the prehistory of the Afghan events, about who and how made the decision to send troops to Afghanistan, because "... most of the interesting pages of this epic have already been read and turned over."
It is only worth recalling that on the morning of December 25, 1979, the troops received a directive signed by the Minister of Defense of the USSR D. Ustinov on the introduction of a contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. The entry of parts of the 40th Army of TurkVO began at 15.00 Moscow time, at the same time military transport aircraft with an amphibious division on board crossed the air border.
Counterintelligence support for the deployment of the 40th Army played an important role in the deployment of troops. Along with the advanced units, units of the field administration of the Special Department of the KGB of the army, headed by its first chief, Colonel S. Bazhkov, entered Kabul.
An operation was carried out in Kabul on December 27 "Storm - 333" to capture the Afghan capital and overthrow Amin. The main events unfolded around the Amin's palace "Taj Bek"- the residence of the head of the Afghan state.
Special groups of the KGB took part in the storming of the palace and neutralization of its guard, numbering over 2.5 thousand people. "Zenith" and "Thunder", "Muslim battalion" and a company of the 345th parachute regiment. The total number of storming officers is more than 650 people.
"Objects of influence" were not limited only to the palace (in fact, the fortress) of Amin. "Detachment" Zenith "acted as part of 9 groups, headed by the most trained and experienced officers: Amin's palace - Y. Semenov, Tsaranda (police) - Y. Melnik, General Staff - V. Rozin, KAM (military counterintelligence) - R Shafigulin, prison - F. Korobeinikov, telegraph - V. Ovsyannikov, "well" (communication - ed.) - B. Pleshkunov, post office - A. Puntus, television center - A. Ryabinin.
During the seizure of these objects in Kabul Zenit acted with the support of paratroopers of the 103rd "Vitebsk" division (each group was assigned an airborne company on armored vehicles).
During the operation "Storm - 333" from the composition Zenith three officers died: Colonel G.I.Boyarinov, Captain A.N. Group "Thunder" lost two employees: captains D.V. Volkov and G.E. Zudin. Losses "Muslim battalion" and paratroopers were 10 people.
By early 1980 Zenith and Thunder(with the exception of two small groups guarding the Soviet embassy and the new Afghan leader Karmal) were withdrawn from Afghanistan and returned to the Union. The KGB leadership was reported on the operation in Afghanistan and proposals were made to reorganize the KGB special forces.
In April 1980, by a closed decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a large group of KGB officers were awarded state awards. Colonel G. I. Boyarinov " for the courage and heroism shown in the provision of international assistance to the fraternal Afghan people ", was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously). Colonel V. V. Kolesnik (GRU), captain V. F. Karpukhin (Group "A") and captain II rank E. G. Kozlov (PGU) were awarded the same rank. About 400 people were awarded orders and medals.
General V.A.Kirpichenko recalls: “... Afghanistan became the main task: we strengthened the security agencies of Afghanistan, sent our advisers to many Afghan provinces, began to train hundreds of Afghan intelligence officers and counterintelligence officers on the territory of the Soviet Union and in Kabul ...
The orders of the KGB leadership were unambiguous: nothing to spare for Afghanistan, all their requests must be satisfied immediately ...
In the leadership of the PGU ... four people were engaged in Afghan affairs: the head of the (foreign intelligence) V. A. Kryuchkov, myself, the deputy chief of intelligence in this area, Ya. P. Medyanik, and ... the head of the C Department, Yu. I. Drozdov. "
The difficult situation in Afghanistan required the constant presence in this country of a trained KGB special forces unit. As the Soviet troops were drawn into hostilities, it became necessary to counter the tactics of guerrilla warfare used by the rebels. For these purposes, by order of the Chairman of the KGB Yu.V. Andropov, a reconnaissance and sabotage detachment was formed and sent to Afghanistan. "Cascade"... The detachment was created on the basis of the mobilization of OBON special reservists, the total number was about 1000 people (military personnel from the border troops were recruited to the positions of drivers, riflemen, signalmen, etc.).
"Additional training" detachment was carried out in Fergana on the basis of the 105th airborne division ...
... detachment "Cascade" ... were assigned and ... specific tasks:
Objective # 1: Assisting in the establishment of local security agencies.
Task number 2: the organization of operational - undercover work against the existing bandit formations.
Task number 3: organizing and conducting special measures against the most aggressive opponents of the Afghan people's regime and the USSR. "
The organizational structure of the detachment was simple, but flexible, which made it possible to ensure combat readiness and livelihoods. "Cascade"... The functions of the headquarters included: planning of combat operations, personnel work, maintaining operational documentation, organizing communications with Moscow and teams on the territory of Afghanistan, ensuring security and protecting the deployment sites.
Captain I rank V.N.Sopryakov, chief of staff of one of the "Cascades" remembers: “The headquarters of the detachment was located in Kabul ... the total number - more than 700 people: of them 215 - officers, 30 - warrant officers, about 500 - soldiers of border troops, 30 - translators. Each team and the Kabul center had their own armored vehicles, vehicles and a radio station ... ".
In every team "Cascade" there were about a hundred people, of which about 30 were operational officers. Teams were deployed in major cities throughout Afghanistan (for example, in "Cascade-3": Herat - team "Carpathians", Shindand - "Karpaty-1", Kandahar - "Caucasus", Ghazni - Altai, Jalalabad - "Tibet", Mazar-i-Sharif - "North-1" and Kunduz - "North-11").
Autumn 1980 "Cascade" was operatively subordinated to the special forces detachment of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs "Cobalt", numbering 600 people. All combat operations staff Cobalt jointly with "Zenith", with the support of army units.
“Zenith teams” were precisely that operational - combat unit, which represented a formidable weapon in the conditions of hostilities in Afghanistan. The high training of the staff made it possible to achieve great results in the operational and reconnaissance activities of the detachment, with minimal losses ".
The Afghan events raised the question of creating a permanent KGB special unit to carry out special tasks around the world. At a closed joint meeting of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on August 19, 1981, the country's top leadership decided to create a top secret special-purpose detachment at the PGU KGB to conduct operations outside the USSR in "Special period"... The detachment received the name "Pennant" E. G. Kozlov was appointed its commander. The core of the detachment was made up of employees who passed the KUOS. For conspiracy purposes, the detachment in all documents was called "Separate training center"(OUTS) KGB.
Since the summer of 1982, operational staff "Pennant" passed combat training as part of "Cascade".
Yu.I. Drozdov recalls: “The stay of the officers in Afghanistan at that time - I emphasize - of the forming Vympel made it possible to immediately engage in the development of a serious area, to get the practice of actions in acute combat conditions; gave interesting stuff to hone training programs, to understand the peculiarities of the enemy's work, with whom you can meet here ...
Thanks to efficiency, knowledge of the situation, good intelligence ... they managed to achieve the most important goal- reducing the number of possible victims of the Soviet Army and the opposing sides ".
One of the activities of the KGB special forces in Afghanistan was the creation and training of similar structures in the security agencies of Afghanistan. Thus, the former head of the Special Operations Directorate of the Ministry of State Security (KHAD) of the DRA, General "Ahmed" remembers: “… Advisers from the USSR worked, including officers of the Vympel Group… In 1982, the first 10 people went to the USSR for special training.
... The department consisted of two units, one of which, No. 58, operated on the territory of the country, in the zone controlled by the enemy, the other, No. 055, abroad, in Pakistan and Iran, against bases and training centers opposition ".
According to many experts, the most trained and efficient in the security agencies of Afghanistan were the special units of the KHAD, trained by Soviet security officers - intelligence officers.
Four trains passed through Afghanistan "Cascade"... The first three detachments were commanded by Colonel (since 1981 - Major General) A. I. Lazarenko, in 1982 he was replaced by Colonel E. A. Savintsev.
In the spring of 1983, the Afghan epic "Cascade" ended. At the end of March, he was replaced by a detachment "Omega" under the leadership of Colonel V. I. Kikot. The structure and tasks of the new detachment were the same as in "Cascade".
Assessing the activities of "Omega", an employee of this division E. S. Abdulaev recalls: “... (our) work provided invaluable assistance in planning military operations and negotiating, saved many lives not only of peaceful Afghans, but also of our soldiers ...
In April 1984 ... the Omega squad ceased to exist. The war in Afghanistan was developing into a new quality. Now the main burden of the armed struggle against the rebels fell on the shoulders of the Afghan partners and advisers ".
In addition to the employees of special forces, special officers of the military counterintelligence who served in the 40th Army also actively participated in the hostilities. All multi-plan activities of military counterintelligence in Afghanistan were aimed primarily at assisting the army command in increasing the combat capability of troops, the effectiveness of combat operations and the fight against the enemy's agent activities. 1980 - 1989 military chekists uncovered and suppressed the activities of 44 agents of foreign special services, as well as 875 agents of rebel gangs.
One of the most important tasks of the special officers in Afghanistan was to keep track of Soviet servicemen who, due to various circumstances, went missing or were captured by the rebels. Collecting information about their fate, death or being in a certain gang, information about their heroic or criminal behavior. The main thing was to organize their release. Over the years Afghan During the war, the military counterintelligence officers released 98 Soviet servicemen from captivity.
In 1988, a large group of KGB officers arrived in Afghanistan again, which was engaged in the formation of elite units of the MGB, subordinate directly to Afghan President Najibullah-volunteer "Guards of special purpose"- the last hope of the Kabul regime. Until the fall of Najibullah, the guards actively participated in hostilities against the rebels.
In addition to the above-mentioned special forces of the KGB, employees of the Group took part in the hostilities "A", who underwent two-month combat training in Afghanistan. "Alfovtsy" they were driven in by regular departments - 15 people each - as part of the Kerkinsky border detachment of the Central Asian border district.
M.V. Golovatov (in those years - senior lieutenant) recalls: “… (Our) task is for young employees to gain combat experience, using all the means of the border troops… During the two months that the group was in a combat airborne assault group,… they spent forty days without leaving the territory of Afghanistan. They took part in ambushes, raids, sweeping, neutralizing the leaders of large gangs, went out together with a motorized group to guard the gas pipeline, blocked the caravans ... "
The participation of the KGB Border Troops (FGP) in the "Afghan" war was a secret almost until the end of these events.
It would not be an exaggeration to say that Soviet border guards were the first to clash with the Afghan armed opposition units. Almost immediately after the April 1978 coup (so-called. "Saur revolution") a civil war broke out in the country, and the state border of Afghanistan with the USSR turned into Hot line.
During 1979, groups of rebels reached the border river Pyanj in the areas of the Khorog, Moscow and Pyanj border detachments and occupied the dominant heights along the border. For example, in October, up to 600 rebels entrenched themselves against the 12th outpost of the Khorog border detachment. The new Afghan government had neither the strength nor the ability to resist this. In this regard, the protection of the Soviet border in the sections of the Central Asian (SAPO) and Eastern Border Districts (VPO) was reinforced by people and equipment transferred from the Iranian and Chinese borders.
Combat missions began to be carried out by the created combined combat detachments - SBO - in the initial period, by motor-maneuverable groups - mmg and airborne assault groups - dshg and units of border aviation (unlike mmg, airborne and helicopter units were deployed in border detachments on the territory of the USSR).
The first two SBO (from the Khorog and Pyanj border detachments) crossed the river. Pyanj already in early January 1980, covering the Soviet regional center Kalai-Khumb, the Dushanbe-Khorog road and the Afghan port of Sherkhan.
During 1980, as a result of a series of operations ( "Mountains-80", "Spring-80", "Autumn-80", "Balamurgab" and others), Soviet border guards freed a significant part of northern Afghanistan from the armed opposition units, which made it possible to somewhat stabilize the situation on the border. In May 1980, garrisons from the Murghab border detachment of the VPO were deployed there to cover the northern section of the border of Afghanistan with Pakistan and China.
In order to improve the control system of the operational - combat activity of troops, in 1981 operational (operational - military) groups (OG) SAPO and VPO were created, field operational groups were controlled in border detachments.
At the beginning of 1982, to coordinate the actions of border troops units with units and formations of the 40th Army and the Afghan troops, the post of deputy (since 1983 - first deputy) chief of the USSR PV was introduced. Lieutenant General I.P. Vertelko was appointed to this position. He recalls: “I had under my command a group of officers from the High Command, fifty people, in addition, technical specialists from all over the border ...”.
One of the main tasks of this group was to create almost from scratch the border troops of Afghanistan. The implementation of this task fell on the shoulders of instructors and military advisers allocated from the PF.
From the memoirs of I.P. Vertelko: “Our border advisers ... had a particularly hard time. If in the infantry division of the Afghan army there were up to sixty advisers with translators, service staff and guards, then in the border brigade there were ten times less. Moreover, they were not given either guards or translators to support them ... our upper advisory echelon had to work under the same conditions - generals Yu. Neshumov, N. Makarov, V. Konstantinov, I. Yarkov, A. Romanenko, A. Vlasov, I. . Sagaidak and many others ... ".
In total, from December 1979 to February 1989, 386 officers of the USSR PV of the Soviet Union were on advisory work in the Afghan border troops.
« Considering the combat activities of border troops in Afghanistan, three stages can be distinguished:
1. In 1980 - 1982. the forces of the SBO and mmg were covered by the deployment of garrisons on Afghan territory, the most dangerous areas on the Soviet-Afghan border; in 1981, a continuous 15 km security zone was created along the entire border. The size of the border grouping in Afghanistan during this period, taking into account mobile reserves and aviation operating from the territory of the Union (6 mmg - 12 garrisons, 2 dshmg, an air regiment - since 1981 and a separate squadron) was about 2.5 thousand people.
2. In 1982 - 1988. a system of military cover was created for the mmg of the Soviet-Afghan border (to a depth of 100 - 150 km) and a number of sections of the border of Afghanistan with China, Pakistan and Iran; the largest operations (about 800) were carried out to defeat the rebel formations. During these years, more than 7.5 thousand border guards served in Afghanistan (28 mmg - 49 permanent and temporary garrisons, 5 dshmg, 2 air regiments).
3. In 1988 - 1989. the main task was the fulfillment of tasks related to ensuring the security of the Soviet border and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. During this period, the border group was strengthened (6 newmmg), which was associated with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from some areasnorthern Afghanistan and a sharp intensification of the actions of the rebels in theborder zone and at the border itself.
For the period of withdrawal, the group consisted of more than 11 thousand border guards.
(32 mmg, 1 dshmg - 66 garrisons, 5 dshmg, 2 air regiments).
In the course of hostilities in Afghanistan, a system of combating rebel formations developed, which included:
- reconnaissance and search actions to identify anti-government forces;
- military actions (raids, blocking and combing, ambushes) to defeat rebel detachments;
Protection (security, defense) of border areas in the zone of responsibility in order to ensure the security of the Soviet-Afghan border.
Mobile reserves (dshmg and helicopters from the territory of the Union) were used in combat operations as a striking force.
The last point in this war was put by the Soviet border guards: after the withdrawal of the last army units on the morning of February 15, 1989, in the second half of the same day, the last unit of the border troops, the mmg of the Takhta-Bazar border detachment, crossed the border.
In total, over the years of the war, border units in Afghanistan conducted more than 1113 operations. More than 41 thousand rebels were destroyed, about 20 thousand were captured, weapons - 20,334 units were destroyed and seized, ammunition - 3,023 thousand, vehicles - 742.
Summing up the results of the combat activities of the PoE units in Afghanistan, we can say that the border guards fully fulfilled their tasks of protecting the Soviet state border. Combat experience was acquired, which is of great practical importance in modern conditions.
More than 62 thousand border guards passed through Afghanistan, 22 thousand were awarded orders and medals, 7 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (two - posthumously). "
Little is known about the participation of KGB officers and border guards in the Afghan events. Being in the most acute sectors of the struggle, they were the first to enter the battle, risked and sacrificed their lives when the situation demanded.
In the period from 1979 to 1989, 576 servicemen of the KGB bodies and troops were killed, including:
Servicemen of the border troops - 518 people
Military counterintelligence officers - 18 people
Servicemen of the special communications troops - 11 people
Employees of divisions of the central office and territorial bodies of the KGB,
who were part of the advisory apparatus - 29 people.
BORDER GUARDS - IN THE FIRE WAR OF AFGHANISTAN
"History, combat experience of the past is the teacher of the future." “As long as a person in uniform is alive, they love him; will die in battle - they remember. " Time and years erase a lot from memory, but it often works selectively: extraordinary, dramatic events affecting the fate of many people and the country as a whole are usually not subject to oblivion, and the undying memory of them often brings us back to thinking about those days and their assessments.
"OUR MEDIA WERE
MORE THAN SHY
IN THE LIGHTING OF THESE
CONFLICTS ... "
The events in Afghanistan and Chechnya in the late 70s and 1980s, respectively, in the 1990s and early 2000s, will remain such, forever memorable for many. These events, unlike other military conflicts, wars of past years, were not preceded by the usual angry political and diplomatic skirmishes in such cases, and our media were more than shy in their coverage. They developed somehow gradually, without publicity, and initially seemed to many (including the author of these recordings) purely local, affecting only the Afghans themselves. In the media, especially in the early periods, it was silent that border special forces, officers of the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (including the police), special forces of the Internal Troops and a number of other specialists - advisers not only to law enforcement agencies, but also to economic industrial ministries and departments, as well as an abundance of translators in various instances. So this campaign, like the events in Chechnya, was specific, and the experience that we gained and accumulated here should be studied in detail, generalized, preserved, it should find its application in the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, possible conflicts with the use of force structures. Eastern wisdom says: "You don't need an earthquake to create an oasis."
It would seem that against the background of such historical upheavals as the destruction of the Soviet Union, a serious change in the entire geopolitical map of the world, and other major events, they are destined to fade and become a thing of the past. And we often remember about them and even mark the dates.
... For ten years (1979-1989) the attention of the world community was riveted on the events taking place in Afghanistan, and then, years later, on the anti-terrorist campaign in Chechnya ...
ON THE SOVIET-AFGHAN BORDER
The state border with its southern neighbor, once distinguished by relative stability, turned into a "burning line", the entire burden of guarding which fell on the border troops of the USSR.
From the second half of 1979, the situation on the Soviet-Afghan border, and especially against the section of the troops of the Central Asian Frontier District (KSAPO), sharply deteriorated. Oppositionists everywhere created militant groups and Islamic committees, which dispersed the authorities, rampaged in villages, and cruelly dealt with supporters of the Kabul regime. Combat groups of the Mujahideen reached the Panj River, blocking the few Afghan border guard posts, and occupied the dominant heights. The DRA government troops, shackled by the fighting in the provinces of the center, were unable to fight the rebels in the border areas. The actions of the Mujahideen on the Soviet-Afghan border began to acquire a demonstratively threatening character. The militants, reaching the border, began to provoke our border detachments. They crossed over to our side for the purpose of robbery, shelling and capture of our border posts.
Afghan leaders have appealed to our side more than 10 times for help by bringing our troops there.
COMMISSION OF THE TROOPS
The troops entered between December 25-27, 1979. In Afghanistan, our army, border guards, special forces of the KGB, Internal Troops, numerous Soviet apparatus met with an enemy acting in an unusual way (which was not taught at the academy). This enemy ("dushman", militant, terrorist) used, in fact, traditional for Afghanistan, but little-known for many other armies (including ours) forms and methods of military operations. They were based on: raids, ambushes, sabotage of communications, terrorist attacks in cities and towns. This war "around the corner" wore out the troops, forced them to adapt to new conditions at the cost of trial and error. Unfortunately, the events in Chechnya, years later, were more painful in their consequences (and losses) than in Afghanistan. Even excluding the political aspects of those and other events, we must admit that they repeated and even multiplied our mistakes and failures in the use of operational, forceful forms and methods of fighting the insurgents in Afghanistan. And where is the guarantee that this will not happen again in some other border region?
The authority of the Soviet border troops of the KGB, special forces of the Internal Troops and groups at that time was quite high not only among our friends and allies, but also among other countries of the world.
... For the border troops of the USSR in Afghanistan, a border zone of responsibility was established with a depth of up to 200 km (i.e., to the depth of the adjacent provinces to our border) at the front: from the junction of three borders (USSR, Iran, Afghanistan) to the junction of borders ( USSR, China, Afghanistan).
The border guards of the USSR began to protect our state border on both sides, since the Afghan border posts were partially destroyed by the opposition, and some of them were moved to the Pakistani border. Thus, our border guards in the Afghan events took the most direct active part practically with the entry of the first Soviet units into the DRA. The scale of the participation of our troops on the line indicated above, from the junction of the borders of three states in the west to the junction of the borders of three states in the east, was overwhelming. At this point, we had to experience everything: the joy of victories, and the bitterness of losses and failures. But with dignity and honor, having passed all the tests, they left Afghanistan last in a combat readiness, covering the withdrawal of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops. In the open press about the participation of border troops, special forces of the Internal Troops was not reported.
FIRST COMBAT ACTIONS
... Our first action on January 7, 1980: two of our combined combat special detachments (SBO) took under protection the port of Sherkhan on Afghan territory, the other - in the Nusai region, against our Kalaya - Khumba. The operations on their input were successful.
In February - March 1980, the author of these lines carried out a large complex operation "Mountains-80" to clear the Afghan border strip in the northern part of Badakhshan from armed rebels under the cover of a squadron of helicopters, on armored vehicles and with the use of airborne troops, Lieutenant Colonel Fayziev (Chief of Staff of the Serak Border Detachment ).
A strip up to 10 kilometers deep and up to 150 kilometers long was freed from the Mujahideen - this is the entire kishlak zone. With the completion of the operation, new garrisons of the USSR border troops were deployed in a number of settlements.
BORDER GUARDS
FREE
AFGHAN PROVINCES
At the request of the Afghan authorities, operation Balamurghab was carried out under my leadership, during which the border guards cleared the border strip of militants opposite the Takhta-Bazar border detachment. Then the complex operation "Winter-80" was carried out.
During 1980, also with my participation and under my direct supervision, large-scale operations "Spring-80", "Summer-80", "Autumn-80", "Ostrov", "Ruslan", etc. were carried out. Border guards liberated a significant territory of Afghanistan in the provinces of Takhar, Badakhshan, which allowed the Afghan authorities to create authorities here, organize and deploy security units.
In May 1980, at the request of the Afghan government, garrisons from the Murghab border detachment of the Eastern Border District were deployed to cover the DRA border with Pakistan and China. Soviet border guards securely closed a 500-kilometer section of the border, ensuring the interception of caravans with weapons and ammunition, militants and enemy agents traveling from abroad to Afghanistan.
The situation was tense on the western section of the Soviet-Afghan border.
On July 5, 1980, the Mujahideen, blocking the Afghan posts, staged a massacre in the villages, then, crossing the Murghab River, attacked our border detachment, killing the senior frontier detachment of Corporal A.A. The river. In mid-June, about 600 Afghan women, children and the elderly, fleeing from bandits, were forced to flee to Soviet territory.
Thus, by the summer of 1980, our units were firmly entrenched in the settlements of Sherkhan, Hairaton, Yangikala, Chahi-Ab, Rustak, Khaun, Kalai-Kuf, Nusai, in the Small Afghan Pamir - in the regions of Sarhad, Gumbat, Gulkhana. Covering the main facilities in settlements and blocking the routes of possible movement of the rebels, they maintained close contacts with the KHAD (AGSA) and Tsarandoi authorities, as well as the Afghan border guards, providing them with food, ammunition, fuel and lubricants, medicines, etc.
The operation "Spring-81" was attended by about 2,000 people of the border troops.
"THE FIGHTERS HAVE
AND THE ATTRACTS KILLED
PORTRAITS ... "
At the end of March 1981, at one of the outposts of the Takhta-Bazar frontier detachment, militants captured and brutally killed a border guard consisting of two border guards. I was instructed to investigate the merits of the case, and then plan and carry out a complex operation "Murghab", during which they found the bodies of those killed in Afghan territory, identified and eliminated the organizers and perpetrators of the terrorist attack, and also cleared the border area from the town of Kushka to the Sabzak pass with setting up a reinforced garrison in Meimen, Koisar, Balamurghab ...
This was followed by the complex operation of the Pyanj and Moscow border detachments "Autumn-81".
In total for 1980-1981. special units of the border troops on the territory of the DRA conducted dozens of planned and private operations, hundreds of combat raids and ambushes, dozens of agitation and propaganda activities that helped stabilize the situation and strengthen the authorities in the northern regions of Afghanistan and thereby ensure the security of the USSR borders.
In large-scale operations, the border troops closely interacted with the formations of the Afghan Armed Forces, in particular, with the 17th, 18th, and 20th infantry divisions of the 5th border brigade, with our special forces KGB "Kaskad", the Ministry of Internal Affairs "Cobalt". As a rule, 2-3 infantry battalions on armored personnel carriers, operational companies, a battalion of the Tsarandoy (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the Ministry of State Security of Afghanistan took part in the operations of the border troops. The result of the operations carried out was a constant increase in the number of so-called detachments (committees) for the defense of the revolution. For example, in 1984, 210 such detachments of 20-50 fighters each operated in the area of responsibility of the border troops.
MORE THAN 800
COMBAT OPERATIONS ...
In 1982-1986, special forces of the border troops conducted more than 800 operations, both independently and jointly with units of the 40 army and the Afghan Armed Forces. They were especially intense in the mountainous regions where the rebels were based or hiding. Here, the fighting, in fact, was carried out constantly.
During this period, border guards covered and accompanied transport convoys, ensured the entry (withdrawal) of military units, participated in the elimination of caravans with weapons and ammunition. The sequential or simultaneous blocking and cleansing of large areas of the location of the armed formations of the opposition and their mountain bases were characteristic methods of actions of the border troops for the main period of their participation in the Afghan war.
So, for example, in January - February 1982, a special operation was carried out to enter military units into the northern part of the provinces of Takhar and Kunduz. Here the enemy tried to keep the base areas at all costs. The operation was attended by 6 MMG and DSh MG on 78 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, 2 infantry battalions of the 20th Afghan division, a motorized rifle and tank platoon with an artillery battery from the 201st MRD. The operation was led by the head of the KSAPO operational group, Colonel A.F. Borisov.
Typical for operations in large settlements, well prepared for defense, was the Tashkurgan operation in September 1983. Tashkurgan was defended by 16 armed opposition groups. The operation involved 6 MMGs on 51 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 8 helicopters, 10 infantry battalions of the 18th and 20th Afghan divisions, a motorized rifle battalion, an artillery battalion and the Grad battery of the 201st MRD. The group was led by the senior military adviser, Colonel V.A. Hartman, his deputy for border troops was the head of the KSAPO operational group, Colonel V.N. Smirnov.
An example in the elimination of the mountain bases of the Mujahideen is the Marmol operation, carried out in January-February 1984. It was attended by 3 MMGs, 4 DSh MGs, 30 helicopters, a combined artillery division of the 201st motorized rifle division and a fighter aviation regiment, 9 Afghan infantry battalions. The operation was led by the chief of the KSAPO troops, Major General G.A. Zgersky.
In March - April 1985, under the leadership of the new chief of the KSAPO troops, Major General V.I. Shlyakhtin also carried out the Tashkurgan operation to destroy the mountain bases. It was attended by 6 MMGs, 3 DSh MGs on 72 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 28 helicopters, an artillery regiment, 3 motorized rifle battalions and 12 helicopters of the 201st MRD, 10 Afghan battalions of the 18th and 20th infantry divisions.
In April - May 1986, units of the Eastern Border District, together with a separate motorized rifle regiment (860th), conducted a major operation in the Varduj Valley, outside the zone of operations of the border troops. As a result, a vast territory was liberated from the enemy and the Paharak-Hasravi road was cleared. The exposed garrisons ensured the deployment of Afghan divisions of the Tsarandoy and the MGB of the DRA in the liberated regions of the province.
During this period, special units of the border troops also carried out purposeful work among the wavering groups of mujahideen and rebels.
In 1985 alone, over 2.5 thousand people (26 combat groups) went over to the side of the government, and 5 national battalions were formed on their basis.
"ACTIONS
SPECIAL UNITS
POGRANVOISK
SHOULD NOT
TO AFFILIATE ... "
By July 1986, there were special units of our border troops in Afghanistan: 28 MMGs, 20 border posts were deployed in 55 garrisons on Afghan territory. 151 infantry fighting vehicles and 248 armored personnel carriers, more than 200 mortars and other weapons were involved in the hostilities.
By the instructions of the leadership of the KGB of the USSR, the actions of the special forces of the border troops in Afghanistan were not supposed to be advertised, and they were there under the guise of our army units.
We were constantly alarmed by the information of our intelligence officers about the expansion of the scale of training of rebels in Pakistan, Iran and other countries.
... To clear the border zone with the USSR from the most active rebels, the border troops were forced to carry out several operations together with Afghan forces in 1987-1988. For example, on October 22, 1987, the actions of the irreconcilable imamsahib group were thwarted by the repeated shelling of the Soviet city of Pyanj.
From May 15, 1988 to February 15, 1989, special forces of the border troops took a number of large-scale actions to ensure the safety of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan of the 40th Army. During this period (third period), more than 50 operations and over 2500 raids were carried out, about 1400 marches were made, about 4000 ambushes were set up. In September 1988 to January 1989 alone, the aviation of the border troops made more than 1900 sorties.
To ensure the withdrawal of the OKSV from Afghanistan, a command post and a checkpoint were deployed in five directions of the movement of the convoys to the border. In these areas, operational groups of 6-19 people with communications equipment were created from among the officers of the GUPV, the district directorates of the KSAPO, KVPO. I headed the task force, as in the introduction of the OKSV into Afghanistan, in the Termez, main direction.
"NO ONE
BORDER WARRIOR
DIDN'T GET IN CAPTURE "
Having passed the units and units of the 40th Army through their battle formations, the border troops covered their withdrawal, and by 16.25 on 15.02.1989 they entered their territory. The units of the border troops completed their task. Their actions contributed to the preservation of stability on the Soviet-Afghan border.
At a time when the war was going on in Afghanistan, the population of the Soviet border area was provided with a peaceful life.
The border guards, performing their military duty in Afghanistan, showed high patriotism, acted selflessly, realizing that they were defending the borders of the Motherland. When performing assigned combat missions in isolation from other units and often surrounded by mujahideen, they invariably showed mutual assistance, courage and heroism. Not a single border guard soldier was taken prisoner in ten years of fighting. Not one of the dead border guards was left to lie in a foreign land.
During the ten years of the war, several tens of thousands of border guards have passed through Afghanistan. 518 soldiers were killed. The vast majority of them (90.9%) died during military operations, directly in battle, or died from wounds received during the battle. Thousands of border soldiers were awarded orders and medals. Many border guards have been awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Among them are Lieutenant Colonels V.I. Ukhabov (posthumously) and F.S. Shagaleev, majors A.P. Bogdanov (posthumously) and I.P. Barsukov, captains A.A. Lukashov and V.F. Popkov, ensign V.D. Kapshuk, General of the Army V.A. Sailors.
This was the most difficult and difficult period of the operational and military activity of the Soviet border troops for the entire period of their existence, when combat operations were conducted continuously for almost 10 years on a front over 2300 and to a depth of 200 kilometers.
Units of the border troops in Afghanistan, together with the OKSV, the KGB special forces "Cascade", the Ministry of Internal Affairs "Cobalt" and the national formations of government troops conducted over a thousand planned and private operations, during which they neutralized a large number of armed formations of the opposition, the security of the southern borders of the USSR was ensured.
Each border guard - from an ordinary to a general, inclusive - knew why we were brought into Afghanistan: firstly, to ensure the security of the USSR state border and the security of our border population, and secondly, it was necessary to provide international assistance to the Afghan people deployed in the Afghan territories in more than 50 points, where we had to gain a foothold on a section with a length of about 3 thousand km, and all - under our cover ... Yes, and the operation itself was unique, entered in dozens of directions, worked out a lot for the first time, considered different variants... They worked out their own specific tactics of preparing and conducting military operations, into which the army's cumbersome structures simply did not fit ...
... Thus, the "Buffer zone", as Yu.V. Andropov, played a positive role in normalizing the situation on the border and in the DRA. The good, the positive, unfortunately, is often forgotten. A simple example is the Chechen affairs ... The entry of army units was organized so ridiculously illiterately and the military operations were prepared. The same can be said about operational intelligence, which is the basis. They did not know what was going on there, and did not know until they poked themselves in there. And we in Afghanistan acted in small landings: landed, entrenched ... And more than one landing was not shot down, and therefore the losses are so scanty ...
IN THE COMPOSITION OF "COBALT" ACS
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
... The units of the reconnaissance detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR "Cobalt", with which we and the army commanders interacted, also showed themselves well in Afghanistan. The priority for the formation of his unit was operatives who passed the school of criminal investigation, snipers - servicemen of the internal troops. It included the aces of the criminal investigation department, for example, the employee of the Main Directorate of Criminal Investigation of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Dznov, who later headed "Cobalt", the future minister Erin, the future head of the Omsk Regional Department of Internal Affairs Kuchumov and others. The main task of this detachment was the operational search for the band leaders, well-organized and trained bandit formations, in order to direct our military groupings to them with the aim of destroying them. The Cobalt scouts identified, calculated the routes of the Dushman caravans and guided our Soviet companies. Often they themselves had to engage in battle with the guards of the caravans. But their main task was reconnaissance, and not participation in hostilities as tactical units. Reconnaissance Squad "Cobalt" is 23 small groups of scouts scattered throughout Afghanistan to provide assistance also by tsaranda. Each group consists of 7 people, an armored personnel carrier and a radio station. They were associated with the center and with the Tsarandoi advisers in the provinces. The commander of one of the "Cobalt" groups was V. Erin. Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeev gave a high assessment of the intelligence and practical actions being extracted to the Cobalt units ...
Thus, the combat experience gained in Afghanistan and Chechnya should be introduced into the service and combat activities of the security bloc ...
V.N. KHARICHEV, Major General
On the southern borders of the great Russian Empire, it was restless ever since Central Asia became part of the Russian state. And this was due to the fact that the territories inhabited by wild Afghan tribes became the arena of clashing interests of England and Russia.
The rivalry between Britain and Russia for Asian domination in the 19th - early 20th century went down in history under the name “ Big game”, It did not end in the XX century either. With the adoption of independence by Afghanistan, the influence of England in this region decreased, however, the contradictions within this country itself increased.
In 1978, as a result of the revolution, the People's Democratic Party came to power in Afghanistan, proclaiming a republic and taking a course to reform the country. This led to an escalation of conflict between the new leadership and the Islamic opposition.
The fighting in Afghanistan was conducted by the forces of not just an active army, KGB special forces units, internal and border troops were involved.
For the border troops of the USSR on Afghan territory, a special zone of responsibility was established with a depth of 200 kilometers at the junction of three borders - the USSR, the PRC and Afghanistan. In fact, these were the border territories of the Afghan provinces adjacent to the USSR.
At the same time, the border guard service was conducted from both sides of the state border, since almost all Afghan border posts were destroyed by opposition militants (who rightly considered the USSR an ally of the PDPA).
In the spring of 1980, the first major military operation was carried out under the leadership of the Chief of Staff of the Central Asian Border District (SAPO), Colonel V.N. Kharichev. The essence of the operation was to clean up the border strip of the northern part of mountain Badakhshan from the rebels (the operation was included in military history called "Mountains-80"). Units of the Moscow, Pyanj, Khorog border detachments on 30 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, under the cover of 11 Mi-8 helicopters, together with the paratroopers, carried out a purge of several areas and the elimination of groups of militants led by a certain A. Vakhoba. The cleansing area extended up to 10 kilometers for more than 150 kilometers: all villages in the area of this zone were cleared of the Mujahideen. Upon completion of the operation, new border garrisons were deployed in some settlements.
Subsequently, only within one year such significant operations as "Balamurgab", "Winter 80", "Spring 80", "Summer 80", "Autumn 80", "Ruslan" and some others were carried out.
In order to cover the borders of Afghanistan with China and Pakistan, garrison units were deployed from Murghab to the Eastern Border District. This helped filter the corridor of caravans between states, with the help of which the militants often transported weapons or ammunition.
By 1981, Soviet troops managed to gain a foothold in a number of settlements: Kalai-Kuf, Rustak, Hairaton, Sherkhan, Khaun, Yangikala, Chahi-Ab, Nusai, as well as in the Small Afghan Pamir. Covering important facilities in villages, controlling the routes of possible movement of militants and cargo with weapons, the border guards maintained close ties with the Afghan KHAD (AGSA) and Tsarandoi (Afghan special services and police, respectively), and also helped the Afghan border guards with food, medicine and ammunition.
In the period from 1981 to 1986, Soviet border special forces conducted more than 800 operations, some of which were coordinated with other troops, including parts of the armed forces of Afghanistan. Moreover, in the mountainous parts of this country, due to the specifics of the mountainous terrain, convenient for the subversive activities of the mujahideen, military operations were carried out almost constantly. Typical examples of military operations in the high-mountainous part of Afghanistan are the Marmol operation in January-February 1984, the Tashkurgan operation in 1985, conducted under the leadership of the new chief of the KSAPO troops, Major General V.I. Shlyakhtina.
After some relative lull in 1986, Soviet border guards were forced to re-organize several serious operations (for example, on October 2, 1987, an attack by a long-vexed imamsahib group on the city of Pyanj was thwarted).
During the third period of hostilities in Afghanistan (1988-1989), border guards helped to ensure the safe withdrawal of units of the 40th Army from the country.
Also, during this time, special forces of the border troops conducted 50 armed operations, about two and a half thousand raids and sorties, set about four thousand ambushes.
For ten years of fighting in Afghanistan, several tens of thousands of border guards have passed. The dedication and high morale of these people is evidenced by the fact that for all these years not a single border guard was taken prisoner by the Mujahideen, while 518 of them died directly in battle during special operations.
1989 in the field of deployment of border troops in Afghanistan. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was organized, since preparations for it had been under way since the spring of 1988. At the second stage of the withdrawal of troops (11/15/1988 - 02/15/1989), the opposition's struggle to expand their sphere of influence increased significantly. Having consolidated around the IOA, they overthrew the legitimate government in a number of cities (Imamsahib, Khanabad, Yangi-Kala, etc.). In January, they made a similar attempt in relation to the village of Chakhi-ab. It was important to prevent the concentration of large rebel forces on the main communications, routes for the movement of parts of the OKSV from Afghanistan to the Soviet-Afghan border. This task was solved by a whole range of measures: constant reconnaissance, strikes against the formations of "irreconcilable" rebels, and even through negotiations and agreements (temporary, of course) with some of the leaders. On January 19, 1989, during a reconnaissance flight in the Khanabad area (north of Khanabad, near the Kohnakal village), a helicopter of the 23rd separate Dushambinsk border aviation regiment of captain IK Sharipov was shot down. Only the commander of the helicopter managed to escape from the crew (he jumped out with a parachute and was picked up by the crew of Captain Popkov V.F.). The crew killed: the navigator of the helicopter detachment st. Lieutenant BARIEV Ilfat Midekhatovich Art. air operator of a special purpose helicopter unit st. Lieutenant DOLGAREV Viktor Ivanovich Art. helicopter technician Art. Lieutenant SCHENYAEV Alexander Petrovich Senior flight mechanic st. Ensign ZALEDDINOV Ismagil Sakhapovich Art. flight mechanic of the air regiment st. Ensign KLIMENKO Sergei Pavlovich The plan for the withdrawal of the PV from Afghanistan was drawn up by the OG GUPV and approved by the chief of troops. On its basis, the warring districts drew up their plans. So on January 27, 1989, at a meeting in Ashgabat, the chief of staff of the KSAPO troops, Colonel B.I. Gribanov reported to General of the Army V.A. Matrosov plan for the withdrawal of the district's special forces. In accordance with it, thirty-two garrisons have already been transferred to the mobile version, that is, they are ready, upon receipt of an order, to begin an exit to the USSR, while lifting all the remaining materiel with their own transport, and the remaining twelve garrisons were transferred to the mobile version by February 1. By this time, there were nine garrisons in the OVG of the Eastern Border District. A new military town was built for them in Ishkashim. Later the OVG was reorganized into a border detachment. The withdrawal of troops began strictly according to plan. Management was carried out: General - from the command post in Termez. The leader is the chief of the troops of the district, Major General I.M. Korobeinikov. CP officers: Lieutenant Colonel V.V. Sedykh, the head of the detachment, Lieutenant Colonel V.Ya. Dmitrienko (died during a military operation in Tajikistan). Takhta Bazar. 68th border detachment. The head of the operation is Major General A.S. Vladimirov. CP officers: Colonel I.F. Kelembet, head of the detachment, Lieutenant Colonel N.S. Reznichenko. Kerki. 47th border detachment. The head of the operation is Colonel A.I. Tymko. CP officers: the head of the detachment, Lieutenant Colonel V.V. Samokhin, Chief of Intelligence Major R.Yu. Janskauskas. The general management of the withdrawal of the units of the Kerkinsky and Takhta-Bazarsky directions was carried out by Lieutenant General G.A. Zgersky. Termez. 81st border detachment. The head of the operation, Major General V.N. Kharichev. CP officers: Lieutenant Colonels Yu.G. Spiridonov, A.G. Zorin, I. V. Samoilov, Major B.S. Radchenko. Pyanj. 48th border detachment. The head of the operation is Major General A.N. Martovitsky. CP officers: chief of intelligence of the OG Lieutenant Colonel A.P. Suvorov, head of the detachment, Lieutenant Colonel I.A. Kharkovchuk, lieutenant colonel V.I. Agoshkov, Colonel V.M. Latyshev. Moscow detachment. 117th border detachment. The head of the operation is Colonel V.G. Sheepskin. CP officers: the head of the detachment, Lieutenant Colonel M.M. Valiev. Khorog. 66th border detachment. The head of the operation is Colonel V.V. Kochenov, the head of the detachment, Lieutenant Colonel K.V. Totsky. Ishkashim. OVG of the Eastern Border District. The head of the operation is Lieutenant General E.N. Neverovsky. CP officers: Colonel L.P. Komlev, head of the OVG Lieutenant Colonel V.E. Pronichev, Colonel V.N. Karnauch. The withdrawal of special forces was carried out in the form of seven large-scale and short-term airborne operations in the areas of border detachments on the front with a total length of more than two thousand kilometers. During the withdrawal of troops, the border guards ensured in their zone of responsibility the withdrawal of units and formations of the 40th Army without losses and themselves did not lose a single person. On January 29, 1989, he died in Leningrad after a serious illness received in Afghanistan (he was in the RA from 08/11/1986 to 08/09/1988, acted as an advisor), an employee of the USSR KGB Colonel Alexander Stepanovich LEPETUNOV Unfortunately, in general a well-organized withdrawal of troops, not without annoying incidents ... 01/31/1989, an officer of the military counterintelligence of the KGB of the USSR of the Special Department of the KGB of the 40th Army, Captain Igor Valerievich BOROVKOV, was killed in battle. and the withdrawal of our border units from Afghanistan was carried out, in agreement with the General Staff, by the operational groups of the Central Asian and Eastern Border Districts with the participation of the command of the border detachments. The advancement of army columns in the area of responsibility of the border troops was carried out along two routes with their passage at the border in Kushka and Termez. Special units of the border troops were withdrawn from the DRA in the last turn. The redeployment of border garrisons to border areas was carried out from 5 to 15 February 1989, in stages - in the areas of all six border detachments. Only after the safe exit of all units of the 40th Army was ensured, did the border units begin to cross the border. 5 outposts, 10 MMGs and DShMGs, a separate battalion of patrol ships, 2 air regiments and 3 OKPPs and checkpoints (Termez, Tashkent and Kushka) covered the exit routes of OKSV formations and units and passed them across the border. 02/13/1989, in the area of Bondar-post, st. Sapper-reconnaissance officer DShMG KVPO Private Leonid Nikolayevich RESHETNIKOV By the decree of 04/21/1989 the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to the commander of the helicopter crew of the Dushanbe Separate Aviation Regiment PV Captain Popkov Valery Filippovich (medal No. 11594). Losses of servicemen of bodies and troops of the KGB of the USSR in 1989 amounted to 9 people
Participation in the war in Afghanistan is a special page in the history of the Border Troops. For a long time this was hushed up, since the Border Troops of the KGB of the USSR did not officially participate in the war on the territory of Afghanistan. Officers, warrant officers and soldiers who died in Afghanistan were presumed to have died while guarding the border between the USSR and Afghanistan. The border guards did not outwardly differ from the servicemen of the 40th Army. All of them were dressed in the same uniform, shoulder straps were changed to combined arms. The only peculiarity is that all rear services and combat support services, as well as all border aviation, were located on Soviet territory, at the locations of border detachments. Meanwhile, the border guards played an exceptional, very important role in the Afghan war. They defended the borders of the Motherland on both sides of the Soviet-Afghan border.
Few people know that the participation of Soviet border troops in the Afghan events began long before the official entry of Soviet troops into the DRA. After the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in January 1980, the border guards carried out a number of military operations on the territory of the neighboring state. The scale of their operational combat operations in the northern Afghan provinces extended from Zulfagar (the junction of the borders of the USSR, Iran and the DRA) to the Small Afghan Pamir, inclusive. The last point in this war was also put by the border guards. February 15, 1989 General B.V. Gromov said: "Not a single Soviet soldier is left behind me!" But the commander was somewhat inaccurate. Not a single soldier of the 40th Army remained behind him. In Afghanistan, there was still an almost 10,000-strong group of border troops, which by their actions largely ensured the withdrawal of units and formations of the 40th Army from the territory of Afghanistan. The border guards were the last to leave after a few hours.
Considering the activities of the border troops in Afghanistan, four periods can be distinguished.
1st period- from January 1980 (the beginning of military operations PV) until January
1980-82 the forces of combined combat detachments (SBO) and motorized maneuverable groups (MMG) covered the most dangerous areas on the Soviet-Afghan border by deploying garrisons on Afghan territory; in 1981, a continuous 15-kilometer security zone was created along the entire border. The size of the PV grouping in Afghanistan during this period was about 2.5 thousand people, taking into account mobile reserves and aviation operating from the territory of the Union.
2nd period- from January 1982 to 1988
1982-88 a system of military cover for the MMG of the Soviet-Afghan border was created to a depth of 100-150 km. and a number of sections of the border of Afghanistan with China, Pakistan and Iran, the largest operations (about 800) were carried out to defeat the rebel formations. More than 7.5 thousand border guards served in Afghanistan these years.
In 1988-89 the main task was the fulfillment of tasks related to ensuring the security of the Soviet border and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. During this period, there was a strengthening of the border grouping in connection with the withdrawal of army units from some areas of northern Afghanistan and a sharp intensification of the actions of the rebels in the border zone and on the border itself. The grouping for this period consisted of more than 11 thousand border guards.
After the withdrawal of troops from the USSR, Afghanistan was left with state obligations to transfer a large amount of material assets to the Afghan side. Their transportation and transfer was entrusted to the border guards. For this purpose, six delivery companies were formed in the structure of the border troops. It was they (and even helicopters) that delivered these valuables to Afghanistan. Despite the complicated situation in the border areas, the Soviet border guards managed to complete the task without loss.
PROLOGUE.
In early March 1979, a group of border guards of 20 people with reinforcement equipment (service dogs, signal devices, night surveillance devices, etc.) arrived in Kabul to strengthen the security of the USSR Embassy in Kabul. In April, officers-border guards (8 people) arrived, who, as advisers, went to the border service departments of the Afghan provinces. At the end of May, a second group of border guard officers (15 people) arrived for advisory work in the DRA border service. In the summer, the permanent representative of the Soviet border troops, Major General A.A. Vlasov - Head of the Pole Department. On September 4, a separate PV company - 50 people - arrived on alert duty in the embassy town.
The Afghan war, having barely begun (the entry of the 40th Army into Afghanistan - December 25, 1979 at 15:00), gave rise to a lot of problems. One of them is how to ensure the inviolability of the Soviet border and the security of the population of our border area. The government troops of the DRA, chained by fighting in the province of Badakhshan, were unable to fight the rebels in the border areas. The 40th Army, solving its tasks, met with increasing resistance day by day, the "jihad" began.
Vigorous actions were required to dramatically affect the stabilization of the situation in the border area. All this served as the background for the government's decision to send a small contingent of USSR border troops to the northern provinces of Afghanistan. For these purposes, a special grouping began to be created, consisting of combined combat detachments (SBO), staffed by the border guards of the Central Asian and Eastern border districts. Places of deployment in the DRA were chosen taking into account the activity of the mujahideen in order to prevent the possibility of their exit to the Soviet border. At first, these were the Pyanj and Pamir directions, then, gradually, the so-called zone of responsibility of the border troops was formed. The command to cross the state border for the first SBO arrived on January 6, 1980. From dawn on January 7, the first two SBO crossed the border.
START.
The operation to bring border units into Afghan territory was led by the Chief of Staff of the Central Asian Border District, Major General I.G. Karpov. The operation was successful without enemy resistance and without losses. The Khorog SBO (150 people, 6 armored personnel carriers) crossed the Pyanj River (partly by watercraft, and partly by helicopters) and settled in the village of Nusay, covering the Soviet regional center Kulayi-Khumb and the Dushanbe-Khorog road. The Pyanj SBO (204 people, 6 armored personnel carriers) landed from helicopters in the area of the port of Sherkhan, preventing the threat of its capture by the rebels. The exposed garrisons were visually visible from our shore and could be supported by fire at any moment.
In May 1980, the border units of the Red Banner Eastern Border District were tasked with conducting an operation in the Pamir direction to bring troops into Afghanistan and subsequently cover the Afghan-Chinese border and more than 200 kilometers of the Afghan-Pakistani border. For this purpose, an operation was carried out under the code name "Roof". On May 22, 1980, two frontier posts were parachuted from helicopters in the Sarhad area, another outpost advanced in a ground column from Lyangar to its destination.
Special units of the border troops on the territory of Afghanistan were supposed to operate in conjunction with units of the 40th Army. However, its main forces were located in the central and southern regions of the DRA. In the northern regions of the country, only units of an air assault brigade, a tank platoon and a motorized rifle regiment of the 201st motorized rifle division were stationed along the border. But they, too, at the end of 1981 - beginning of 1982. were withdrawn from the zone of action of the border troops, and the airborne assault brigade was transferred to the south of Afghanistan. Thus, the border troops were actually left alone with the northern group of mujahideen, led by Ahmad Shah Massoud. The Afghan government forces here were small units of the border guard. Reduced to company and battalion garrisons, these Afghan units were only able to protect themselves.
During 1980, as a result of a series of operations "Spring-80", "Summer-80" and "Autumn-80" in the border regions of North Badakhshan and the province of Takhar, border guards liberated a significant territory from the rebels, which allowed the Afghan authorities to create authorities here. organize and deploy security units.
At the beginning of 1981, in order to increase the efficiency of control over the actions of special forces, an operational group of the Main Directorate of the Border Troops was formed at the headquarters of the border troops in Moscow, and in the Central Asian border district, an operational group was formed in Pyanj. The Moscow task force was headed by Lieutenant General I.G. Karpov, and in Pyandj Colonel N.T. Butko. The coordination of the actions of the special forces of the border troops was entrusted to Lieutenant General I.P. Vertelko. The created control system ensured flexibility in the management of service and combat activities and the timeliness of decision-making in a rapidly changing environment. Subsequently, every day for almost 10 years Afghan war personally the chief of the border troops, Hero of the Soviet Union (February 26, 1982), General of the Army V.A. Sailors and Chief of Staff of the Border Troops Lieutenant General Yu.A. Neshumov, and since 1985, Lieutenant General I.Ya. Kalinichenko, constantly maintaining contact with the operational group of the Central Asian border district and the command of the border detachments, assessed the developing situation, clarified their combat missions.
Thus, by the end of 1981, a grouping of border troops and a control system for their special forces operating on the territory of the DRA were created. As a result of the operations carried out, the plans of the opposition centers to seize the entire territory of Badakhshan and establish an anti-government regime there were thwarted. The threat of the seizure of the areas adjacent to the Soviet-Afghan border by the armed formations of the opposition and the strengthening of Islamic influence in them was eliminated, large armed formations that were forced to leave the border were defeated.
Border outpost MMG-2 of the Red Banner Eastern Border District.
MAIN PERIOD. Declaration and implementation of the policy of national reconciliation in Afghanistan.
Despite the successes achieved, the situation in the north of Afghanistan became more and more difficult. On January 8, 1982, full-time border troops were deployed to the northern provinces. Initially, they were represented by six motorized maneuverable groups (MMG). The composition of the MMG was not unified and depended on the area of operation and the tasks assigned, but most of all they represented the structures of the battalion composition. Artillery was also attached to the MMG: 82 and 120-mm mortars and BM-21 Grad rocket launchers.
To fulfill the assigned tasks, the border troops were assigned a zone of responsibility to a depth of 100 kilometers to the road connecting the centers of the northern provinces. Already in February, measures began to clear the line of responsibility of the border troops from the Mujahideen formations operating there. Subsequently, the grouping of the border troops was doubled. Twelve MMGs stood as separate garrisons in different provinces, providing their own security from the attacks of the Mujahideen, and went out to conduct operations.
If necessary, the forces of several MMGs could combine for the conduct of larger-scale operations against large formations of the enemy. In addition, airborne assault maneuver groups (DShMG) began to operate from the territory of the Union. In the initial period of the war, combat missions were carried out mainly with the use of armored and automobile equipment, and since 1983 the operations began to have a more pronounced airmobile character. Troops suddenly landed in a designated area from helicopters, which subsequently carried out air fire support and evacuated units after completing the task.
Border guards of the Khorog DShMG before an operation on the territory of the DRA.
The essence of airborne assault operations was the rapid, sudden and massive landing of well-armed and maximally lightweight airborne assault units and landing pad capture groups along the perimeter of the cover (blocking) area. The landing was carried out with strong fire support for the combat operations of the landing units from the air, with a subsequent build-up of forces and assets at the captured or newly picked up landing sites. Usually, such operations were carefully prepared, carried out boldly, daringly and in a limited time.
DShMG mortar crew in position during the operation in Tashkurgan, March 1985
All combat activities of the border troops in Afghanistan were planned and carried out on the basis of information obtained by intelligence about the presence of a large base or an accumulation of mujahideen in a particular area. The operations were carefully prepared. Usually they involved 5 - 7 outposts from MMG, reinforced with mortars, 1 - 3 DShMG up to 200 people each, as well as Afghan units from 200 to 1000 people. Subdivisions and units of the 40th Army were involved in separate operations.
The crew of the BMP MMG-2 "Shebergan" in the Faryab operation (October 1983)
An example of this is Operation Marmol, carried out in January - February 1984. It involved 3 MMGs, 4 DShMGs, 30 helicopters, 9 Afghan infantry battalions, 1 combined artillery division of the 201st motorized rifle division and 1 fighter aviation regiment. The operation was led by the chief of troops of the Central Asian border district, Major General G.A. Zgersky. The created group took up its initial positions on Afghan territory - in the mountains. Mazar-i-Sharif. The operation was also controlled from here. Afghan units from the east and west blocked the Marmol depression. On the heights where the positions of the Mujahideen were located, powerful air strikes were inflicted, and then DShMG units were landed along the entire circumference of the plateau. In the wake of them, MMG units entered the area, which completed the defeat of the base area. After the operation, a large number of warehouses with weapons and ammunition located in caves were discovered in the area. Subsequently, one of the MMGs was placed in Marmol in the center of the plateau.
Major General G.A. Zgersky (center) after the end of "Marmolskaya"
operations, February 1984
Sappers of the Marmolskaya MMG 1988
The work of sappers MMG (area of the village of Marmol, 1988)
Ambushes were another way of conducting military operations by border guards. The main object of ambush actions were not caravans with weapons and ammunition, as was the case in the east and south of the country, but migrating bandit groups. Using good intelligence information, the border guards tried to act more accurately, directing their activities against specific field commanders. Experience has shown that when they were captured or destroyed, the formations they led, as a rule, disintegrated. Ambushes were deployed at night in the MMG deployment area at a distance of 5-15 km, so that reinforcements could quickly provide assistance within 30 minutes.
In 1985, in the course of a series of operations, special forces of the Soviet border troops, together with Afghan border guards, took under protection a section of the border with Iran at the junction of three borders, setting up border garrisons here. The 100-kilometer stretch of the Afghan-Iranian border has been securely closed to arms and ammunition caravans traveling from Iran to Afghanistan.
In April - May 1986, units of the Eastern Border District, together with a separate motorized rifle regiment, conducted a major operation in the Vaarduj Valley, outside the zone of operations of the border troops. As a result, a vast territory was liberated from the enemy and the Baharak-Hasravi road was cleared. The deployed garrisons ensured the deployment of Afghan units of the Tsarandoy and the DRA Ministry of State Security in the liberated regions of the province.
During this period, the special forces of the border troops also carried out purposeful work among the wavering rebel groups. In 1985 alone, over 2.5 thousand people (26 battle groups) went over to the side of the government. V winter periods, especially at the end of winter, when famine struck in many areas, the border guards provided food assistance to the population. It paid off. Knowing that the border guards would never refuse, the Afghans turned to our doctors for help. In 1986, it became more and more common to practice humanitarian marches in vehicles. Arriving in a remote village, the border guards held rallies with the help of Afghan activists, distributed food, and provided medical assistance.
Border guards of the Kerkinskaya DShMG. 1986 year
Since the beginning of 1987, when the policy of national reconciliation was announced, the situation in the country has not become peaceful. The difference was that now the Soviet troops could not carry out active and preemptive actions. It was only allowed to respond to the sallies of the Mujahideen, who, taking advantage of the forced passivity of the border guards, became more active. The rebels, having gained freedom of movement, began to rebuild their bases, make up for the losses, mainly by transferring armed sabotage and terrorist groups from Pakistan. These actions led to the disruption of national reconciliation and to the protraction of the fratricidal war. There was even the so-called "Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan" Ahmad Shah Massoud, who managed to unite a number of rival armed formations and conduct several successful offensive operations and provocations on the border. So, in March 1987, oppositionists fired at the Soviet mountains with jet systems. Panj and attacked a group of border guards of the Moscow border detachment. As a result of these attacks, border guards and civilians were killed.
To ensure the security of the Soviet-Afghan border and prevent bandit actions, Soviet cities and settlements Kushka, Termez, Pyanj, Moskovsky, Khorog and a number of others, as well as all bridges and crossings. For this purpose, special units were allocated, outposts and border detachments were reinforced with personnel, artillery, including jet artillery, as well as other military equipment. The border guards additionally received helicopters and airplanes. In order to clear the border zone with the USSR from the most active formations of rebels, the border troops were forced together with Afghan forces in 1987-1988. carry out several operations again. For example, on October 22, 1987, measures were taken to disrupt the actions of the irreconcilable Imamsahib group on the repeated shelling of the mountains. Pyanj. In November - December 1987, an operation was carried out against the bandit formation of the field commander Yermamad and the liquidation of the enemy base "Darband" against the section of the Kerkinsky frontier detachment of the ball.
PREPARATION FOR WITHDRAWAL AND WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES FROM DRA.
In 1988, the preparation of Soviet troops for the withdrawal from the DRA began. From May 15, 1988 to February 15, 1989, the special forces of the border troops took a number of large-scale actions to ensure the safety of the withdrawal of the 40 Army from Afghanistan. The advancement of army columns in the zone of responsibility of the border troops was carried out along two routes with their passage at the border in Kushka and Termez. Special units of the border troops were withdrawn from the DRA in the last turn.
5 outposts, 10 MMG and DShMG, 1 separate division of border patrol ships, 2 border air regiments and 3 checkpoints (Termez, Tashkent and Kushka) covered the routes for the withdrawal of army formations and units and their passage across the border. From May 15 to August 15, 1988, with the departure of 50% of Soviet troops, the armed opposition groups managed to take control of a number of regions of the DRA (Faizabad, Shakhri-Buzurga, Khanabad, Kunduz, etc.), and in December 1988, having united in 5 -thousand-strong group, conduct a major offensive operation and capture the mountains. Talukan.
In this regard, to cover the Soviet-Afghan border in the zones of responsibility of the Takhta-Bazarsky, Kerkinsky, Pyandzhsky and Moscow border detachments, 6 MMGs were additionally introduced from the Eastern, Transbaikal, Pacific and Far Eastern border districts. The border detachments were reinforced with Grad rocket launchers. By the end of 1988, the border troops had the largest universal grouping during their stay in the DRA, possessing great combat and operational capabilities. The group was located in 66 garrisons on Afghan territory and was supported by significant forces of border units and aviation from Soviet territory.
Having passed the units and units of the 40th Army through their battle formations, the border troops remained on the territory of the DRA for another two weeks. And only on February 15, early in the morning, having passed the last army convoy across the border, the border guards began their withdrawal. The exit of the grouping was carried out in 12 directions under the cover of the aviation of the border troops. The situation in the areas controlled by the border guards was quite calm, so the withdrawal took place without incidents. The only difficulty was caused by the withdrawal of MMG from the Czech Republic. To enter the road from the Rustak zone, our units had to cover a section of the road for about 1.5 km. The road went between the heights, which was occupied by one of the irreconcilable leaders. He decided to prevent the withdrawal of MMG from Czehiab.
The conclusion of the MMG was led by Major General A.N. Martovitsky, who agreed with the local elders to accompany the column, sitting on the armor. The agreement was fulfilled, for which the town of MMG and the food remaining there were transferred to the Afghans. The elders did not allow the Mujahideen to prevent the MMG from leaving the Chechiab "sack". The last one, at 16:39, crossed the border of the 5th MMG of the Takhta-Bazar border detachment.
THE FINAL STAGE.
The final stage in the transfer of material assets to the Afghan side took place in the difficult conditions of the aggravated civil war. The situation at the border was very difficult. And despite the fact that our troops were withdrawn to the Union, sometimes we had to intervene to protect the Afghans from the atrocities of bandits.
In the area of responsibility of the MMG of the Pyanj border detachment was the village of Zangirye, in which the Ismaili religious community lived. They supported good relationship with our border guards. In April 1989 it became known that the bandit groups under the command of Ishon Burkhonetdin and Sheikh Saadi decided to attack the village. Mortal danger loomed over the peace-loving Ismailis, and they turned to the Soviet border guards for help. The situation was reported to Moscow.
Moscow approved the provision of assistance to the community. The operation was led by the head of the Khorog border detachment, Lieutenant Colonel K.V. Totsky (later Colonel General, Director of the Federal Border Service of the Russian Federation). Two MMGs were nominated to Pyanj. The bandits, having learned about the preparations of the Soviet side, went to negotiations, but did not abandon their initial plans. After some time, they went to storm the village, firing from all types of weapons. Shells and mines even flew into Soviet territory. Then the border guards struck fire with 82 and 120-mm mortars. The blow was delivered very clearly, covering the battle formations of the bandits. Having suffered heavy losses and realizing that the Ismailis are under serious protection, the Mujahideen left the village.
Over the ten years of the war, more than 62 thousand border guards have passed through Afghanistan. Over the years, the group of border troops carried out 1113 operations on the territory of the DRA. During the hostilities, 41,216 mujahideen were destroyed, 545 of them were field commanders, 19,335 militants were captured, of which 279 were commanders of combat groups and detachments. Destroyed and captured 20334 weapons, 742 vehicles.
Own losses of border guards amounted to 518 people, including officers - 80, warrant officers and conscripts - 13, sergeants and privates - 425. Sanitary losses (wounded and shell-shocked) amounted to 2540 people.
Not a single soldier-border guard in ten years of war was taken prisoner. Not one of the dead border guards was left to lie in a foreign land. Twenty two thousand border soldiers were awarded orders and medals.
Seven border guards were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Among them, Lieutenant Colonel V.I. Ukhabov (posthumously), Major A.P. Bogdanov (posthumously), lieutenant colonel F.S. Shagaleev, Major I.P. Barsukov, captains N.N. Lukashov and V.F. Popkov, ensign V.D. Kapshuk.
Awarding state awards to border guards who distinguished themselves in Afghanistan. In the center - the leadership of the border troops of the KGB of the USSR: General of the Army V.A.Matrosov, Lieutenant General I.Ya. Kalinichenko, Major General N.V. Britvin
The hero of the USSR
Sergeant Major Kapshuk
Victor Dmitrievich
The Afghan war was the most difficult and difficult period of the operational and military activity of the Soviet border troops for the entire period of their existence, when the hostilities were conducted continuously for almost ten years along a front of 2300 and to a depth of 100 km. and more.
In the course of operational combat operations, the organizational and staff structure of subunits, command bodies, weapons, combat and special equipment of the border troops were tested, new structures for the border troops were tested - airborne assault and motorized maneuverable groups capable of acting both independently and as part of any groupings. Of decisive importance was well-organized reconnaissance and targeted combat training, the coherence of actions of various forces and means of special forces of the border troops in different types battle. The border troops have acquired a unique experience of combat operations, which is of great theoretical and practical significance for modern conditions.
The material uses the memoirs of I.P. Vertelko, G.A. Zgersky, A.N. Martovitsky, V.S. Donskov, S.N. Bogdanov.
Material prepared
veteran of the border troops B.I. Popov.