Potapov signed an agreement on behalf of the brigade. Plans of seminars and practical classes in the discipline: Labor law

1. The general meeting of participants of the production cooperative "Vostok", taking into account the need to bring the organizational and legal form of the enterprise in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation, decided to reorganize it into a limited liability company. When approving the text of the memorandum of association and the charter of the company, Zadorov's legal adviser pointed out the need to remove from the charter the reasons for dismissal that were not provided for by labor legislation. Opposing Zadorov, the chairman of the cooperative, Rokotov, referred to the fact that the charter of the company fixed the grounds for excluding any participant from its membership.

Determine the sectoral nature of labor legal relations of members of cooperative organizations, employees - members of non-state enterprises in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation. Describe the features of the content of labor relations of the corresponding types.

2.Potapov entered into an agreement on behalf of the brigade with the administration of the Avangard stadium in accordance with which the brigade undertakes to put the football field in full order within three months, and the administration to pay for the work after its completion.

After three months, when making the calculation, the brigade workers demanded that they also be paid compensation for unused leave in proportion to the hours worked.

Is this requirement to be met? What type of labor contract was concluded?

3. Sergeev refused to sign a contract with the branch of the closed joint-stock company "Berezka", demanding that not the branch, but the joint-stock company as a whole, be indicated as the employer. He believed that only in this case he acquires the right to receive additional social benefits stipulated in the contract. The head of the branch explained to Sergeev that the separate structural divisions, to which the branch belongs, have the right to conclude civil and labor contracts.

Analyze the legal status of a separate structural unit from the point of view of civil and labor legal personality.

4. Do the following situations comply with the labor legislation of the Russian Federation:

a) 14-year-old Akulov went to work as a courier during the summer holidays at school. However, at the request of the parents, the employment contract with Akulov was terminated because they did not give their consent to the employment of their son;

b) The mayor of the city made a decision prohibiting the leaders of the organization from hiring adolescents who do not have a complete secondary education;

c) The minor Volin entered into an oral agreement with his neighbors on growing seedlings, which he later wanted to sell in bulk;

d) Khalilova was refused a part-time job on the grounds that she was already working as a part-time job in another organization;

e) Engineer Goberidze was not hired by the state unitary enterprise, since the head of the corresponding department is Goberidze's stepfather;

f) Storekeeper Zhuchkin, who was declared incompetent by the court, was fired from his job for stealing an expensive tool.

5.One of the nightclubs in the city "Orion", by agreement with young people, prepared a croupier at his own expense to work in his establishment. However, having received professional knowledge and skills, having worked for a short time, the newly minted croupiers quit Orion.

What are the rights and obligations of the employer and the employee in this situation?

6.Determine the grounds for the occurrence of the following individual labor relations if it is known that the employee is:

a) General Director of JSC;

b) professor of the state university;

c) director of a state unitary enterprise;

d) the chairman of the city court;

e) Dean of the Faculty of ASTU;

f) a member of a professional basketball team.

7. Citizen Kuznetsov came to the lawyer's office and asked to clarify to him whether he was considered hired and whether he could demand the registration of a work book. Kuznetsov explained that he works at LLC Pirozhok as a loader, an agreement was signed with him called the "Agreement for the performance of contract work", according to which he is at work by eight o'clock every day, except Saturday and Sunday. His working day lasts nine hours, during the day he performs loading and unloading work in the bakery as the need arises, while reporting to the director of the LLC.

As a lawyer, give a motivated answer to Citizen Kuznetsov.


Commander Mikhail Potapov


My acquaintance with the fate of Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov and the history of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front began by chance. Several years ago, while digging in the Internet, I drew attention to the map of the Soviet-German front as of August 25, 1941, apparently borrowed from a certain English-language resource. By this time, the Germans occupied Novgorod, Smolensk, approached Bryansk, besieged Odessa in the south and reached the Dnieper line from Kremenchug to the mouth.

And only to the south of the Pinsk bogs a powerful wedge literally pierced several hundred kilometers into the thickness of the territory occupied by the Nazis. On the edge of this wedge there was a laconic inscription "5 POTAPOV". It was the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front under the command of Major General Potapov.


Of course, the front line could not be uniform, in different parts of it were opposed to each other in numbers and strength of formations, and many circumstances influenced success or disaster. In addition, such a wedge could not exist for a long time, since it was easily turned into an environment. From the south, the Germans came close to Kiev, and it was necessary to level the front to organize a stable defense of the city. A potential threat was also brewing to the right flank of the 5th Army, after the German troops of Army Group Center, bypassing the swampy basin of Pripyat, reached the Gomel-Starodub line. On August 19, the 5th Army received an order to withdraw beyond the Dnieper to a depth of 140-180 kilometers. And yet, the fact that the 5th Army's retreat path from the western border of the USSR, even for some time, was almost three times shorter than that of its neighbors, aroused the desire to learn as much as possible about this formation and its commander.

During the first two months of the war, Potapov's troops loomed menacingly from the north over the German Army Group South, but even after the retreat beyond the Dnieper, the 5th Army had a noticeable influence on the decisions of the Reich's high command. In his very first directive, dedicated to military operations on Eastern Front(Directive No. 33 of 07/19/1941), Hitler indicates: "The enemy 5th Army must be quickly and decisively defeated." But it does not work out quickly and decisively, and the next directive No. 34 of 30.07.41 again instructs the German troops to "force the 5th Red Army ... to force into battle west of the Dnieper and destroy it." The Fuehrer did not rule out a breakthrough of Potapov's troops north through Polesie into the flank of Army Group Center and demanded that measures be taken to prevent this, frankly, an unlikely maneuver. Two weeks pass and Hitler irritably reminds again that "the 5th Russian army must be ... finally destroyed." (Appendix to Directive No. 34 of 12.08.41). However, a few days later, Potapov's army disappeared behind the wide expanse of the Dnieper.

One should not be surprised at the Fuhrer's persistence - he saw the same maps of military operations that we see now, and quite adequately perceived the threat posed by the activity of troops under the command of Potapov.


Finally, on August 21, Hitler issues an order in which three times (!) Repeats the idea of ​​the need to destroy the 5th Army. But the main thing is that for the first time he is ready to allocate "as many divisions as necessary" to carry out this task. Along with the success of the operation to blockade Leningrad, the defeat of Potapov's army is considered by the Fuhrer to be a prerequisite for a successful offensive "against the group of forces of Timoshenko," that is, the Western Front. It turns out that the way to Moscow, according to Hitler, lay through the defeated 5th Army.

I learned all these details later, but when I examined the map, the name Potapov, alas, did not tell me anything. Gradually, after getting acquainted with the documents and research, conversations with the widow of the commander of the army, Marianna Fedorovna Modorova, the amazing life of this man was revealed to me.

From deacons to generals

Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov was born in October 1902 in the village of Mochalovo, Yukhnovsky district then Smolensk province, now the Kaluga region. Although in the questionnaires the future commander-5 referred his parents to the "middle peasants", rather, they should be ranked among the wealthy artisans: Mikhail's father was a contractor when paving roads and streets.

Without leaving the volost, Mikhail received a very decent primary education for a village boy. In a rural school, his teacher was a "simplified" prince from the Gagarin family, and later he studied at a parish school at a church in the neighboring village of Putogino. The trustee of the church and the school was the St. Petersburg millionaire-book publisher, a native of these places, Ignatius Tuzov, so, for sure, the level of knowledge of the students was taken care of here.

The first World War and the economic crisis is not the best way affected the family well-being of the Potapovs. As a teenager, Mikhail began to help his father. October revolution The Potapovs met in Kharkov, where they worked as bridge builders in a tram depot.


By the spring of 1920, Mikhail returned to his native Mochalovo, and in May he became a Red Army soldier in the Yukhnov military registration and enlistment office. Formally, Potapov is considered a participant in the Civil War, but he did not take direct part in the hostilities.

Potapov, after completing cavalry courses in Minsk in September 1922, was appointed platoon commander of the 43rd cavalry regiment of the Volga Military District. It was not easy for a 20-year-old young man who did not smell gunpowder to command experienced riders from the Cossacks, many of whom had two wars behind them. Oddly enough, a thorough knowledge of church rituals contributed to the gaining of authority among subordinates - in Putogino Mikhail not only studied at the church, but also served for some time as a deacon. From the deaconhood, Potapov will have a well-delivered luxurious baritone for the rest of his life. Many years later, already being a general in the Soviet army, the former deacon did not shy away from attending church services in full "parade".


Two years later, already in the position of assistant commander of the squadron, Potapov leaves for Moscow, for the Military-chemical courses. The new place of service is the 67th Cavalry Regiment of the North Caucasus Military District. Since 1931, he is back at school - now as a student at the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army. The cavalryman becomes a tanker. After graduating from the academy in 1936, his career is developing rapidly, which, however, is typical for many future commanders of the Great Patriotic War. It took Potapov exactly four years to go from chief of staff of a regiment to commander of an army.

Undoubtedly, the meeting with Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov played a significant role in his career. It happened in May 1937 in Belarus, where Potapov commanded a regiment, and Zhukov commanded a division. By the time they met, the future marshal had already received a new appointment, but since then the fellow countrymen have not let each other out of sight. In the book "Memories and Reflections" Georgy Konstantinovich writes: "Practically on field exercises and maneuvers and in the 3rd and 6th corps, I had to act with the 21st separate tank brigade (brigade commander MI Potapov). This commander was my colleague in the past, and we understood each other in a "combat situation", from a half-word. "

When in June 1939 Zhukov was offered to lead an operation against the Japanese army on Khalkhin Gol, he insisted on the appointment of Potapov as his deputy.


They flew to the Far East on one plane. Marshal recalled: “The brigade commander Potapov was my deputy. On his shoulders lay a lot of work to organize the interaction of formations and combat arms, and when we launched a general offensive, Mikhail Ivanovich was entrusted with the leadership of the main grouping on the right wing of the front. "

In June 1940, Zhukov became the commander of the Kiev Special Military District, at the same time Potapov was transferred to KOVO to the post of commander of the 4th mechanized corps. Six months later, Mikhail Ivanovich becomes an army commander. In February 1941, Zhukov, appointed chief of the General Staff, moved to Moscow. The fellow countrymen had a chance to meet again only in the post-war years.

It remains to be regretted that the remarkable mutual understanding of the two military leaders could not be used for the cause of Victory. I note that these were very dissimilar personalities, in some ways even opposite, but this circumstance only contributed to their mutual attraction.

Blitzkrieg failed

In the event of an enemy attack, Potapov's army was responsible for the "cover area No. 1", 170 km long from Wlodawa to Krystynopol in the north of the Ukrainian section of the Soviet-German border. In the last days of peace, Potapov took a number of measures to increase the combat capability of the army. On the night of June 16-17, units of the 62nd Rifle Division set out from the camp and, after two night crossings, reached positions near the border. On June 18, Potapov ordered the 45th rifle division to be withdrawn from the range. On the same day, the 135th Rifle Division received an order to advance to the border.

But this could not change the general situation, which, with the outbreak of hostilities, developed extremely unfavorably for our troops. On the Sokalsky ledge, the Germans achieved a threefold superiority in manpower and equipment. Stretched out along the front, the Soviet divisions did not hold back the blow of the German army corps, which were densely built in the directions of the main attack. Mechanized subdivisions of the 5th army were only being pulled up to the border from the places of deployment.

Nevertheless, from the very first hours of the war, Potapov's troops fought stubbornly and skillfully. For each destroyed or burned Soviet tank, the formations of the 1st tank group of von Kleist suffered 2.5-3 times more damage. The 5th Army not only fiercely defended itself, but also inflicted counterattacks on the enemy. "The leadership of the enemy forces in front of Army Group South is amazingly energetic, its continuous flank and frontal attacks inflict heavy losses on us," Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Franz Halder noted in his notes.

On June 26, a counteroffensive by the South-Western Front began in the Brody-Lutsk-Dubno triangle, where the first counter-offensive in the history of World War II took place. tank battle... Four Soviet mechanized corps (two from the 5th Army) failed to build on their initial success. The inconsistent position of the front command also played a role, which in the midst of the fighting in the triangle ordered to go on the defensive, and then again returned to the offensive plan.

I will note the following detail: in these days of fierce confrontation, namely on June 30, Potapov issued an order in which he pointed out the inadmissibility of shooting prisoners of war.

On July 1, against the background of a general withdrawal of the front's forces, the 5th Army launched a powerful counterattack on the northern flank of the German offensive. In particular, the 20th Panzer Division threw back enemy units by 10-12 km, destroyed up to 1,000 enemy soldiers, 10 tanks, and 2 batteries.

Army General S.M. Shtemenko wrote: "The 5th Army ... became, as they say, a thorn in the eye of Hitler's generals, put up strong resistance to the enemy and inflicted significant damage on him."


Fascist German troops did not manage to quickly break through the front here. Potapov's divisions knocked them off the Lutsk-Rovno-Zhitomir road and forced them to abandon an immediate attack on Kiev.

Shtemenko, in those months one of the leading employees of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, was referring to the successful counteroffensive of the 5th Army, undertaken on July 10. Then Potapov's tankmen, behind the backs of the III Army Corps formations, intercepted the Novograd-Volynsky - Zhitomir highway at a width of over 10 km. What a headache the loss of this most important communication became for the Germans can be judged by the fact that the commander of the troops of Army Group South Gerd von Runstedt was seriously planning to use aviation to transfer the infantry regiment Herman Goering to the Zhitomir region.

While Potapov's troops attacked the northern flank of the German offensive, the defenders of Kiev received a respite. The command of the 6th German army was forced to declare: "The nature of the threat to our troops from the main forces of the 5th Russian army is still such that this threat should be eliminated before the attack on Kiev." The loss of the Ukrainian capital was postponed by two months.

German military historian Alfred Filippi also points out that the slowdown in the advance of Army Group South was the opposition of the 5th Army. “And although this opposition ... was not completely unexpected for the German command, it nevertheless brought tactical successes to the Russians from the very beginning of the campaign, and then in the Novograd-Volynsky, Zhitomir region acquired operational significance, much more serious than possible. was to assume. This had a rather significant paralyzing effect on the will of the command of the 6th Army to carry out the main operational task, which was to reach the Dnieper near Kiev. "

In late July - early August, during the battles for the Korostensky fortified area, Potapov's army again tried not so much to keep the Germans with a solid defense, but also by decisive counterattacks and pressure on the flanks forced the attackers to weaken the blow. Here the enemy concentrated 11 divisions against the 5th Army. Considering that the staff of the German infantry division was 14 thousand people, then the enemy troops were at least twice as large as the forces at Potapov's disposal. German military historian Werner Haupt notes that "the 5th Soviet Army, under the command of the talented Major General Potapov, was located on the left flank of the 6th German Army and inflicted very heavy losses on it." After the war, it will be calculated that, on average, for every day of hostilities in the zone of the 5th Army, there were from 8 to 10 strikes by our troops against the enemy.

On August 9, Commander von Runstedt gave the order to suspend the offensive on the Kiev-Korosten line and temporarily go on the defensive in order to disperse the troops in depth and provide them with the opportunity to rest. In assessing the situation presented in OKH, the command of Army Group South expressed a rather pessimistic opinion regarding the situation on its northern wing. It was even suggested that the Russians intended "to go on the offensive from the Kiev region and from the Ovruch region in order to crush the northern wing of the army group." However, the physical exhaustion and losses, which von Runstedt lamented, no less, if not more, affected the state of the Soviet troops.

Fatal triumph?

Thus, Hitler's order of August 21, aimed at destroying Potapov's troops, looked quite reasonable. The idea to single out the tank forces of Guderian, who was operating in Belarus, cannot be called spontaneous. A month earlier, in the very first document concerning the 5th Army - Directive No. 33 of 07/19/1941, the Fuehrer already intended to use the southern flank of Army Group Center for an operation north of Kiev. Perhaps he considered the proposal that had been received the day before from the headquarters of the “southerners” to be worthy of attention: to strike through Mozyr on Ovruch with the forces of the 35th corps of Army Group Center. On August 9, von Runstedt again asked for the help of his neighbors.

Consequently, by August 21, Hitler had formed a firm conviction of how the campaign in the East should develop. First, an offensive on Moscow can only be launched after the defeat of the 5th Army, which, on the one hand, will ensure the safety of the right flank of the troops aimed at the Soviet capital, and on the other hand, will create favorable conditions for action in Ukraine by the von Runstedt group. Second, to successfully achieve this goal, it is necessary to involve the forces of Army Group Center. Do not forget that for the Fuhrer, the priority was the methodical destruction of enemy forces on the territory, regardless of geographical or political goals. As early as July 13, he declared to the commander-in-chief of the ground forces Walter von Brauchitsch: "It is not so important to attack the East quickly as to destroy the enemy's manpower."

Meanwhile, the General Staff was almost unanimously inclined to strengthen Army Group Center and strike directly on a narrow front in the direction of Moscow. The most displeased with the Fuehrer's order to turn to the south was the key figure of the upcoming operation - the commander of the 2nd Panzer Group Heinz Guderian: “On August 23, I was summoned to the headquarters of Army Group Center for a meeting, in which the chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces took part. He told us that Hitler decided to attack primarily not Leningrad or Moscow, but Ukraine and Crimea ... We were all deeply convinced that Hitler's planned attack on Kiev would inevitably lead to the winter campaign with all its difficulties ... " ...

These lines, written after the war, clearly belong to the genre of generals' memoirs "How Hitler prevented us from winning." “It is always easier to extol the merits of some hypothetical alternative than to justify caution and disappointing reality. And in this case, moreover, it so happened that all the people who opposed the offensive in the center had already died. Keitel, Jodl, Kluge, Hitler himself - they didn’t have time to write exculpatory memoirs, ”British military historian Alan Clark notes, not without sarcasm.

In fact, on the 20th of August 1941, the question was not so categorical: either to Moscow or to Ukraine. The operation against Potapov's troops was conceived by the Fuhrer as an auxiliary one precisely within the framework of the decisive offensive of the Wehrmacht on the capital of the USSR.


On August 30, in a conversation between Hitler and Halder, it was noted that the troops of Army Group Center had turned to Ukraine not for a “war in the south”, but in order to start “an operation against Tymoshenko's troops” as soon as possible. In the order of the Fuehrer of August 21, it is noted that the defeat of the 5th Army should guarantee Army Group South "the possibility of creating a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Dnieper in its middle reaches, so that then the center and left wing continue the offensive in the direction of Kharkov, Rostov." As we can see, the immediate task looks rather modest, and there is no talk at all about the capture of Kiev, especially the defeat of the South-Western Front.

The German generals could not then know for sure that Guderian's turn to the south would lead to a winter campaign, as the "fast Heinz" claims in his notes, just as they could not have known that the fragile building of the Southwestern Front would collapse and bury under its rubble plans for a quick and smooth transition to an offensive on Moscow. Because it was no longer Hitler's directives, but the rapid development of events - developing very favorably for the Germans - that dictated the logic of action to the German command.

On September 1, the following report comes from the headquarters of Army Group South: “If the enemy in Eastern Ukraine is not destroyed, then neither Army Group South, nor Army Group Center will be able to conduct an offensive without stopping ... direction earlier than in Ukraine, it is impossible due to the fact that the operation and actions already begun by Army Group "South" south wing Army groups "Center" to support this operation went too far (emphasis mine. - MZ) to transfer the main efforts to another area ... ". The Germans had no choice but to act according to the situation. The rapid advance of Guderian in the north and the occupation of the Derievsky bridgehead near Kremenchug on the southern flank of the SWF prompted von Runstedt on September 4, even without the consent of the high command, to give the order for a decisive offensive.

According to Werner Haupt, the battle for Kiev was the most important battle of the entire war: “Because of the events of the next two weeks, the decisive German attack on Moscow was ignored. This probably changed the outcome of the Eastern campaign. " But we repeat: everything that happened is the result of a paradoxical situation, when the very real prospect of the defeat of an entire front made adjustments to the strategy and tactics of the enemy, and the catastrophe of the Soviet troops and the triumph of the Hitlerite armies in the Kiev cauldron took the Germans a whole month and moved the date of the decisive rush to Moscow to the beginning. the onset of cold weather.


Chronicle of the disaster

Unfortunately, the solution of their tasks was facilitated by the Germans' miscalculations of the command of the South-Western Front. Together with the 5th Army, the 27th Rifle Corps retreated beyond the Dnieper. Meanwhile, the corps not only did not obey Potapov, but also made a retreat according to its own schedule. An easily predictable inconsistency led to the fact that on August 23 the Germans broke through the weak rearguard curtain at the junction of the army and the corps, reached the Dnieper north of Kiev at Okuninovo, seized the bridge and occupied a bridgehead on the eastern bank. Units of the 5th Army and 37th Army under the command of A.A. Vlasov unsuccessfully tried to eliminate the expanding Okuninovskaya enemy grouping.

On August 29, Potapov tried to launch a counteroffensive, this time unsuccessfully. Not surprising, because the 5th Army has ceased to be that formidable force that a month ago. Almost a third of it (five divisions) was transferred to the 37th Army; The 135th Infantry Division and the 5th Artillery Anti-Tank Brigade were transferred to the 40th Army. The 1st Airborne Corps was also withdrawn from the 5th Army and entered into the reserve of the front. Due to the lack of tanks, the 9th and 19th mechanized corps had to be reorganized into battalions. Rifle divisions due to heavy losses, they had no more than 20-25% of the personnel.

Only the immediate withdrawal of the 5th Army to the Desna River made it possible to avoid the danger of encirclement. With such a proposal, Potapov in the morning of August 30 turned to the Military Council of the South-Western Front, but it did not meet with proper understanding.


On the same day, the 21st Army of the Bryansk Front unexpectedly withdrew from its positions, and the Wehrmacht units immediately rushed into the breakthrough on the approaches to Chernigov. On September 1, the Germans occupied a bridgehead on the banks of the Desna River in the near rear of the 5th Army. The units thrown to eliminate the breakthrough did not succeed. The countdown of the time remaining before the inevitable catastrophe has begun.

On the evening of September 5, Potapov again addressed the front commander, Kirponos, with a proposal to withdraw his troops, but received a categorical refusal. It is noteworthy that it was on this day, according to Halder's notes, that Hitler first spoke of the Kiev cauldron. Only on September 9 did the Headquarters sanction the withdrawal of the 5th Army to the Desna River. By this time, the main forces of Potapov were reliably surrounded. From the entire army of 70 thousand personnel, less than 4 thousand fighters remained, as well as about 200 guns and mortars of various systems.

At the end of September 14, Potapov and his headquarters once again made an attempt to stop the retreat of the remnants of the army, and to delay the advance of the superior enemy forces. However, it was not possible to gain a foothold on any of the subsequent lines, since the Germans, pressing from the front, simultaneously bypassed both flanks. And on the morning of September 16, at the headquarters of the 5th Army it became known that the day before, in the rear of the front in the area of ​​Lokhvitsa (Poltava region), the troops of the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian, advancing from the north, had joined forces with the troops of the 1st Panzer Group of Kleist, who had broken through from south. Five have already been surrounded Soviet armies... The Kiev boiler has become a reality. According to German data, more than 660 thousand soldiers and officers of the Red Army were captured, 884 tanks and more than 3 thousand guns were captured.

On September 21, a combined detachment from the remnants of the headquarters of the front and the 5th Army gave the last battle to the enemy. Potapov was wounded and lost consciousness. In the heat of battle, the general was mistaken for a dead man and hastily "buried" with the bodies of the dead.


Potapov's documents were handed over to Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, the future marshal, and then the commander of the 15th rifle corps of the 5th army. "I literally sobbed when the documents of our commander were handed over to me. I did not know at all what would happen to us now, since Mikhail Ivanovich was killed."

The bitter fate of the commander

Three days later, Potapov was discovered by the Germans. The test of captivity began. In the Nazi concentration camps, Mikhail Ivanovich's paths crossed with Generals M. Lukin and I. Muzychenko, Senior Lieutenant Y. Dzhugashvili, the leaders of the defense of the Brest Fortress Major P. Gavrilov and Captain I. Zubachev. In 1992, reports and transcripts of interrogations of Potapov were published, who, when asked whether the Russian people are ready to wage a war if the army retreats to the Urals, replied: “Yes, it will remain in a state of moral defense, and the Red Army will continue to resist. " German investigators assessed the behavior of the Red Army general in the following way: “as a prisoner he behaved with dignity,” “on strategic issues, he referred to his lack of awareness,” “he answered with restraint to questions concerning his future.” The Germans also characterized Potapov as a "Russian nationalist", although it is difficult to say what exactly they meant by this wording.

Potapov categorically refused to cooperate with traitors from the ROA. At the same time, Mikhail Ivanovich spoke respectfully of Vlasov himself until the end of his life, did not believe in the betrayal of his southern "neighbor" on the South-Western Front, believing that the Germans somehow used the general for their own purposes against his will.

Mikhail Ivanovich met the victorious spring of 1945 in the "general's" camp Hammelburg. On April 22, American troops came close to them. The camp commandant went with a white flag to Patton's army. The Americans arrived at the camp and transported all the prisoners to their place, then transported them to the French, and already from Paris, the recent prisoners of war returned home.

However, the homeland greeted them unkindly. Literally from the plane's ladder, Potapov and his comrades were sent to the "facility" in Golitsyno, near Moscow. For seven months a special check took place, which left indelible marks in the soul of Mikhail Ivanovich.


Until the end of his life, the invariably balanced and witty Potapov grew gloomy and withdrawn at the mention of the name of the former SMERSH chief Abakumov, whom he considered a rare villain.

Nevertheless, the results of the check, most likely, turned out to be objective, since Potapov was reinstated in the rank of major general and returned to the army. Mikhail Ivanovich wrote an application for reinstatement in the party. And again Zhukov came to the rescue, who gave the following recommendation to his longtime comrade-in-arms: “As for commanding qualities, Comrade Potapov was the best army commander, and the units and formations that he commanded were always leading. In the border battle, the 5th Army fought with exceptional tenacity and valor. Retreating under the influence of superior enemy forces, she repeatedly counterattacked and defeated the Germans. Comrade Potapov ran the army brilliantly. I will also say that he was a big-hearted man who was loved by all his subordinates for his benevolence and understanding. " It is difficult to read without excitement these lines from an official document, which came from the pen of a marshal far from sentimentality.

Obviously, Zhukov's opinion was shared by many in the political and military leadership of the USSR. In any case, Mikhail Ivanovich was probably the only one of the highest Soviet officers who passed captivity, who not only returned to the army, but also made, if not enchanting, but, given the vicissitudes of our post-war history, quite a worthy career. He served in Transbaikalia, in the Far East; Colonel-General Potapov died in January 1965 as the first deputy commander of the Odessa military district.

The place of Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov in a kind of hierarchy of military leaders of the Great Patriotic War, built in the post-war period, clearly does not correspond to his military leadership talent and contribution to the Victory.


But still it cannot be said that the name of the commander of the 5th Army was hushed up. Soviet marshals I.Kh. Baghramyan, I.I. Yakubovsky, and former opponents - Guderian, Keitel, Halder. It should be noted that the 5th Army became a real forge of personnel - such recognized commanders as M.E. Katukov, K.S. Moskalenko, K.K. Rokossovsky, I.I. Fedyuninsky. All of them highly appreciated the merits of their former commander. During Potapov's lifetime, A. Filippi's book "The Pripyat Problem" was published in the USSR, where the role of the 5th Army in disrupting the blitzkrieg was investigated in detail.
And nevertheless, the name of Potapov for the 70 years that have passed since the victorious May 1945 has not become the property of the general public. So, today the memory of Mikhail Ivanovich is immortalized only in Ukraine, where streets in Kiev and Zhitomir are named after him. How long? It seems that the anniversary of the Great Victory is a worthy occasion for Russians to deservedly acknowledge the merits of the remarkable commander and patriot of our Motherland.

The article was published as part of a socially significant project implemented with state support funds allocated as a grant in accordance with the President's order Russian Federation No. 11-rp dated 01/17/2014 and on the basis of a competition held by the All-Russian public organization "Knowledge" Society of Russia.

Page 1

The District Court, considering the case at the suit of A.G. Petrov to P.S. Ivanov on the collection of the debt under the loan agreement, announced a break at a later time on the same day in order for the plaintiff to submit to the court a genuine written receipt from the defendant.

Since the consideration of other cases was scheduled for that day, the court, during the announced break, considered the case of reinstatement at work, on which it made a decision.

After that, the court continued the hearing on the first case on debt collection under the loan agreement, since the plaintiff presented the defendant's original receipt.

Have the principles of civil procedural law been violated by the court?

In this task, the object of civil procedural relations is the announcement by the court of a break at a later time on the same day, and the consideration of another case during this break.

The subjects in this task are: the district court, the plaintiff - Petrov A.G., the defendant - Ivanov P.S.

When solving these problems, it is necessary to refer to paragraph 3 of Art. 157 Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation.

Answering the question of the problem - yes, in this case the principle of the continuity of the trial was violated. The court was supposed to postpone the trial (clause 1 of Art. 169 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation, in order to present additional evidence), only after that it is possible to consider other civil cases. After the postponement, the proceedings begin over again - paragraph 3 of Art. 169 Code of Civil Procedure.

Potapova V.N. received a valuable package from my sister. After opening it, it turned out that all the things contained in it were damaged due to the fact that the package was stored in a damp room. Potapova V.N. turned to legal advice to a lawyer with a request to assist her in protecting the violated right and collecting the cost of the parcel from the telecom operator.

What advice should Potapova's lawyer give regarding the procedure for protecting her rights?

In this case, the object of civil procedural legal relations is the protection of the violated right and the collection of the cost of the parcel from the telecom operator.

The subjects in this case are: Mrs Potapova V.N., a lawyer, a communications operator, and in the future, depending on the type of protection of rights, another subject may appear - a court.

In this situation, it is necessary to refer to paragraph 2, Art. 11 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, it is also necessary to refer to Part 6, Art. 52 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of April 15, 2005 N 221 Moscow "On approval of the Rules for the provision of postal services"

A lawyer giving advice must explain that in this situation, both administrative and judicial procedures for the protection of the violated right are possible. Those. Potapov, can make a complaint to the postal operator, and wait for an answer. If the postal operator refuses to satisfy the claim, if he agrees to partially satisfy the claim, or if he does not receive a response from the postal operator within the time limits established for the consideration of the claim, the user of the postal service has the right to sue in court. But the selection by the victims of the administrative procedure for the protection of the violated right does not deprive him of the possibility of subsequent, and sometimes even simultaneous, appeal to the court on the same issue.

Akimov V.I. sued for construction crew out of three people to OOO Polet on the collection of 60 thousand rubles. for the accomplished construction works under a work contract. In the power of attorney issued to V.I. Akimov Brigadier Petrov S.K., indicated the right of the representative to sign the statement of claim, present it to the court and perform other procedural actions on behalf of the members of the brigade. The members of the construction team themselves were not involved in the case.

A general who was rated higher by the enemy than his command. The contribution to the general Victory of General Potapov and the 5th Army entrusted to him is difficult to overestimate - historians do not exclude that it was her staunch defense that prevented the fall of Moscow in the fall of 1941.

My acquaintance with the fate of Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov and the history of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front began by chance. Several years ago, while digging in the Internet, I drew attention to the map of the Soviet-German front as of August 25, 1941, apparently borrowed from a certain English-language resource. By this time, the Germans occupied Novgorod, Smolensk, approached Bryansk, besieged Odessa in the south and reached the Dnieper line from Kremenchug to the mouth.

And only to the south of the Pinsk bogs a powerful wedge literally pierced several hundred kilometers into the thickness of the territory occupied by the Nazis. On the edge of this wedge there was a laconic inscription "5 POTAPOV". It was the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front under the command of Major General Potapov.

Of course, the front line could not be uniform, in different parts of it were opposed to each other in numbers and strength of formations, and many circumstances influenced success or disaster. In addition, such a wedge could not exist for a long time, since it was easily turned into an environment. From the south, the Germans came close to Kiev, and it was necessary to level the front to organize a stable defense of the city. A potential threat was also brewing to the right flank of the 5th Army, after the German troops of Army Group Center, bypassing the swampy basin of Pripyat, reached the Gomel-Starodub line. On August 19, the 5th Army received an order to withdraw beyond the Dnieper to a depth of 140-180 kilometers. And yet, the fact that the 5th Army's retreat path from the western border of the USSR, even for some time, was almost three times shorter than that of its neighbors, aroused the desire to learn as much as possible about this formation and its commander.

During the first two months of the war, Potapov's troops loomed menacingly from the north over the German Army Group South, but even after the retreat beyond the Dnieper, the 5th Army had a noticeable influence on the decisions of the Reich's high command. In his very first directive on military operations on the Eastern Front (Directive No. 33 of 07/19/1941), Hitler points out: "The enemy 5th Army must be quickly and decisively defeated." But it does not work out quickly and decisively, and the next directive No. 34 of 30.07.41 again instructs the German troops to "force the 5th Red Army ... to force into battle west of the Dnieper and destroy it." The Fuehrer did not rule out a breakthrough of Potapov's troops north through Polesie into the flank of Army Group Center and demanded that measures be taken to prevent this, frankly, an unlikely maneuver. Two weeks pass and Hitler irritably reminds again that "the 5th Russian army must be ... finally destroyed." (Appendix to Directive No. 34 of 12.08.41). However, a few days later, Potapov's army disappeared behind the wide expanse of the Dnieper.
One should not be surprised at the Fuhrer's persistence - he saw the same maps of military operations that we see now, and quite adequately perceived the threat posed by the activity of troops under the command of Potapov. Finally, on August 21, Hitler issues an order in which three times (!) Repeats the idea of ​​the need to destroy the 5th Army. But the main thing is that for the first time he is ready to allocate "as many divisions as necessary" to carry out this task. Along with the success of the operation to blockade Leningrad, the defeat of Potapov's army is considered by the Fuhrer to be a prerequisite for a successful offensive "against the group of forces of Timoshenko," that is, the Western Front. It turns out that the way to Moscow, according to Hitler, lay through the defeated 5th Army.
I learned all these details later, but when I examined the map, the name Potapov, alas, did not tell me anything. Gradually, after getting acquainted with the documents and research, conversations with the widow of the commander of the army, Marianna Fedorovna Modorova, the amazing life path of this man was revealed to me.

From deacons to generals

Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov was born in October 1902 in the village of Mochalovo in the Yukhnovsky district of the then Smolensk province, now the Kaluga region. Although in the questionnaires the future commander-5 referred his parents to the "middle peasants", rather, they should be ranked among the wealthy artisans: Mikhail's father was a contractor when paving roads and streets.
Without leaving the volost, Mikhail received a very decent primary education for a village boy. In a rural school, his teacher was a "simplified" prince from the Gagarin family, and later he studied at a parish school at a church in the neighboring village of Putogino. The trustee of the church and the school was the St. Petersburg millionaire-book publisher, a native of these places, Ignatius Tuzov, so, for sure, the level of knowledge of the students was taken care of here.

The First World War and the economic crisis did not affect the family well-being of the Potapovs in the best way. As a teenager, Mikhail began to help his father. The Potapovs met the October Revolution in Kharkov, where they worked as bridge workers in a tram depot.

By the spring of 1920, Mikhail returned to his native Mochalovo, and in May he became a Red Army soldier in the Yukhnov military registration and enlistment office. Formally, Potapov is considered a participant in the Civil War, but he did not take direct part in the hostilities.

Potapov, after completing cavalry courses in Minsk in September 1922, was appointed platoon commander of the 43rd cavalry regiment of the Volga Military District. It was not easy for a 20-year-old young man who did not smell gunpowder to command experienced riders from the Cossacks, many of whom had two wars behind them. Oddly enough, a thorough knowledge of church rituals contributed to the gaining of authority among subordinates - in Putogino Mikhail not only studied at the church, but also served for some time as a deacon. From the deaconhood, Potapov will have a well-delivered luxurious baritone for the rest of his life. Many years later, already being a general in the Soviet army, the former deacon did not shy away from attending church services in full "parade".

Two years later, already in the position of assistant commander of the squadron, Potapov leaves for Moscow, for the Military-chemical courses. The new place of service is the 67th Cavalry Regiment of the North Caucasus Military District. Since 1931, he is back at school - now as a student at the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army. The cavalryman becomes a tanker. After graduating from the academy in 1936, his career is developing rapidly, which, however, is typical for many future commanders of the Great Patriotic War. It took Potapov exactly four years to go from chief of staff of a regiment to commander of an army.

Undoubtedly, the meeting with Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov played a significant role in his career. It happened in May 1937 in Belarus, where Potapov commanded a regiment, and Zhukov commanded a division. By the time they met, the future marshal had already received a new appointment, but since then the fellow countrymen have not let each other out of sight. In the book "Memories and Reflections" Georgy Konstantinovich writes: "Practically on field exercises and maneuvers and in the 3rd and 6th corps, I had to act with the 21st separate tank brigade (brigade commander MI Potapov). This commander was my colleague in the past, and we understood each other in a "combat situation", from a half-word. " When in June 1939 Zhukov was offered to lead an operation against the Japanese army on Khalkhin Gol, he insisted on the appointment of Potapov as his deputy.

They flew to the Far East on one plane. Marshal recalled: “The brigade commander Potapov was my deputy. On his shoulders lay a lot of work to organize the interaction of formations and combat arms, and when we launched a general offensive, Mikhail Ivanovich was entrusted with the leadership of the main grouping on the right wing of the front. "

In June 1940, Zhukov became the commander of the Kiev Special Military District, at the same time Potapov was transferred to KOVO to the post of commander of the 4th mechanized corps. Six months later, Mikhail Ivanovich becomes an army commander. In February 1941, Zhukov, appointed chief of the General Staff, moved to Moscow. The fellow countrymen had a chance to meet again only in the post-war years.

It remains to be regretted that the remarkable mutual understanding of the two military leaders could not be used for the cause of Victory. I note that these were very dissimilar personalities, in some ways even opposite, but this circumstance only contributed to their mutual attraction.
Blitzkrieg failed

In the event of an enemy attack, Potapov's army was responsible for the "cover area No. 1", 170 km long from Wlodawa to Krystynopol in the north of the Ukrainian section of the Soviet-German border. In the last days of peace, Potapov took a number of measures to increase the combat capability of the army. On the night of June 16-17, units of the 62nd Rifle Division set out from the camp and, after two night crossings, reached positions near the border. On June 18, Potapov ordered the 45th rifle division to be withdrawn from the range. On the same day, the 135th Rifle Division received an order to advance to the border.

But this could not change the general situation, which, with the outbreak of hostilities, developed extremely unfavorably for our troops. On the Sokalsky ledge, the Germans achieved a threefold superiority in manpower and equipment. Stretched out along the front, the Soviet divisions did not hold back the blow of the German army corps, which were densely built in the directions of the main attack. Mechanized subdivisions of the 5th army were only being pulled up to the border from the places of deployment.

Nevertheless, from the very first hours of the war, Potapov's troops fought stubbornly and skillfully. For each destroyed or burned Soviet tank, the formations of the 1st tank group of von Kleist suffered 2.5-3 times more damage. The 5th Army not only fiercely defended itself, but also inflicted counterattacks on the enemy. "The leadership of the enemy forces in front of Army Group South is amazingly energetic, its continuous flank and frontal attacks inflict heavy losses on us," Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Franz Halder noted in his notes.

On June 26, a counter-offensive by the South-Western Front began in the Brody-Lutsk-Dubno triangle, where the first oncoming tank battle in the history of World War II took place. Four Soviet mechanized corps (two from the 5th Army) failed to build on their initial success. The inconsistent position of the front command also played a role, which in the midst of the fighting in the triangle ordered to go on the defensive, and then again returned to the offensive plan.

I will note the following detail: in these days of fierce confrontation, namely on June 30, Potapov issued an order in which he pointed out the inadmissibility of shooting prisoners of war.

On July 1, against the background of a general withdrawal of the front's forces, the 5th Army launched a powerful counterattack on the northern flank of the German offensive. In particular, the 20th Panzer Division threw back enemy units by 10-12 km, destroyed up to 1,000 enemy soldiers, 10 tanks, and 2 batteries.

Army General S.M. Shtemenko wrote: "The 5th Army ... became, as they say, a thorn in the eye of Hitler's generals, put up strong resistance to the enemy and inflicted significant damage on him."

Fascist German troops did not manage to quickly break through the front here. Potapov's divisions knocked them off the Lutsk-Rovno-Zhitomir road and forced them to abandon an immediate attack on Kiev.
Shtemenko, in those months one of the leading employees of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, was referring to the successful counteroffensive of the 5th Army, undertaken on July 10. Then Potapov's tankmen, behind the backs of the III Army Corps formations, intercepted the Novograd-Volynsky - Zhitomir highway at a width of over 10 km. What a headache the loss of this most important communication became for the Germans can be judged by the fact that the commander of the troops of Army Group South Gerd von Runstedt was seriously planning to use aviation to transfer the infantry regiment Herman Goering to the Zhitomir region.
While Potapov's troops attacked the northern flank of the German offensive, the defenders of Kiev received a respite. The command of the 6th German army was forced to declare: "The nature of the threat to our troops from the main forces of the 5th Russian army is still such that this threat should be eliminated before the attack on Kiev." The loss of the Ukrainian capital was postponed by two months.

German military historian Alfred Filippi also points out that the slowdown in the advance of Army Group South was the opposition of the 5th Army. “And although this opposition ... was not completely unexpected for the German command, it nevertheless brought tactical successes to the Russians from the very beginning of the campaign, and then in the Novograd-Volynsky, Zhitomir region acquired operational significance, much more serious than possible. was to assume. This had a rather significant paralyzing effect on the will of the command of the 6th Army to carry out the main operational task, which was to reach the Dnieper near Kiev. "

In late July - early August, during the battles for the Korostensky fortified area, Potapov's army again tried not so much to keep the Germans with a solid defense, but also by decisive counterattacks and pressure on the flanks forced the attackers to weaken the blow. Here the enemy concentrated 11 divisions against the 5th Army. Considering that the staff of the German infantry division was 14 thousand people, then the enemy troops were at least twice as large as the forces at Potapov's disposal. German military historian Werner Haupt notes that "the 5th Soviet Army, under the command of the talented Major General Potapov, was located on the left flank of the 6th German Army and inflicted very heavy losses on it." After the war, it will be calculated that, on average, for every day of hostilities in the zone of the 5th Army, there were from 8 to 10 strikes by our troops against the enemy.

On August 9, Commander von Runstedt gave the order to suspend the offensive on the Kiev-Korosten line and temporarily go on the defensive in order to disperse the troops in depth and provide them with the opportunity to rest. In assessing the situation presented in OKH, the command of Army Group South expressed a rather pessimistic opinion regarding the situation on its northern wing. It was even suggested that the Russians intended "to go on the offensive from the Kiev region and from the Ovruch region in order to crush the northern wing of the army group." However, the physical exhaustion and losses, which von Runstedt lamented, no less, if not more, affected the state of the Soviet troops.
Fatal triumph?

Thus, Hitler's order of August 21, aimed at destroying Potapov's troops, looked quite reasonable. The idea to single out the tank forces of Guderian, who was operating in Belarus, cannot be called spontaneous. A month earlier, in the very first document concerning the 5th Army - Directive No. 33 of 07/19/1941, the Fuehrer already intended to use the southern flank of Army Group Center for an operation north of Kiev. Perhaps he considered the proposal that had been received the day before from the headquarters of the “southerners” to be worthy of attention: to strike through Mozyr on Ovruch with the forces of the 35th corps of Army Group Center. On August 9, von Runstedt again asked for the help of his neighbors.

Consequently, by August 21, Hitler had formed a firm conviction of how the campaign in the East should develop. First, an offensive on Moscow can only be launched after the defeat of the 5th Army, which, on the one hand, will ensure the safety of the right flank of the troops aimed at the Soviet capital, and on the other hand, will create favorable conditions for action in Ukraine by the von Runstedt group. Second, to successfully achieve this goal, it is necessary to involve the forces of Army Group Center. Do not forget that for the Fuhrer, the priority was the methodical destruction of enemy forces on the territory, regardless of geographical or political goals. As early as July 13, he declared to the commander-in-chief of the ground forces Walter von Brauchitsch: "It is not so important to attack the East quickly as to destroy the enemy's manpower."

Meanwhile, the General Staff was almost unanimously inclined to strengthen Army Group Center and strike directly on a narrow front in the direction of Moscow. The most displeased with the Fuehrer's order to turn to the south was the key figure of the upcoming operation - the commander of the 2nd Panzer Group Heinz Guderian: “On August 23, I was summoned to the headquarters of Army Group Center for a meeting, in which the chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces took part. He told us that Hitler decided to attack primarily not Leningrad or Moscow, but Ukraine and Crimea ... We were all deeply convinced that Hitler's planned attack on Kiev would inevitably lead to the winter campaign with all its difficulties ... " ...

These lines, written after the war, clearly belong to the genre of generals' memoirs "How Hitler prevented us from winning." “It is always easier to extol the merits of some hypothetical alternative than to justify caution and disappointing reality. And in this case, moreover, it so happened that all the people who opposed the offensive in the center had already died. Keitel, Jodl, Kluge, Hitler himself - they didn’t have time to write exculpatory memoirs, ”British military historian Alan Clark notes, not without sarcasm.
In fact, on the 20th of August 1941, the question was not so categorical: either to Moscow or to Ukraine. The operation against Potapov's troops was conceived by the Fuhrer as an auxiliary one precisely within the framework of the decisive offensive of the Wehrmacht on the capital of the USSR.

On August 30, in a conversation between Hitler and Halder, it was noted that the troops of Army Group Center had turned to Ukraine not for a “war in the south”, but in order to start “an operation against Tymoshenko's troops” as soon as possible. In the order of the Fuehrer of August 21, it is noted that the defeat of the 5th Army should guarantee Army Group South "the possibility of creating a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Dnieper in its middle reaches, so that then the center and left wing continue the offensive in the direction of Kharkov, Rostov." As we can see, the immediate task looks rather modest, and there is no talk at all about the capture of Kiev, especially the defeat of the South-Western Front.

The German generals could not then know for sure that Guderian's turn to the south would lead to a winter campaign, as the "fast Heinz" claims in his notes, just as they could not have known that the fragile building of the Southwestern Front would collapse and bury under its rubble plans for a quick and smooth transition to an offensive on Moscow. Because it was no longer Hitler's directives, but the rapid development of events - developing very favorably for the Germans - that dictated the logic of action to the German command.

On September 1, the following report comes from the headquarters of Army Group South: “If the enemy in Eastern Ukraine is not destroyed, then neither Army Group South, nor Army Group Center will be able to conduct an offensive without stopping ... direction earlier than in Ukraine, it is impossible due to the fact that the operation already begun by Army Group "South" and the actions of the southern wing of Army Group "Center" to support this operation went too far (emphasis mine. - M.Z.) to transfer the main efforts to another area ... ". The Germans had no choice but to act according to the situation. The rapid advance of Guderian in the north and the occupation of the Derievsky bridgehead near Kremenchug on the southern flank of the SWF prompted von Runstedt on September 4, even without the consent of the high command, to give the order for a decisive offensive.

According to Werner Haupt, the battle for Kiev was the most important battle of the entire war: “Because of the events of the next two weeks, the decisive German attack on Moscow was ignored. This probably changed the outcome of the Eastern campaign. " But we repeat: everything that happened is the result of a paradoxical situation, when the very real prospect of the defeat of an entire front made adjustments to the strategy and tactics of the enemy, and the catastrophe of the Soviet troops and the triumph of the Hitlerite armies in the Kiev cauldron took the Germans a whole month and moved the date of the decisive rush to Moscow to the beginning. the onset of cold weather.

Chronicle of the disaster

Unfortunately, the solution of their tasks was facilitated by the Germans' miscalculations of the command of the South-Western Front. Together with the 5th Army, the 27th Rifle Corps retreated beyond the Dnieper. Meanwhile, the corps not only did not obey Potapov, but also made a retreat according to its own schedule. An easily predictable inconsistency led to the fact that on August 23 the Germans broke through the weak rearguard curtain at the junction of the army and the corps, reached the Dnieper north of Kiev at Okuninovo, seized the bridge and occupied a bridgehead on the eastern bank. Units of the 5th Army and 37th Army under the command of A.A. Vlasov unsuccessfully tried to eliminate the expanding Okuninovskaya enemy grouping.

On August 29, Potapov tried to launch a counteroffensive, this time unsuccessfully. Not surprising, because the 5th Army has ceased to be that formidable force that a month ago. Almost a third of it (five divisions) was transferred to the 37th Army; The 135th Infantry Division and the 5th Artillery Anti-Tank Brigade were transferred to the 40th Army. The 1st Airborne Corps was also withdrawn from the 5th Army and entered into the reserve of the front. Due to the lack of tanks, the 9th and 19th mechanized corps had to be reorganized into battalions. Rifle divisions, due to heavy losses, had no more than 20-25% of the personnel.

Only the immediate withdrawal of the 5th Army to the Desna River made it possible to avoid the danger of encirclement. With such a proposal, Potapov in the morning of August 30 turned to the Military Council of the South-Western Front, but it did not meet with proper understanding.

On the same day, the 21st Army of the Bryansk Front unexpectedly withdrew from its positions, and the Wehrmacht units immediately rushed into the breakthrough on the approaches to Chernigov. On September 1, the Germans occupied a bridgehead on the banks of the Desna River in the near rear of the 5th Army. The units thrown to eliminate the breakthrough did not succeed. The countdown of the time remaining before the inevitable catastrophe has begun.
On the evening of September 5, Potapov again addressed the front commander, Kirponos, with a proposal to withdraw his troops, but received a categorical refusal. It is noteworthy that it was on this day, according to Halder's notes, that Hitler first spoke of the Kiev cauldron. Only on September 9 did the Headquarters sanction the withdrawal of the 5th Army to the Desna River. By this time, the main forces of Potapov were reliably surrounded. From the entire army of 70 thousand personnel, less than 4 thousand fighters remained, as well as about 200 guns and mortars of various systems.

At the end of September 14, Potapov and his headquarters once again made an attempt to stop the retreat of the remnants of the army, and to delay the advance of the superior enemy forces. However, it was not possible to gain a foothold on any of the subsequent lines, since the Germans, pressing from the front, simultaneously bypassed both flanks. And on the morning of September 16, at the headquarters of the 5th Army it became known that the day before, in the rear of the front in the area of ​​Lokhvitsa (Poltava region), the troops of the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian, advancing from the north, had joined forces with the troops of the 1st Panzer Group of Kleist, who had broken through from south. Five Soviet armies have already been surrounded. The Kiev boiler has become a reality. According to German data, more than 660 thousand soldiers and officers of the Red Army were captured, 884 tanks and more than 3 thousand guns were captured.

On September 21, a combined detachment from the remnants of the headquarters of the front and the 5th Army gave the last battle to the enemy. Potapov was wounded and lost consciousness. In the heat of battle, the general was mistaken for a dead man and hastily "buried" with the bodies of the dead. Potapov's documents were handed over to Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, the future marshal, and then the commander of the 15th rifle corps of the 5th army. "I literally sobbed when the documents of our commander were handed over to me. I did not know at all what would happen to us now, since Mikhail Ivanovich was killed."
The bitter fate of the commander

Three days later, Potapov was discovered by the Germans. The test of captivity began. In the Nazi concentration camps, Mikhail Ivanovich's paths crossed with Generals M. Lukin and I. Muzychenko, Senior Lieutenant Y. Dzhugashvili, the leaders of the defense of the Brest Fortress Major P. Gavrilov and Captain I. Zubachev. In 1992, reports and transcripts of interrogations of Potapov were published, who, when asked whether the Russian people are ready to wage a war if the army retreats to the Urals, replied: “Yes, it will remain in a state of moral defense, and the Red Army will continue to resist. " German investigators assessed the behavior of the Red Army general in the following way: “as a prisoner he behaved with dignity,” “on strategic issues, he referred to his lack of awareness,” “he answered with restraint to questions concerning his future.” The Germans also characterized Potapov as a "Russian nationalist", although it is difficult to say what exactly they meant by this wording.

Potapov categorically refused to cooperate with traitors from the ROA. At the same time, Mikhail Ivanovich spoke respectfully of Vlasov himself until the end of his life, did not believe in the betrayal of his southern "neighbor" on the South-Western Front, believing that the Germans somehow used the general for their own purposes against his will.

Mikhail Ivanovich met the victorious spring of 1945 in the "general's" camp Hammelburg. On April 22, American troops came close to them. The camp commandant went with a white flag to Patton's army. The Americans arrived at the camp and transported all the prisoners to their place, then transported them to the French, and already from Paris, the recent prisoners of war returned home.
However, the homeland greeted them unkindly. Literally from the plane's ladder, Potapov and his comrades were sent to the "facility" in Golitsyno, near Moscow. For seven months a special check took place, which left indelible marks in the soul of Mikhail Ivanovich.

Until the end of his life, the invariably balanced and witty Potapov grew gloomy and withdrawn at the mention of the name of the former SMERSH chief Abakumov, whom he considered a rare villain.

Nevertheless, the results of the check, most likely, turned out to be objective, since Potapov was reinstated in the rank of major general and returned to the army. Mikhail Ivanovich wrote an application for reinstatement in the party. And again Zhukov came to the rescue, who gave the following recommendation to his longtime comrade-in-arms: “As for commanding qualities, Comrade Potapov was the best army commander, and the units and formations that he commanded were always leading. In the border battle, the 5th Army fought with exceptional tenacity and valor. Retreating under the influence of superior enemy forces, she repeatedly counterattacked and defeated the Germans. Comrade Potapov ran the army brilliantly. I will also say that he was a big-hearted man who was loved by all his subordinates for his benevolence and understanding. " It is difficult to read these lines from an official document without excitement, which came from the pen of a marshal, far from sentimentality.

Obviously, Zhukov's opinion was shared by many in the political and military leadership of the USSR. In any case, Mikhail Ivanovich was probably the only one of the highest Soviet officers who passed captivity, who not only returned to the army, but also made, if not enchanting, but, given the vicissitudes of our post-war history, quite a worthy career. He served in Transbaikalia, in the Far East; Colonel-General Potapov died in January 1965 as the first deputy commander of the Odessa military district.

The place of Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov in a kind of hierarchy of military leaders of the Great Patriotic War, built in the post-war period, clearly does not correspond to his military leadership talent and contribution to the Victory.

But still it cannot be said that the name of the commander of the 5th Army was hushed up. Soviet marshals I.Kh. Baghramyan, I.I. Yakubovsky, and former opponents - Guderian, Keitel, Halder. It should be noted that the 5th Army became a real forge of personnel - such recognized commanders as M.E. Katukov, K.S. Moskalenko, K.K. Rokossovsky, I.I. Fedyuninsky. All of them highly appreciated the merits of their former commander. During Potapov's lifetime, A. Filippi's book "The Pripyat Problem" was published in the USSR, where the role of the 5th Army in disrupting the blitzkrieg was investigated in detail.

In 1954, he again became the commander of the 5th Army, albeit without him, but reached, in 1945, to the enemy's lair. His biggest grudge against Destiny was this: "I didn't let you, villain, get to Berlin!" And his wife, Marianna Fedorovna, answered: "Thank God that he remained alive!" "You do not understand!" - the stern general was angry.
He passed away on January 26, 1965 from a heart attack - with the rank of Colonel General, at the post of 1st Deputy Commander of the Odessa Military District. Streets in Kiev, Lutsk, Volodymyr-Volynskiy were named after him.

The article was published as part of a socially significant project carried out with state support funds allocated as a grant in accordance with the order of the President of the Russian Federation No. 11-rp dated January 17, 2014 and on the basis of a competition held by the All-Russian public organization Knowledge Society of Russia.

Maxim Zarezin

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Altai State University

WORKSHOP AND PRACTICE PLANS

by discipline: Labor law

Barnaul 2011

The plans of seminars and practical classes of the academic discipline were developed by Candidate of Law, Associate Professor, Candidate of Law, Associate Professor, Candidate of Law, Associate Professor on the basis of:

1) SES VPO in the area of ​​training: 030600.62 "Jurisprudence" approved by the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation on March 27, 2000

2) SES VPO in the specialty: 030501.65 "Jurisprudence" approved by the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation on March 27, 2000

The plans of seminars and practical sessions of the academic discipline were approved at a meeting of the Department of Labor, Environmental Law and Civil Procedure.

dated "___" ______________ 2011, minutes No. _______

Head of the Department _______________________________

The plans of seminars and practical classes of the academic discipline were approved at a meeting of the methodological commission of the law faculty of Altai State University

dated "___" ________ 20__, minutes No. ___

Chairman of the Methodological Commission _________________________

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656099. Barna.

INTRODUCTION

The global changes taking place in Russia today in political, social, economic life have had a significant impact on the regulation of labor relations. They entailed new approaches to the well-established concepts of labor law, as well as to its individual institutions. This is reflected in the Labor Code of the Russian Federation adopted on December 21, 2001 by the State Duma. However, the code was not free from flaws, and the practice of its application showed many of its flaws. In this regard, on June 30, 2006, the the federal law"On amendments to the Labor Code of the Russian Federation, recognition of some normative legal acts of the USSR as invalid on the territory of the Russian Federation and invalidation of some legislative acts (provisions of legislative acts) of the Russian Federation", which made significant changes in the regulation of labor relations.

c) The minor Volin entered into an oral agreement with his neighbors on growing seedlings, which he later wanted to sell in bulk;

d) Khalilova was refused a part-time job on the grounds that she was already working as a part-time job in another organization;

e) Engineer Goberidze was not hired by the state unitary enterprise, since the head of the corresponding department is Goberidze's stepfather;

f) Storekeeper Zhuchkin, who was declared incompetent by the court, was fired from his job for stealing an expensive tool.

5. Protection of the rights of trade unions.

6. Other representatives of employees in labor relations.

Normative acts:

1. On the protection of the rights of workers' representatives at the enterprise and the opportunities provided to them: ILO Convention of 01.01.01, No. 000 // Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the International Labor Conference. 1T. II.- Geneva: International Labor Office, 1991.

2. On the protection of the rights of workers' representatives at the enterprise: ILO Recommendation 1971 No. 000 // Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the International Labor Conference. 1T. II.- Geneva: International Labor Office, 1991.

3. On insolvency (bankruptcy): Federal Law of 01.01.01 (as amended on 01.01.2001) // SZ RF. - 2002. - No. 43. - Art. 4190.

4. On trade unions, their rights and guarantees of their activities: Federal Law of December 8, 1995 (as amended on 01.01.2001) // SZ RF. - 1996. - No. 3. - Art. 148.

2. Released from prison Shishkin, expelled from the 9th grade of secondary school Svistunov and disabled person 3 gr. Kurochkin decided to go to work. After applying for assistance to the employment authorities, all of them were sent to the plant. Kurochkin and Svistunov applied for the positions of couriers, Shishkin - the head of the shop. The head of the personnel department of the plant, having familiarized himself with the submitted documents, refused to hire them, arguing that; Svistunov is a minor and it is not profitable for the plant to hire him; Kurochkin is disabled and therefore cannot cope with the work of a courier; Shishkin was released from prison and it is unlikely that the workers of the shop would want to work under his leadership. In addition, according to the job description, the head of the shop must have a higher technical education, while Shishkin has a specialized secondary education. On the arguments of the applicants that they were sent by the employment service and therefore must be hired, the head of the personnel department said that the enterprise is private and therefore, in conditions of complete economic independence, the employment directions given by the employment service are not mandatory for the employer.

3. Karasev went to court with a claim to compel him to conclude an employment contract and recover compensation for moral damage. In support of the stated requirements, he indicated that from an advertisement posted in the newspaper, he became aware that a driver was required for the said company. When contacting on the issue of employment, they took the documents from him and asked him to come in two days. When Karasev arrived at the appointed time, he was denied employment. In response to the demand to justify the refusal, the plaintiff was orally explained that he was refused due to the lack of the necessary work experience, as well as due to the fact that he did not provide a medical certificate of health. In addition, the head of the personnel department called Karasev's former place of work, and there he was described as an irresponsible worker, which also influenced the decision to refuse. In the statement of claim, Karasev asks to oblige the defendant to conclude an employment contract with him and recover from compensation for moral damage in the amount of 5,000 rubles, since, according to the plaintiff, there was discrimination on the part of the defendant, which is expressed in the presentation of additional requirements to persons applying for the position of a driver in terms of the requirements for the duration of work experience.

Was Karasev lawfully denied the conclusion of an employment contract? Are his requirements subject to satisfaction?

Give a qualified assessment of the situation. What requirements can Mitrokhin make if she decides to go to court?

6. Commodity expert Zhdanova went on parental leave for a year. In her place, Vlasov was accepted, with whom a fixed-term employment contract was concluded for one year. After a year, Vlasov was dismissed under paragraph 2 of Art. 77 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation. Disagreeing with the dismissal, Vlasov went to court with a claim for reinstatement at work, referring to the fact that Zhdanova did not leave the parental leave.

How should this case be resolved?

7. Kolevatova was hired as a storekeeper, while no labor contract was signed with her. According to the provisions of the order for her enrollment, the employee was established a month probationary period with wages RUB 8,000 After passing the probationary period, they promised to increase the salary. Four weeks after the start of work, the director of the store, inspecting the warehouse, pointed out to Kolevatova that she was in a mess at her workplace, the boxes were not neatly folded, blocking the aisles. To this remark, Kolevatova replied that she was not given ancillary workers, and it was not her responsibility to carry boxes, while she was pregnant. A week after the conversation, Kolevatova was fired as having failed the test.

Give an assessment of the legality of the employer's actions.

8. Ignatov applied to the store for a job as a food seller. The following documents were demanded from him: 1) passport; 2) work book; 3) military ID; 4) a diploma of higher education; 5) insurance certificate of compulsory pension insurance; 6) TIN; 7) characteristics from the previous place of work; 8) certificate of registration at the place of residence; 9) a medical certificate from the polyclinic on the state of health.

Are these requirements legal?

9. When concluding an employment contract with Ivanova about working as the head of the sales department, the director proposed to include the following conditions in the employment contract: on the establishment of a probationary period; on the termination of the employment contract if Ivanova refuses to go on a business trip; about Ivanova's obligation not to become pregnant within the next three years; do not work part-time for another employer; on non-disclosure of commercial secrets. Ivanova signed an agreement on the proposed terms.

Are the terms of the employment contract legal?What are the consequences of including conditions that are contrary to labor laws in an employment contract?

10. On June 20, 2009, the labor contract with the head of the supply department Kireev was terminated in connection with conscription for military service. Kabanov was accepted in his place. After the end of his service, Kireev returned to the plant and demanded the provision of the previous position. The administration denied him this. Kireev went to court.

How to resolve this dispute?

Sessions 11-12

Topic: Change of employment contract

1. The concept and grounds for changing the employment contract.

2. The concept of transfer to another job. The difference between transfer to another job from moving. Classification of translations.

3. Changes to the terms of the employment contract determined by the parties for reasons related to changes in the organizational or technological working conditions.

4. Labor relations when changing the owner of the organization, changing the jurisdiction of the organization.

5. Suspension from work.

Normative acts:

1. On employment in the Russian Federation: Law of the Russian Federation of 01.01.2001, No. 000-1 (as amended on 01.01.2001) // SZ RF. - 1996. - No. 17. - Art. 1915.

Literature:

1. Bugrov of the terms of the employment contract determined by the parties for reasons related to changes in organizational or technological conditions // Labor law. - 2007. - No. 3.

2. Bugrov and general modern rules of transfers to another job // Labor in Russia and abroad. - 2011. - No. 4.

3. Bugrov labor contract // Russian legal journal. - 2009. - No. 1.

4. Ivanova the terms of the employment contract on the place of work: the ratio of the provisions of Article 74 with Articles 72.1 and 81 Labor Code Russian Federation // Labor law. - 2010. - No. 9.

5. Kostyan of the owner of the organization's property: legal consequences for the parties to the employment contract // Labor disputes. - 2008. - No. 4.

6. Suspension from work as a way to protect the interests of the employer // Legality. - 2011. - No. 9.

7. Petrov labor contract: issues of theory and practice, improving chapter 12 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation // Legislation and Economics. - 2009. - No. 5.

8. On the regulation of temporary transfer to another job by agreement of the parties // Journal of Russian law. - 2011. - No. 3.

9. Tikhomirov for another job and other changes in working conditions: A Practical Guide. M., 2009.

10. Khnykin changes to the employment contract // Legislation. - 2009. - No. 1.

11., Tsypkina contract: the procedure for concluding, changing and terminating / ed. ... 3rd ed., Rev. and add. M., 2008.

12. Changing the terms of the employment contract (transfer to another job, transfer) // Economy and law. - 2009. - No. 9.

Tasks:

1. Leontiev, accepted in the firm "Alla" by the driver of "Ford", by order of the deputy. the director of the company was transferred to a Mitsubishi minibus. Leontyev disagreed with the transfer because the minibus was out of whack and went on strike. He spent a whole week in the director's waiting room, never showing up at his workplace. For refusing to do work and a long absence from the workplace, he was fired for absenteeism. Leontyev appealed to the court with a request to reinstate him at work as a driver of a passenger car, to recover wages for the time of the forced absence from work and to compensate for moral damage.

Solve the case.

2. Karavaeva applied to the court with a claim to declare the transfer illegal and to compensate for moral damage. In the statement of claim, she indicated that as a result of the transfer from petrol station No. 5 to petrol station No. 8, the terms of the employment contract were violated, since her work volume decreased, since at petrol station No. 8 the volume of fuel sales is small, and this, in turn, affected the size of the salary - it decreased. In addition, she is charged a monthly premium for professional skills in the amount of 15%, whereas during the period of work at filling station No. 5, this premium was charged in the amount of 30%. Also, petrol station no. 8 is too far from her house, and she has to get to and from her place of work for two hours. In court, the defendant's representative explained that the terms of the employment contract were not violated, since it provides for the employer's right to move the employee without his consent from one gas station to another. When Karavaeva moved, her functional duties did not change, the terms of the contract were not violated, since the allowances do not apply to mandatory conditions labor contract.

Solve the case.

3. Upon joining Terem LLC, the seller Sidorov, who has an economic education, agreed to include in the employment contract a condition that, if necessary, he could be transferred by order of the director to any job requiring economic knowledge for any period. After 4 months, Sidorov was transferred to the position of an accountant for the period of the latter's illness. A month after the transfer, Sidorov wrote an application addressed to the director with a request to return him to his former place of work, since he did not have sufficient experience and knowledge to properly perform the duties of an accountant. The director refused the request, citing an employment contract. Then Sidorov promised to go to court with a claim to declare the translation illegal, since he did not sign a separate written agreement on the translation. To which the director objected that Sidorov voluntarily took up the duties of an accountant, thereby expressing his consent to the translation.

4. Golovina worked at a garment factory as a seamstress-mechanic. On April 30, she received the conclusion of the medical consultation commission that her work was contraindicated for her health reasons. In connection with this conclusion, Golovina was transferred without her consent to work on the numbering of the cut. Since she did not start this work, she was fired from her job under paragraph 3 of Art. 81 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation. Golovina went to court with a claim to reinstate her at work as a seamstress-minder.

What decision should the court make?

5. Has the applicable labor legislation been complied with for the following transfers made without the consent of the employees:

Due to severe frosts in the village of Kerchevo, there was a threat of damage to the heating system of communal facilities, in this connection the plumber of JSC Bytsnab Nikolaev was transferred for 10 days as a plumber to the municipal repair and construction department;

Sanko, a 5th grade carpenter at the car depot, was transferred for three weeks as a spare parts distributor with the wording “to prevent spoilage of spare parts”;

Accountant Seregina was transferred by way of temporary replacement to the position of a sick chief accountant for a period of 1 month.

6. Nikolaeva worked in a budgetary institution in the position of chief accountant since March 2007. Upon admission to work, a probationary period was set - 6 months, while the employment contract was concluded for an indefinite period. In May 2011, the new structure of the institution was approved. As a result, the name of the structural unit where Nikolaeva worked was changed: from “accounting” to “sector of accounting and control”. The title of the position has also changed - “head of the accounting and control sector”. In this regard, Nikolaeva received an offer to conclude a new employment contract with a request to write an application for transfer to the position of head of the accounting and control sector. The proposal also stated that in accordance with Art. 74 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation, she has the right to refuse to work in the new conditions. In the new employment contract presented for review, it was stipulated that it was concluded for 1 year, and that a probationary period was established - 6 months. It also followed from the terms of the contract that there was an increase in duties, official salary and wages.

7. Ledneva worked as a specialist of the second category in the branch of the State Unitary Enterprise "Housing and Communal Services". By the order of the relevant state body, the functions of the housing and communal services of this branch were transferred to the jurisdiction. It was also indicated in the order that he was obliged to accept the transfer of employees of the branch of the State Unitary Enterprise "Housing and Communal Services". Since there was no second category specialist in the position, Ledneva was familiarized with the warning about the possible termination of the employment contract in connection with a change in the owner of the organization's property. At the same time, she was offered a job as a janitor in office premises, which she refused. By order of the director of the branch of the State Unitary Enterprise "Housing and Communal Services" Ledneva was dismissed under clause 6, part 1 of Art. 77 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation.

Was Ledneva legally dismissed?

8. Klepikov, driving a personal car outside of working hours, was deprived of his driver's license for driving vehicle without state registration plates for a period of 1 month. In this regard, the director of the organization where Klepikov worked as a driver issued an order to transfer him to a general laborer for up to 1 month so that Klepikov would not have downtime, citing Part 3 of Art. 72.2 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation. Klepikov refused to transfer and did not go to work, for which he was fired from his job for absenteeism.

Decide on the legality of the actions of Klepikov and the CEO.

Questions for credit on labor law:

1. The concept of labor, its role in the life of society. Public organization labor. general characteristics relations arising in the labor process.

2. Concept and subject of labor law.

3. The method of labor law: concept and features.

4. The system of labor law.

5. The place of labor law in the general system of law. Labor law development trends.

6. Functions of labor law.

7The concept and meaning of the basic principles of labor law. Formulation, system, content and specification of the basic principles of labor law.

8. The concept and types of sources of labor law.

9. Features of the system of sources of labor law.

10. General characteristics of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation as the main source of labor law.

11. Unity and differentiation of labor law norms.

12. Local regulations in the system of sources of labor law.

13. The role of judicial acts on the regulation of labor relations.

14. The concept of an individual labor relationship, as opposed to related labor-related relationships.

15. Subjects of the individual labor relationship.

17. Grounds for the emergence, change and termination of the individual labor relationship.

18. Legislation on the rights and guarantees of the activity of trade unions.

19. The right of trade unions to represent the interests of workers, to conduct collective bargaining, to conclude collective agreements and contracts.

20. Protective function of trade unions and the main directions of its implementation.

21. Fundamental rights in the field of labor protection.

22. Protection of the rights of trade unions.

23. Other representatives of employees in labor relations.

24. The concept, meaning and basic principles of social partnership in the world of work.

25. Parties and bodies of social partnership.

26. The system and forms of social partnership.

27. Collective agreement: parties, content, procedure for conclusion, amendment and termination.

28. Agreement: concept, types, features of acceptance and action.

29. Control over the implementation of collective contracts and agreements. Responsibility of the subjects of social partnership.

30. The concept and meaning of an employment contract. Its difference from related contracts related to labor.

32. Types of employment contracts. Fixed-term employment contract.

33. Conclusion and execution of an employment contract.

34. Test at hiring.

35. Labor books.

36. The concept and grounds for changing the employment contract.

37. The concept of transfer to another job. The difference between transfer to another job from moving. Classification of translations.

38. Changes to the terms of the employment contract determined by the parties for reasons related to changes in the organizational or technological working conditions.

39. Labor relations when changing the owner of the organization, changing the jurisdiction of the organization.

40. Suspension from work.

41. General characteristics of the grounds for termination of an employment contract, their classification.

42. Termination of the employment contract at the initiative of the employee.

43. Termination of an employment contract on the initiative of the employer on grounds not related to the employee's culpable actions: grounds and procedure.

44. Termination of an employment contract on the initiative of the employer on grounds related to the employee's guilty actions: grounds and procedure.

45. Termination of an employment contract due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties, as well as due to violation of the established rules for concluding an employment contract.

46. ​​The procedure for registration of dismissal and the production of calculation.

47. Legal consequences of illegal transfer and dismissal.

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