“... The results of the current elections to the State Duma were falsified at the level of the 2011 Duma elections. In these elections, according to my estimates, the scale of falsifications in favor of United Russia is about 12 million votes. This is less than in the 2011 elections. But then there was a higher turnout ... ”(S. Shpilkin, Radio Liberty).

BEARDED CHOICE WITH TAIL

United Russia has 40% with a turnout of 37%, according to statistical analysis and expert assessment by Sergei Shpilkin

Sergei Shpilkin, an independent electoral analyst, has mathematically researched official voting results in Russia since 2007 and uncovered strange deviations that are best explained by fraud and ballot stuffing.

Shpilkin, a graduate of the Physics Department of Moscow State University, laureate of the 2012 Politprosvet Prize, describes why he began to engage in statistical analysis of election results: “In the 2007 elections, having heard several numbers, I mentally built a curve along them, got a straight line, and then the regimental horse effect worked. , which at the sound of a trumpet breaks into battle. I typed points, built graphs, began to look at them. " Shpilkin is proud of the concept of "Churov's beard" that he discovered, which we will talk about later. In an interview with Radio Liberty, he spoke about the method of statistical analysis he used and what conclusions this leads to in the current elections:

- The results of the current elections to the State Duma were rigged at the level of the Duma and presidential elections in 2011, 2008 and 2007, the most rigged in post-Soviet history, as far as it can be traced by analyzing such data, that is, since about 1996. In these elections, according to my estimates, the scale of falsifications in favor of United Russia is about 12 million votes. This is less than in the 2011 elections. But there was a higher turnout in the 2011 elections. Therefore, from the point of view of influence on the final result, this is approximately comparable. According to my estimates, without falsification, United Russia would have received about 40% on the federal list instead of 54.2%, which is now announced on the CEC website based on the count of 108.9 million registered voters.

- How can statistics reveal the extent of fraud? Do I understand correctly that the main tool is to correlate the turnout in certain precincts with the votes cast in these precincts for different parties?

- Exactly. And the basic fact is that, in fact, turnout is a very stable thing and does not depend much on the region. We have a very homogeneous country. This is clearly visible in these elections, because due to the low turnout, this main voting peak stood out around the typical turnout of 36% and stands as a separate peak, to the left of the falsification ( see graph below). Most cheap way falsification, technically cheap in terms of cost and intellectual effort on the part of falsifiers, is simply adding votes in favor of the right party or the right candidate. And the addition of votes leads to the fact that the turnout shifts from the typical value upwards. And she grows such a right tail. The size of this tail is converted into the number of added votes in a rather elementary way. A characteristic feature of these elections is that, it seems, there was almost no throwing of votes from one party to another. Maybe this is the beneficial action of Ella Pamfilova ( the new chairman of the CEC, who replaced Vladimir Churov in this post. - RS), maybe something else. Because the shifting of voices is more difficult to recognize. But this time the situation looks like it's a pure throw-in.

- I understand correctly that you are drawing a graph with the turnout below, and at polling stations with the same turnout you see how many votes were cast for different parties and draw a graph? In principle, the distribution should be as follows: there is a peak in the most popular turnout, and there is a decline in both directions. But we see that there is a peak around 36%, then there is a decline, and then again a rather sharp rise. And in polling stations where the turnout is very high, as luck would have it, everyone votes for United Russia.

- Not that all, but the overwhelming majority. The higher the turnout, the more votes were cast for United Russia. According to the "duck principle" - it looks like a throw-in, it is calculated as a throw-in.

- What is the "duck principle"?

- If something quacks like a duck, walks like a duck and looks like a duck, then it's a duck. This is a classic programming principle.

- Let's try to imagine that I am a United Russia functionary and try to find counter-arguments. If I say: the country is heterogeneous, there are places where people are very fond of the president and the government. They are motivated and go to vote. And it is these people who give such a second tail.

- This raises two questions at once. First, the subject of the vote is not the polling station, but the voter. A polling station is a kind of association of voters, which, in a sense, averages them. If I had two types of voters - those who love United Russia and those who do not love United Russia, they would somehow mix. And I have, on the contrary, a deep and rather wide gap between the two types of voting. And it looks as if the subject is not a voter, but a precinct. Our polling stations are divided into two types, not voters. And such non-mixing, such segregation according to two types of voting is well explained by fraud. In 2011, in Moscow, at the very vote that caused the protests ( in the elections to the State Duma. - RS), similar sites were found in the same area, literally in two parts of the same residential complex.

In the Ramenki area, two symmetrical halves of a commercial residential complex built by Yuri Luzhkov's wife voted: one for United Russia - 30%, and the other - 70%. And in 2012, all these differences disappeared somewhere, and everyone voted the same way with a completely homogeneous turnout and with a very homogeneous result, up to explainable sociological differences. I think that this year (although there has not yet been time to understand this) there will be a lot of such examples. At least in the preliminary results, for example, in the Kemerovo region, which has been characterized by a rare level of falsifications since a certain time, there were sections, in one of which the turnout was 11% at noon, and in the neighboring one - 68%. If this case were a regional feature, then there would be no such mixing. The results would be uniform across the region. And experience shows that in regions with tailings, areas with high and low results coexist. This time, for example, I see that in Mordovia, which has always shown fantastic turnout and voting figures, there are several polling stations with completely typical average Russian turnout and voting results for United Russia. It will be interesting to see what it is. Another important thing. In these elections, we know a lot about polling stations, including, for example, what houses they consist of, how many apartments are in each house. This can be useful for further in-depth analysis.

- And what does such knowledge give?

- This, for example, gives the knowledge that this site is not a village, but a city, or that these two sites are similar in the composition of houses. If these two sites consist of five-story buildings, then it can be assumed that they have approximately the same population, and additional justifications will be needed to explain the radically different, twice different results.

- And your explanation that where there is such a sudden high turnout is stuffing.

- Stuffs and postscripts.

- Do you not take into account such regions as Chechnya? It is known that in Chechnya, for example, there is a very high turnout and the results are usually very high. This is a kind of uniformity. There are all such areas, I think. There are no neighboring houses where one is like this and the other is like that. Could it be that such regions give this tail?

- Voting in Chechnya is a difficult thing to observe. But there is, for example, Dagestan, where similar results. And in Dagestan in 2012, people sat and watched video footage from cameras at polling stations, they simply counted the voters who appeared in the frame, approaching the ballot boxes. From these videos, it can be seen that the turnout in Dagestan is actually not 90% or 80%, as it is officially declared in the protocols, but somewhere around 38%, that is, lower than the national average. And there is no uniformity of results there either. In this sense, it is more difficult to say anything about Chechnya, because it is a very closed territory. It's hard to say anything about Chechnya at all, but from time to time, at different elections in different Caucasian republics, quite average Moscow voting results are met. Either these are individual chairmen of election commissions of principle, or these are some districts that emphasize their autonomy from the central government. But this always holds true. And it allows us, at least hypothetically, to say that voting in such places is not very different from the national average. And what we see in the official protocols is rather an illusion. And then these regions really form the tail of a high turnout, high voting, but if we consider them against the all-Russian background, they contribute to the same estimate of the extra votes. Yes, this is some hypothesis, but this is the best we can do with the data we have.

- You are building a kind of mathematical model, with the help of which you assess the real situation. Can you go to court with this?

- Why?

- Because no court will accept an expert assessment - and this is still an expert assessment - and, most likely, will not accept mathematical arguments. As for the mathematical arguments, there was such a wonderful phenomenon called "Churov's beard", when the number of sections with a turnout level that is a multiple of 10 and 5 is, for some reason, greater. "Churov's beard" or "Churov's saw" existed until 2011 and seems to be visible in these elections too. This phenomenon can be assessed quite strictly mathematically. Just this year, my co-authors and I published The Annals of Applied Statistics about the fact that the mathematical probability of this phenomenon is astronomically small.

- Are you talking about the fact that the number of polling stations where the turnout is a round number is greater than the number of polling stations with a turnout close to them, but not round?

- And you explain this by the fact that the heads of the precincts just like round numbers.

- Yes. It is important to understand that turnout is not an official parameter at all. It is not in any protocol. And to make it round, you need to specially adjust some numbers in the protocol or take a calculator and calculate.

- The whole world is based on mathematics. All processes around us are calculated based on mathematics. Why, then, with this base it is impossible to go to court and say - look, there is a model that describes the elections very well. There are violations in this model, which clearly indicate that there were stuffing, falsification, and manipulation. Why is this not accepted by the court?

- I am not an expert in judicial practice and I do not know very well how courts handle mathematical arguments. In your question, the keyword is "model". A countermodel can be proposed for any model. Therefore, I think the trial will end there. He will say: and you prove that this is the only model. Moreover, as far as I remember from yesterday's reports, Ella Pamfilova said that for her, the videos taken by the observer were not proof of the stuffing. In a sense, she is legally right, because the observer's video camera is not a certified device. I think that at this level of practice no arguments of this kind will pass. We remember very well how the stuffing documented by the official video surveillance system in 2012 was massively ignored by the courts. In Kazan, a group of observers filed hundreds of such claims for discrepancies between voter counts by video and results in protocols, and received hundreds of rejections. In my opinion, the importance of this model is different. It helps, including the authorities, because they (since such assessments appeared in 2007) began to react to them, that is, some things began to change. For example, there are fewer areas with round results. The model allows you to understand what is really going on. Because the electoral system is multilevel, non-transparent, and not all levels communicate well with each other. I am not at all sure that Ella Pamfilova has a good idea of ​​the actions of the heads of polling stations on the ground, how they keep protocols, fill in the data and submit them to the TEC (territorial election commissions - RS)... Moreover, she can hardly imagine the aggregated results - how many votes were added at these 96 thousand polling stations.

- This is a noble goal - to give Ella Pamfilova an idea of ​​what is really going on. Using your model, you have calculated the number of votes cast in this election for United Russia, based on official data. What then is the real picture of voting?

- The turnout instead of the official 47.8% is about 36.5%, which corresponds very well to that very main peak in the distribution. And the votes for United Russia, respectively, instead of 54.2%, we get somewhere around 40%, taking into account our accuracy.

- And what about the rest of the games?

- Nothing fundamentally changes. For all parties, the number of votes increases because we decrease the denominator by which we divide, that is, the total number of votes cast by voters. But the only fundamental result in this story, perhaps, is that the party "Communists of Russia" with some probability would pass the three percent barrier and could count on federal funding. For the rest of the parties, virtually nothing changes. Perhaps, according to the final results, it will look a little different. When we add up the single-mandate candidates with the proportional part of the United Russia’s list, we will get, perhaps, 68% of the votes from United Russia, and possibly 75. In my opinion, this is still a rather significant difference.

- By the way, single-mandate members. Are your models concerned?

- It is more difficult with single-mandate candidates, because there it is necessary to count at the level of the constituency, and it is relatively small in number. There are more statistical variations. I have not tried to deal with single-mandate people yet. Naturally, if stuffing occurs, then it is likely to occur in favor of single-mandate members. I have a feeling that many of the violations reported yesterday were due to the activity of some influential local single-mandate members. For example, the scandal with the delivery of votes in the Altai Territory. Active "cruise voting" and deliveries were noted there. I must say that cruise voting does not always ensure voting for the desired party. For example, there were cruise voting in Moscow, but there are no visible traces of falsifications in favor of United Russia. Perhaps, these builders brought from the Moscow region, conditionally, raised the percentage for the Liberal Democratic Party.

- Let's look at this whole story from the point of view of the opposition. For her, as I understand it, you cannot say anything good. By and large, she lost miserably.

- Yes it's true. Perhaps some changes could be seen at the local level somewhere in Moscow or St. Petersburg, just at the level of single-member constituencies. But at the level of the federal list, the position of the opposition looks quite hopeless.

- Does this differ from the experience of the previous parliamentary elections?

- Differs in two things. Apparently, there was no selection of votes from the opposition, while it seems that in 2007, for example, Yabloko's votes were taken away. And Yabloko then passed the barrier. This year, apparently, they did not take away from anyone, including the communists, which is a rather exotic situation. Perhaps this is the beneficial influence of Pamfilova.

- Five years ago, rigging in the Duma elections led to massive protests. Then people were interested in it. I remember how your statistical observations diverged, how people operated on them. People started to understand mathematical statistics, which is already good. Now the feeling is gone. Interest falls in the same percentage as the opposition base decreases, which is strange, given that there is a division into the conditional 86% and the opposing 14%. But now, looking at the results, we do not see 14 percent of the opposition, we do not even see 10 percent.

- I'm not a political scientist. Looking at these same figures, I would pay attention to the Liberal Democratic Party. So far, according to the calculations that I have, the LDPR is on a par with the communists or even bypasses them. And in the Trans-Baikal Territory, for example, if we discard the postscripts in the direction of United Russia, which are not very large at the same time, it almost gets the United Russia. And this, in my opinion, is a much more serious problem for the authorities than the problem of some PARNAS. Because the Liberal Democratic Party is such a spontaneous request for justice. This is the place to go and tell the truth to Zhirinovsky. And the fact that this place is becoming so popular is a serious problem revealed by these elections, much more serious than the failure of PARNAS or the final failure of Yabloko. The request remained. It just reformatted. In 2011, this request was reflected in the high score of A Just Russia. And since "Fair Russia" has shown its complete worthlessness over the past time, and everyone is tired of the Communist Party, it has shifted towards the Liberal Democratic Party. So the question really remains. The slogan "You can't even imagine us", with which they went in 2011, remained. Most of the population feels unrepresented. And this is far from only the 14% that everyone loves to talk about, it is much more.

- This movement "You don't even represent us" in the current elections, one would assume, would have to vote for parties like PARNAS. I tried to see in this distribution where the very 10-14% who sympathized with this movement five years ago, and did not find.

- Apparently, they decided to stay at home. They remained in the same 64 de facto or 52 official percent that did not go to the polls. This is also a question, because such a tough one-party parliament, elected with a very low turnout, in my opinion, is a problem for everyone, including the authorities. I don't know how she will get out of it, how we will get out of this. I think that the demand for fair elections will now come from the other side. Maybe this will happen somehow through single-mandate candidates, who better feel their connection with local residents, their voters, than people elected on a party list. Perhaps something will happen inside the United Russia faction, which is actually an entire parliament

- Do you personally have opposition views? Can we say that you sympathize with the opposition and therefore are engaged in statistical analysis of the election results? Or is it out of love for mathematics and a dislike for the fact that life does not conform to the correct mathematical models?

- Both are true, but with motivation more likely to love numbers than sympathy for the opposition. One with the other does not fit well. There is a temptation to adjust or twist something. And you can't do that. Numbers are numbers. When choosing between numbers and opposition, I choose numbers.

- Can we say that people around you are still in opposition?

- Rather - yes, but it does not mean anything. It is rather the same 14%. These are not people who go to rallies or are somehow opposed, but rather people who do not watch TV.

- Five years ago, your calculations were popular in the circles that then made up the For Fair Elections movement. Do you have a feeling that something has changed now?

- I do not belong to opposition circles. Therefore, I cannot say anything on this topic. I think generations change. Still, five years is a long time. Someone started a family, many new people came. The current students then graduated from school. This is a big change. I do not know what my calculations have to do with the opposition, they just then fell into some common point of tension. The tension increased regardless of any numbers and broke out then. And the fact that these calculations were in the right place in right time, Is just a case.

- Previously, there was a stratum of people, what was called the scientific and technical intelligentsia, which may not have gone to rallies, but constituted an important part of the independent social movement... Do you think these people have changed their feelings over the past 5-10 years?

- I am no longer engaged in science and cannot judge the mood. Another question is that these calculations, oddly enough, were best perceived by physicists, albeit those who left physics. This is a pretty funny effect. Moreover, this is work at the level of a second year physical training course. There is nothing complicated there. In contrast, for example, mathematicians were more skeptical. It was such a pinpoint hit. Perhaps it was that layer of generalized physicists who went to the rallies at that time. Maybe there was a coincidence.

- This is just clear to me - physicists operate with mathematical models that they apply to the real world... Do you have the feeling that life in Russia has completely diverged from the models and is becoming more and more unpredictable?

- There is. The previous time, such a feeling was somewhere starting from the year 2010. There is such a state before the phase transition, when the minimal external influence causes huge fluctuations. The last time it was in 2010. In my opinion, now it is all very tense too. Any minimal story causes a sharp violent reaction, at least in some segments of society. This probably means that something is brewing. I do not know what.

"Freedom". 20:18 9/18/2016

Sergei Dobrynin

Turnout data found mathematical evidence of fraud

Physicist Sergei Shpilkin explains how abnormal turnout jumps reveal falsifiers in the last elections

Total falsifications. Vladimir Zhirinovsky (United Russia) [Elections 2016]. Zhirinovsky promises to take people to the streets ...

"Give us legitimate mandates, we have ten, choke - take eight, take nine, but leave one, have a conscience, Genghis Khan left more, Hitler left more. What are you doing, United Russia? All our people will curse you, everyone will curse you, and you will be afraid to say that you are from this party, "Zhirinovsky said. More details:

Elections - a seizure of power? [Deceived Russia]

Mass grave of elections 2016. Vladislav Zhukovsky [ROY TV]

Analysis of the situation with systemic and non-systemic opposition in the upcoming elections. Vladislav Zhukovsky understands the details.

On the question of democracy. Nikolay Levashov

Democracy ... democracy - how much meanness and lies are hidden in this word! Such my definition of the essence of democracy will probably surprise a lot of people! But, upon learning why I gave such a definition of democracy, the reader will be even more surprised! I'll start with the very concept of DEMOCRACY!

Democracy appeared in a slave state when slave owners came together to work out a single set of rules and laws in order to better manage slaves! Yes, they came together in order to create a single code of laws and regulations in order to better manage their slaves, and so that there would be no differences in this matter among individual slave owners. Probably, it is not worth explaining what and whose interests these laws reflected in the "free" and "democratic" slave state. And although they will immediately try to give you an explanation that the word DEMOCRACY originated from the Greek word DEMOS, which means - PEOPLE! But, at the same time, as is often the case with those suffering from memory loss in the right places, they will forget to add that only free people were considered DEMOS or people in this state, the overwhelming majority of whom were SLAVE OWNERS! And they will forget to report that the main population was made up of SLAVES, who were not even considered people! Little has changed since then, hasn't it?

Parliamentary elections will be held in Russia in mid-September. Five years ago, elections spilled over into a series of demonstrations, and civic activism has grown remarkably. Today, Russian voters have no illusions. DN followed the campaign of independent candidate Maria Baronova.

Skyscrapers of Moscow City shine and sparkle. At arm's length from them - a block of ugly concrete high-rise buildings. A string orchestra of three young women sits on the cracked asphalt next to one of them, playing the Argentine tango "Por una cabeza".

People quickly gather at the entrance, mostly women, many with children.

"How beautiful! Is it someone's birthday? " - one of them asks.

Nobody has a birthday. This is a pre-election event. On September 18, there will be parliamentary elections in Russia, in which 32-year-old Maria Baronova also participates. For the whole summer, she was engaged in collecting 15 thousand signatures in order to get the opportunity to become an independent candidate from one of Moscow's single-mandate constituencies. Nowhere else has she received so many signatures as here, so this concrete house and became the starting point of her election campaign.

A chamber concert is one of the ways to attract the attention of citizens. Nothing hinders the opposition more than the feeling of apathy and passivity that has gripped Russian voters today. The scattered opposition is doing everything to gather strength. Most of the well-known candidates are on the Yabloko lists, including Dmitry Gudkov and Vladimir Ryzhkov, who are not members of this party. Russian experts contacted by DN believe that the opposition is likely to win several mandates, but overall it is swimming against the tide.

“The Kremlin's goal is to achieve low voter turnout. That is why the elections will be already in September (and the last parliamentary elections were in December 2011). In August, when almost all election campaigns take place, the majority of voters are on vacation. Fewer people will vote than usual, which means that there will be more organized voters in proportion, ”says political scientist Yekaterina Shulman, associate professor at the Russian Presidential Academy.

“Organized Voters” are civil servants, the military, and everyone who works for the state and the municipality, such as police officers and teachers. They are expected to all vote for the ruling party. The lower the turnout, the higher the proportion of organized voters and, therefore, the less need for falsification. In the last elections to the State Duma in 2011, this came as an unexpected problem for the Kremlin, when a new class of conscientious and critical voters exposed the fraud, which began a series of demonstrations against Putin's rule. Now the protest movement has been silenced.

Context

Elections in Russia are more important than American ones

Hela Gotland 09/03/2016

Putin's party loses support

Dagens Nyheter 09/02/2016

Asymmetry of Putin's power

Asahi Shimbun 09/01/2016
The Kremlin authorities have learned their lesson. Before the current elections, the new chairperson of the Central Election Commission, Ella Pamfilova, called for a “moderate” use of so-called administrative resources (“administrative resources” are tools that the authorities use to influence the outcome of elections). Researcher and editor of the Kontrapunkt publication Maria Lipman believes that this is an attempt to avoid gross forms of falsification.

But at the same time, the ability to detect deception is limited.

“Only one person from a party can be present at a polling station as an observer. There were many more of them before. The Kremlin simply hopes that the elections will be held as quietly as possible, as few voters as possible will vote, and debates are practically ignored. So you can get desired result without resorting to the most flagrant falsifications. "

And Ekaterina Shulman points out that it will not be easy to convince the governors in the regions to abandon the fraud.

“The authorities in the regions are nervous. They will fake the results just in case. And I'm not talking about such areas as the North Caucasus, Chechnya. The turnout is always almost 100% there, because local leaders want to demonstrate loyalty to Putin. "

Maria Baronova is the complete opposite of the official government, she belongs to a group of active and educated city dwellers tired of corruption and abuse. She rose to prominence as one of the leading activists defending the so-called Bolotnaya prisoners - some 30 anti-Putin demonstrators in May 2014 who were tried for riots and vandalism. Charges were also brought against her, but the case was closed. The police broke into her home and ransacked it, social services threatened to take her son away from her, and her life was threatened several times.

She is not a very restless person, but she gets nervous when the Deutsche Welle cameraman shows up. Propaganda on state television drives people into the heads of the people that all opposition candidates are the "fifth column" of Western funding. Foreign cameras at a pre-election meeting can make people suspicious.

“People are now afraid of the foreign press. Do not under any circumstances talk to them while I am here, ”she hisses to reporters.

When Maria Baronova approaches the microphone and begins to speak, I notice that the audience consists only of women, with the exception of two drunken men - the only ones who raise their hand when Baronova finishes her short speech and invites questions.

“The residents of this house have been queuing for housing for 26 years. What will you do to help them? " One of the men asks.

“I could promise that I will solve all your problems, but it will be the same song as the current government. But I want to change the system. I want to develop the country, but I need help. How many of you are going to vote? " - asks a counter question Baronova.

Only a few hands are raised.

“If everyone is passive, nothing will change. You are citizens of the country only if you exercise your civil rights, ”Baronova replies.

“Give us a place to live,” a woman shouts from the crowd.

“All I can promise you is hard work. No changes will be visible at first. But we must all learn to demand from the authorities, this is hard and thankless work that must be done daily, ”says Baronova.

The public doesn't like this answer at all.

“Go see how we live. Look at how we live, ”the woman shouts.

Maria Baronova disappears into the house, accompanied by a group of residents. Journalists are not allowed there. Like many other Russian voters, residents of this house look to Baronova as a solution - in this case, housing problems. Most of the apartments in this house are former communal apartments, that is, old Soviet housing, in which whole families were crowded in one room, and kitchens and bathrooms were shared.

Aleksey Kalitvinov, 21, is studying at one of the most prestigious Moscow universities, the Higher School of Economics. He volunteers to help Maria Baronova. He says that most of the pre-election meetings boil down to simply persuading the people to go and vote.

“But you have to be careful. Many go into a rage when they are told they should vote. They are tired of politicians who are not interested in their problems, they see no way out. It can be difficult to find with them mutual language... We need to make them believe that we really want to do something good. ”

Valentina, 44, was among those who raised their hand when Maria Baronova asked who would vote. She also managed to persuade the candidate to go into the house and see how she lives: a twelve-meter room in a long corridor.

“I have been living here with my son for ten years. Thirteen-year-old son has nowhere to do his homework! Management companies change all the time. The city promises us new housing, but nothing happens, ”says Valentina, who does not want to give her last name.

But she is still glad that she managed to get Baronova, a person with connections, to look at the room. Maybe this will be good. And the elections do not interest her.

It is dark and warm in the August night. Behind the trees shimmers Moscow City, a consumer paradise in shining skyscrapers.

Stuffing and "carousels" in elections can be proved mathematically - for the first time the physicist Sergei Shpilkin spoke about this in 2011. Then, citizens far from mathematics first learned about the "Gauss curve" - ​​a graph that shows the normal distribution of probabilities, in this case, the distribution of turnout by polling station. And in 2011, and this year, first specialists, and then everyone else noticed abnormally a large number of polling stations with a very high turnout, and it is in these polling stations that the majority of votes were cast for United Russia. Sergei Shpilkin, a physicist and laureate of the PolitProsvet Prize, believes that this is an unambiguous sign of falsification, and not an accident. In an interview with Novaya Gazeta, he explains that at least 45% of the votes for United Russia were falsified, turnout was artificially increased by 11%, and Moscow and St. Petersburg, which showed the lowest turnout, missed the opportunity to change the course of the elections.

- How do fluctuations in turnout indicate the presence of possible falsifications?

— Russian society very homogeneous: it is located in a homogeneous information field created by the TV, and differs little in upbringing and education. We do not have a special stratification into strata that could behave politically in different ways. An exception is the conditional “Moscow educated class” - this is a rather narrow stratum, which is represented to varying degrees in Moscow, St. Petersburg and some other cities. Even the poorest urban areas do not differ from the middle-rich ones so much that it would be noticeable in the voting - we do not have a ghetto. There are only a few polling stations where people vote very differently than in other places, for example, the Main Building of Moscow State University or the Grand Park residential complex on Polezhaevskaya, where in 2012 there was the largest number of votes for Prokhorov. Therefore, the turnout does not fluctuate too much. Even between urban and rural districts within the same oblast, the differences are small.

What happens when we want to forge an election, to shift the result in favor of a candidate? I can just add votes in his favor, for example, bring people in and tell them to vote for him - but it's hard to see how they actually do it. I can just ask the election commission to falsify the numbers. To take votes from one candidate in favor of another, but this is the rarest way. And the simplest one is to throw a bundle of ballots into the ballot box. At the same time, the turnout is growing: the more ballots you add, the more it grows. And at such polling stations, we see a very large number of votes for one candidate and a little for the opposition. In the absence of stuffing, the ratio of votes is more or less constant, and if we throw in extra ballots, the numbers of one party grow, in this case, for United Russia.

- What happened to the turnout in these elections?

- I split all polling stations by turnout, see how many votes were cast for each candidate in each interval, draw histograms. We see a typical picture: a peak in the number of polling stations with a turnout of 36%, further failure, then growth again. This means that the maximum number of votes was cast at polling stations where an average of 36% of voters voted, that is, from 25 to 40%. Most likely, everything was normal at these PECs. And what goes beyond these limits looks exactly as if they simply added votes for United Russia. When people vote, the numbers are random and the distribution curve is smooth.

When I start moving the numbers over entire sections, instead of a smooth distribution, I get a sawtooth figure - in 2011 it was called "Churov's beard". Sites with a turnout of 50%, 65%, 75% are suspicious: by chance, such beautiful numbers are almost never obtained. If the turnout at the precinct is 95% - this is most likely a fake, so in big city can not be. Falsifications take place at the stages from voting to entering into the GAS-Vybory system.

Horizontally - the percentage of turnout at polling stations, vertically - the number of votes cast at these polling stations. An abnormally large number of votes only for United Russia at polling stations with a high turnout is a clear sign of falsification, Sergei Shpilkin believes.

- In which regions are there the most anomalies in the turnout?

- Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, the republics of the North Caucasus, except for Adygea, everyone's beloved Saratov region, Belgorod, Bryansk. There are the most areas with an abnormally high turnout, and they have high EP results. As a rule, in the North-West and north of Moscow this rarely happens, in Siberia things are bad only in Yakutia, Kemerovo and Tyumen regions, sometimes in Omsk. Voronezhskaya this time distinguished itself: there is a huge number of polling stations with a turnout of 80-100%. In my opinion, in Crimea and Sevastopol they considered honestly ( about how the elections were held in Crimea - read in "Novaya Gazeta"). There is a high turnout, but the distribution is quite urban, very similar to Moscow.

Maximum amount votes for United Russia were cast at polling stations with a turnout close to 100%, which is very rare under normal conditions

- Can't the turnout jump be natural: just more people came and voted on their own?

- Then the whole schedule would have shifted, as happened in the Kirov and Kursk regions, but not part of it: it would simply have risen entirely.

- Is the situation similar to 2011?

- The CEC website has data on elections since 1999. And the deeper we dig into the past, the more the distribution of votes in elections looks like a bell-shaped curve, which is called the "Gaussian curve" - ​​that is, the normal distribution.

From 1999 to 2005, in all elections in all Moscow districts, the turnout deviates from the city average by no more than 5%.

And in 2008, the Moscow government, apparently, really needed to show loyalty to Dmitry Medvedev, and we got a wide range of turnout even in neighboring polling stations. Then this was repeated in the 2009 elections to the Moscow City Duma, when at the polling station where Mitrokhin voted, there was not a single vote for Yabloko. Then a scandal occurred in 2011 at the Duma elections, when, for example, in Ramenki in the same residential complex, one half gave 28% for United Russia, and the other - 58%. There was a scandal, protests and so on, and in 2012 this machine of falsifications in Moscow was sharply screwed up, and the distribution of the turnout returned to normal. It was also normal in the 2013 mayoral elections in Moscow.

I assumed that these elections would be held either according to the 2003 scenario (the fairest elections for which we have data), or according to the 2011 scenario (the most unfair).

The worst was chosen from the available possibilities. That is, it was not chosen, but simply the machine was already running and working like that, and to stop it, you had to beat her hands for a long time.

In general, it is very similar to 2011, only a lower turnout and a higher result for the EP. And, unlike in 2011, the complete absence of new faces in the list of winners - then there was "Fair Russia". An important point- how the LDPR spoke. Throughout the country, it goes head to head with the Communist Party, in half of the regions it even outstrips, and in the Trans-Baikal Territory it almost catches up with the United Russia Party. The fact that there were falsifications in favor of the LDPR is unlikely: the insanely similar distribution of votes for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and for the LDPR. That is, either someone very skillfully forged both, or it was in fact.

Photo: Organizing Committee of the Enlightener Prize / Facebook

- The turnout was especially low in Moscow and St. Petersburg (35.2% and 32.7%) - how important is it?

- In Moscow, 10 years ago, the turnout was 56%. That is, now one vote of a Muscovite could decide twice as many, and even a small number of supporters of the Democrats could nominate their candidate to the Duma. Now 10% of state employees and pensioners is a sufficient resource to cheat anyone, with such a turnout they decide everything. It is known that Navalny lacked 35 thousand votes before the second round: more people would have come, there would have been a second round. So maybe the big cities missed some chances.

- What can be the real election results based on your calculations?

- 28 million votes were cast for United Russia, of which, according to my calculations, about 12 million were added - this means 45% of votes for United Russia are falsified, and this is about 11% of all voters. This means that instead of the official turnout of 47.8%, we get 36.5%. Instead of 54% for "United Russia" - 40%. From a political point of view, this is quite important result: it turns out that the party was supported by 15% of the total number of voters. And with these 15% real and 27% official, they will need to somehow live.

The Center for Scientific Political Thought and Ideology (Sulakshin Center) carried out a mathematical reconstruction of the true, scientifically substantiated voting results.

Mathematics provides a way of proving not only the fact of falsification, but also its scale, nature and organization of management of the process of falsifications, and, in addition, allows you to reconstruct the true results of voting; the results both in the turnout and in the number of votes actually received by the parties and candidates, how the traces of mass violations were "swept away".

I.Analysis methodology

The initial data for the analysis are the data officially published on the website of the CEC of Russia for all more than 95,000 polling stations.

The methodology for revealing the truth of elections is based on the following principles.

If the distribution deviates from the Gaussian, then there has been an interference in the elections (Fig. 2).

Elections to the State Duma 2016 (party list)

Fig.2 Black is the deviation from the Gaussoid in favor of candidates (parties) from the authorities - United Russia. The ratio of the black area under the curve and the white area under the gaussoid gives the coefficient of falsification

The preferences of citizens of different parties or candidates in "fair" elections do not depend on the turnout. If you can see a Gaussian “honest” cloud of votes, but on increasing turnout, an increase in votes in favor of a candidate and a party from power and a drop in votes for the opposition means that this is definitely a falsification, which is clearly seen in the example of the 2016 elections in the Penza region (Fig. 3).

Fig.3 Honest "cloud" of the opposition is higher than the "cloud" of the party "United Russia". The rest was thrown and attributed in favor of the party "United Russia" and at a loss to the opposition

If on many polling stations in the region the result of the ruling party is the same to within hundredths of a percent, then this means that the command was given to “get” just such a result. This is especially clearly seen in the Saratov region for the United Russia party at 100 polling stations - the result is 62.15%.

If the coefficients of falsifications in the regions of Russia coincide with statistical accuracy both for falsifications of the totals for the party list and for the majority constituencies, then this proves centralized x the nature of the management of fraud.

II. The scale of fraud in the 2016 State Duma elections

The official results of the elections to the State Duma on September 18, 2016, published by the CEC of Russia, are as follows.

The turnout, according to the Central Election Commission of Russia, was 47.88%.

Based on the above methodology of mathematical reconstruction, we will analyze the results of voting in the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation on September 18, 2016 and reveal their real results.

As can be seen from the above data, the Gaussian “cloud” for voting on both party lists and majoritarian districts indicates that the “fair” turnout in real voting is 35%, but not 47.88% recorded by the Central Election Commission of Russia.

Thus, based on the scientific methodology of mathematical reconstruction of the analysis of the voting results in the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation on September 18, 2016 first conclusion as follows: in the organic Gaussian cloud of votes, the average turnout was 35% for both types of voting. An increase in the official turnout to 47.88%, recorded by the Central Election Commission of Russia, is unreliable and is the result of falsifications, which is clearly seen on the right wing of the Gaussian distribution, which goes beyond the boundaries of the pure Gaussian curve.

Second ... From Fig. 4 - the results of voting by party lists and Fig. 5 - the results of voting by majoritarian constituencies, it can be seen that in an organic Gaussian cloud, that is, with really fair elections, the United Russia party received fewer votes than the opposition.

Third . On the right wing of the voting results for party lists and majoritarian constituencies (see Figures 4 and 5), there are clear unambiguous signs of falsification - “spikes” at the turnout in multiples of 5% and 10%. Especially outstanding "spike" - 95% of the turnout is recorded for the party "United Russia".

Fourth ... The left wing of the organic Gaussoid is clearly seen at low attendance, and this makes it possible to reproduce the right wing symmetrically as well. From here it becomes possible to calculate the true number of "honest" votes cast in the elections, and the number of votes attributed, falsified.

Let us evaluate the election results for the United Russia party by simply comparing the areas under the curves of the Gaussian and the falsified long right wing. The evaluation results are shown in Table 1.

Assessment of the true outcome for the party "United Russia"

The coincidence of the coefficients of falsification on party lists and majoritarian elections for the United Russia party is not accidental. This testifies to the fact that the campaign of falsification was carried out under a single management and with a single purpose. The same tasks were set - the "bars" for the result.

Instead of 343 seats in the State Duma, according to the official total, the real total for the United Russia party is 134 seats.

The falsified 209 mandates transferred to the United Russia party are in fact in a state of "seizing power and appropriating power," which is prohibited by the Constitution. Russian Federation and the Criminal Code of Russia.

In fig. 6 clearly shows how much the United Russia party yielded to the opposition in both types of voting in a more or less adequate turnout area.

Rice. 6. In reality, United Russia lost to the opposition

As shown in Fig. 6 data, in the field of unfalsified results, the United Russia party lost to the opposition by about a third of the parliamentary seats. Complete falsified bacchanalia for the United Russia party to the detriment of opposition parties is observed in the right wing of the chart.

The next regularity that helps to reveal falsification is the law of independence from the turnout of preference of a particular candidate by the electorate (Fig. 7).

Rice. 7. It is theoretically unambiguous that voter preferences should not depend on turnout

If the distribution deviates from the horizontal by an angle of plus (from left to right upwards), then this indicates falsification in the form of a vote subscript. If there is a deviation from the horizontal in minus (from left to right down), then this is falsification, on the contrary, in the form of theft of votes.

This methodological approach makes it possible to reveal the amount of falsification in voting for parties and their candidates in all constituent entities of the Federation.

A quantitative measure of the degree of falsification is determined by the slope of the distribution curve - the coefficient of falsification. If it is positive, then this is falsification in favor of the corresponding party or candidate, votes are attributed to him. If negative, then, on the contrary, - falsification at a loss, in this case, votes are stolen.

In fig. 8 (Voronezh region) shows a typical and almost standard form of curves, which is reproduced in almost all subjects of the Federation. Each point on these diagrams represents the number of votes for a particular party or candidate at a particular PEC. In all constituent entities of the Federation, with rare exceptions, the winner (the United Russia party) has a deviation in "+", the Communist Party of the Russian Federation - both the main oppositionist and the rest of the opposition parties - has a deviation in "-". There are dense organic clouds with a small scatter (Fig. 8), ie, a small level of dispersion. And the second, elongated, cloud, which has a very high level of dispersion. It will soon be seen that one of the "clouds" corresponds to the true results, and the second - to falsified ones.

Fig. 8. A typical picture of falsifications in favor of the United Russia party and the withdrawal of votes from other parties. Angles of deviation from the horizontal - coefficient of falsification

This example for the Voronezh region shows a typical picture. The right "tails" of distributions for "United Russia", being falsified, are always directed to the right and upward. For the opposition, the direction is always the opposite, "right and down."

The Report contains data of falsification in favor of the United Russia party and the withdrawal of votes from other parties in all constituent entities of the Russian Federation.

The distribution of the coefficient of fraud by the constituent entities of the Federation (comparative data) for voting on the party list and in the majority constituencies is shown in Fig. 9.

Fig. 9. Fraud coefficient for the United Russia party for all subjects of the federation for majoritarian elections and according to the party list

It can be seen from the nature of the curves that the falsifications were synchronized both on the party list of United Russia and on its candidates in the majoritarian districts. The correlation coefficient of the curves is very high - 0.86!

We would like to emphasize that the average coefficient of falsifications in favor of candidates and parties from power in 2016 increased by 1.9 times than in 2011.

III. Electoral fraud mechanism

The voting results during the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation in 2016 were falsified in several ways: stuffing of false ballots; preparation of false protocols; fraudulent activities with a detachment mechanism; fraud with dummy voters (the so-called carousel); machinations committed by a group of persons in a preliminary conspiracy or by an organized group, combined with bribery, coercion, the use of violence or the threat of its use; threats to teachers and other poor fellows in precinct election commissions with dismissal in case of a low result in the elections of the government's favorites.

Numerous video testimonies, personal eyewitness testimonies, photos and videos of ballot stuffing in many polling stations by members and even chairmen of election commissions testify to the facts of falsification.

In fair elections, the preferences of citizens do not depend on the turnout: that is, the ratio of the number of votes for one party to the number of votes for another, the votes for one candidate to the votes for another does not depend on the turnout. In the direct exit-pool conducted by VTsIOM, which cannot be suspected of being in opposition to the authorities and the Central Election Commission of Russia, at the exit from the polling stations, there is no dependence on the turnout!

The figures above show that before the turnout of 47%, the United Russia party is seriously losing to the opposition. But starting with a turnout of 47%, the opposite is true. And the higher the turnout, the more the United Russia party begins to “win” over the opposition. Moreover, the curves practically coincide for voting by party list and by majority districts. It is important that in the turnout range of 25-40%, which corresponds to an organic cloud of “fair” voting, the attitude does not really depend on the turnout. This means that here the data can be relatively trusted. In this range, the United Russia party lost 1.42 times to the opposition. The average turnout in this range is 32.5%.

For this turnout, the number of voters who voted in the elections is 35,690 thousand people. The above revealed true ratio of votes for the United Russia party and the entire aggregate opposition (1.42 times) makes it possible to obtain the true absolute number of votes for the United Russia party and the corresponding result (percentage). It turns out that the United Russia party actually received 14,750,000 votes. Officially, the CEC of Russia announced 28,525 thousand votes for the United Russia party. And this corresponds to 54.28%. And the true result is 27.9%.

Results of reconstruction of the true election results

Vitoge, we come to the conclusion that the United Russia party was supported by just over 13% of all registered voters and less than 10% of the country's population. The counterfeiters illegally increased its result by more than 1.5 times! More than 200 people entered the State Duma of the Russian Federation to "work" on the basis of illegally appropriated powers! In other words, there was an illegal seizure of power!

Meanwhile, in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, article 3, part 4. it is stated that “no one has the right to appropriate power in the Russian Federation. The seizure of power or the appropriation of power is prosecuted by federal law"- the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

In particular, in Article 278 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - Forcible seizure of power or forcible retention of power - it is written that “actions aimed at forcible seizure of power or forcible retention of power in violation of the Constitution of the Russian Federation ... are punishable by imprisonment for a term of twelve to twenty years .. . ".

Falsification of elections of the federal government body of the State Duma of the Russian Federation is also a criminal offense. Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Article 142. Falsification of electoral documents, referendum documents.

"1. Falsification of electoral documents ... if this act was committed by a member of the electoral commission ... is punishable by a fine in the amount of one hundred thousand to three hundred thousand rubles or in the amount of the salary or other income of the convicted person for a period of up to two years, or by forced labor for a term of up to four years, or by deprivation freedom for the same period….

2. Forgery of voters' signatures, ... or certification of knowingly forged signatures (signature lists), committed by a group of persons by prior conspiracy or by an organized group, or combined with bribery, coercion, the use of violence or the threat of its use, ... are punishable by a fine in the amount of two hundred thousand to five hundred thousand ... or forced labor for up to three years, or imprisonment for the same period ...

3. Illegal production of ... ballots ..., absentee ballots are punishable by a fine in the amount of two hundred thousand to five hundred thousand rubles ... or by imprisonment for a term of 2 to 5 years. "

Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Article 142.1. Falsification of voting results. “Inclusion of unaccounted ballots in the number of ballots used during voting, or presentation of deliberately incorrect information about voters, or deliberately incorrect compilation of voter lists, ... or falsification of voter signatures, ... or replacement of valid ballots with voter marks, leading to the impossibility of determining the will of voters, ... either deliberately incorrect counting of votes, ... or the signing by members of the election commission ... of the protocol on voting results before the vote count or determination of the voting results, or deliberately incorrect (not corresponding to the actual voting results) drawing up of the protocol on voting results, or illegal entry into the protocol of voting results changes after filling it out, or knowingly incorrect determination of the voting results, determination of the election results ... - are punished with a fine in the amount of two hundred thousand to five hundred thousand rubles ... or forced labor for a period of d about four years, or imprisonment for the same period. "

Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Article 141. Obstruction of the exercise of electoral rights or the work of election commissions.

« 1. Obstruction of the free exercise by a citizen of his electoral rights, violation of the secrecy of voting, ... obstruction of the work of election commissions, ... the activities of an election commission member, ... - is punishable by a fine of up to eighty thousand rubles ... or ... correctional labor for up to one year.

2. The same acts:

a) connected with bribery, deception, coercion, use of violence or with the threat of its use;

b) committed by a person using his official position;

c) committed by a group of persons in a preliminary conspiracy or by an organized group - shall be punishable by a fine in the amount of one hundred thousand to three hundred thousand ... or by imprisonment for a term of up to five years.

3. Interference with the use of official or official position in the exercise of an election commission ... of its powers ... in order to influence its decisions, namely, the requirement or instruction of an official on the registration of candidates, lists of candidates, counting of votes ... is punishable by a fine of two hundred thousand to five hundred thousand ... or imprisonment for up to four years. "

IY. conclusions

1.Official turnout of 48%, recorded by the Central Election Commission of Russia, is unreliable and does not exceed 35% for both party lists and majoritarian districts, or the turnout recorded by the CEC of Russia was falsified and overstated by 1.45 times.

2. The party "United Russia" during the voting actually received not 54% of the party list, as recorded by the Central Election Commission of Russia, but 27.9% of the number of voters, or 13.2% of the number of registered voters and less than 10% of the country's population ... The counterfeiters illegally increased its result by more than 1.5 times.

3. Instead of 343 seats in the State Duma of the Russian Federation, according to the official total, the real total for the United Russia party is 134 seats.

The forged 209 mandates transferred to the United Russia party are in fact in a state of “seizing power and appropriating power,” which is prohibited by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Criminal Code of Russia.

General conclusion : scientifically grounded analysis of the electoral process on September 18, 2016 indicates that the elections to the State Duma were held with gross violations, massive falsifications and are subject to cancellation, and State Duma 2016 isillegal.

The saddest thing about this problem is that only certain individuals are actively fighting against gross violations, falsification, scandalous elections, such as T. Yurasova in Mytishchi, S. Posokhov in Krasnogorsk, R. Zinatullin in Tatarstan and a number of others, but not the opposition parties LDPR, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Fair Russia, which were "robbed" in the election process and the only one from the media - "Novaya Gazeta".

Meanwhile, it is the factions of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Liberal Democratic Party, and Fair Russia in the State Duma of the Russian Federation that could bring to the meeting of the State Duma of the Russian Federation the issue of gross violations and massive falsifications in the elections on September 18, 2016 in order to make a political decision - self-dissolution illegal The State Duma of the Russian Federation and an appeal to the President of the Russian Federation as the guarantor of the Constitution of the Russian Federation on the appointment of new elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

Mass violations and falsifications in the 2016 State Duma elections concern a significant number of citizens and have acquired special social and political significance. In this regard, within the framework of its powers, the CEC of Russia has the right to appeal to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation for the protection of the electoral rights of the majority of citizens, as well as to the General Prosecutor's Office and the Investigative Committee of Russia to take measures of the prosecutor's response and initiate a criminal case on the fact of committing crimes provided for in Articles 141, 142, 142.1, 278 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, identifying those responsible for violating the current legislation.

Sincerely yours (Yu.Voronin)

Doctor of Economics, Professor,

Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Tatar ASSR-

Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the TASSR (1988-1990);

First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme

Council of the Russian Federation (1991-1993); State Duma deputy

(second convocation); Auditor of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation.