Lend-Lease: Supply Volumes and Significance for the USSR. Lend-Lease: Just the Facts
phrase lend-lease derived from English words: lend- to lend and lease- to rent. In the candidate's article offered to readers historical sciences P. S. Petrov, the views of American political and military figures are presented, as well as the assessments of Western researchers, gleaned from various US sources, on the issues of Soviet-American cooperation within the framework of Lend-Lease, which largely determined the policy towards the Soviet ally in the period of the past war.
According to the established opinion, when supplying the parties to the war against Germany, the United States of America was guided primarily by its own interests - to protect itself through the hands of others and to preserve as much as possible own forces. At the same time, the US monopoly bourgeoisie pursued certain economic goals, bearing in mind that lend-lease deliveries would contribute to a significant expansion of production and its enrichment at the expense of government orders.
The Lend-Lease Act (officially called the United States Defense Assistance Act) was passed by the US Congress on March 8, 1941. Initially, it extended to Great Britain and a number of other countries against which Germany fought.
According to this act, the head of state received the authority to transfer, exchange, lease, lend or otherwise supply military equipment, weapons, ammunition, equipment, strategic raw materials, food, provide various goods and services, as well as information to the government of any country, "defense which the President deems vital to the defense of the United States."
The states that received Lend-Lease assistance signed agreements with the US government. According to them, delivered cars, various military equipment, weapons, other items destroyed, lost or consumed during the war, were not subject to payment after its end. The remaining goods and materials after the war, which could be used for civilian consumption, were supposed to be paid in full or in part on the basis of long-term loans provided by America. And the United States could demand that military materials be returned back, although, as A.A. Gromyko, former ambassador USSR in the USA in 1943-1946, the American government has repeatedly stated that it will not use this right.
It is important to note that the countries that entered into agreements with the United States, in turn, assumed obligations to “help protect the United States” and provide them with the materials that they had, provide various services and information. The United States thus received a counter, or reverse, lend-lease: machine tools, anti-aircraft guns and ammunition, equipment for military factories, as well as various services, military information, strategic raw materials, precious metals, etc.
By supplying military equipment and materials to the countries fighting against Germany, the United States primarily pursued its own selfish interests. This is evidenced by many American authors, because the government provided lend-lease as an alternative to war. For example, R. Dawson wrote that in the US Congress and the country at the end of October 1941 there was a firm conviction, despite neutralist, isolationist and even anti-Soviet sentiments, that “dollars, even transferred to Soviet Russia, were a much more favorable contribution than sending American Army". On the other hand, the supply of goods contributed to the expansion of production and the receipt of large profits. Thus, the prudence underlying Lend-Lease was hallmark all types of assistance and US policy in the war, which was especially clearly manifested in relations with the USSR.
The US government, which declared after the attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941 by fascist Germany and its satellites that it intended to help him, nevertheless, before doing this, it cleared up for itself for a number of months what "Russia's ability to resist" was, and then has already made its position.
The US proceeded from the fact that Germany poses a danger, first of all, to them and whether Great Britain and the United States will be able to continue to rule the world or whether Germany and Japan will take their place. They understood that the victory of Germany in the war against the USSR would turn out to be "a catastrophe of the highest importance for England and America", because in the event of establishing control over all of Europe and Asia, the Third Reich "would threaten the United States from both sides" . At the same time, they were also worried about the following question: “Suppose that we provide assistance to Russia and she defeats Hitler, who will dominate Europe ..?” .
Only having calculated all the pros and cons, the American leadership decided to provide assistance to the USSR. A week after the outbreak of hostilities on the eastern front, a special committee was created at the US State Department from representatives of various services, which prepared a small list of goods, including military ones, for export to the USSR. The Soviet side was able to purchase materials for cash. However, red tape and bureaucratic obstacles immediately got in the way of this undertaking, because various departments, sending applications from the USSR to each other, argued for a long time about how to get Russian gold.
US Secretary of State Harry Hopkins meeting with Stalin, summer 1941
At the same time, the United States, recognizing that the Russians are also defending America, considered it necessary to assure our country of the desire to help, since they also took into account the need to have a friendly Russia behind Japanese lines. To this end, US leaders began to run into Moscow. The first to arrive was presidential aide Harry Hopkins, who clarified the situation in the USSR and his ability to stand against Hitler. Based on the analysis of the information he received, the president was convinced that "helping the Russians is money well spent."
In negotiations between Hopkins and Stalin in late July 1941, it was determined that the Red Army was in particular need of anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine guns, rifles, high-octane aviation gasoline, and aluminum for aircraft production. The United States assessed these requests as insignificant, but they were in no hurry to satisfy them. “Nearly six weeks have passed since the start of the war with Russia, but we have done practically nothing to deliver the necessary materials to them,” Roosevelt wrote in one document. In addition, he believed that the aircraft intended for sale to the Soviet Union did not have to be the latest models, and the deliveries could be "symbolic".
Former US Secretary of the Interior G. Ickes wrote that only five were sent on the request for 3,000 bombers.
From June to August 1941, only 128 tons of materials purchased for cash were delivered to the USSR. It was the third month of the war, and the United States supplied us only with tools and industrial equipment purchased earlier. The situation has not changed even a few months later. As G. Ickes testifies, the American leadership sought to ensure that “the Russians hand over to us all their gold, which will be used to pay for the supply of goods until (it) is exhausted. From now on, we will apply the lend-lease law to Russia. In payment for supplies, the USSR also transferred to the United States strategic raw materials - manganese, chromium, asbestos, platinum, etc.
It must be assumed that England began real deliveries of military materials to the Soviet Union before the United States, because on September 6, 1941, W. Churchill announced the first limited deliveries of the USSR on terms similar to the American Lend-Lease.
On October 1, 1941, the first protocol on deliveries for a period of 9 months - until June 30, 1942 was signed in Moscow by the representative of the US President A. Harriman. The value of imported goods was $1 billion. For payment, an interest-free loan was provided, which was supposed to begin to be repaid 5 years after the end of the war - within 10 years. On November 7, 1941, that is, four and a half months after the German attack on the USSR, Roosevelt finally signed the document on the basis of the permission passed by Congress to extend the lend-lease law to the Soviet Union.
The first deliveries from the USA date back to October 1941. In that year, the USSR received $545,000 worth of various weapons and military materials, less than one-tenth of a percent of the total cost of American deliveries to other countries. In addition, the USSR purchased goods for cash in the amount of 41 million dollars. Until the end of 1941, the USA supplied the USSR with 204 aircraft instead of 600 provided for under the protocol, 182 tanks instead of 750. According to Harriman, the USA fulfilled only a quarter of their obligations under the first protocol. All this was done with the goal not so much to help the USSR as to keep Russia at war, to keep the front at a considerable distance from American territory with the least human losses, and to minimize direct military material costs. During the fighting near Moscow at the end of 1941, American weapons were just beginning to arrive. The front was provided with Soviet-made weapons, the output of which, after the evacuation of the country's enterprises from west to east, began to steadily increase from the summer of 1942.
In February 1942, Roosevelt advanced a second billion dollars and wished to renegotiate the terms of the loan, and then wrote to Stalin about the planned use of American military forces. These issues were discussed in Washington during Molotov's visit to the United States in May 1942. A second protocol was prepared for one year, according to which it was originally planned to supply 8 million tons of materials. However, the President, referring to the need to ensure the second front promised but not opened in 1942, reduced the volume of deliveries to 2.5 million tons. distribution of the most favored nation regime to the Soviet Union and regulated issues related to supplies. The United States abandoned the formal requirement to pay for loans and transferred lend-lease for the USSR to the same lend-lease basis as for England.
I must say about the quality of American technology, its suitability for combat. Stalin, in correspondence with Roosevelt, noted that American tanks burn very easily from anti-tank rifles that hit from behind and from the side, because they run on high-grade gasoline. He also wrote that the Soviet side was ready to temporarily completely abandon the supply of tanks, artillery, ammunition, pistols and other things, but was in dire need of an increase in the supply of fighter aircraft. modern type, but not the aircraft "Keetyhawk", which can not withstand the fight against German fighters. The preference was given to the Airacobra fighters, but it turned out that they often fall into a tailspin, and this did not cause the Americans themselves to want to fly them and risk their lives. Marshal G.K. Zhukov also wrote that tanks and aircraft from the United States were not distinguished by high combat qualities.
In 1942, the USSR delivered: 2505 aircraft, 3023 tanks, 78,964 vehicles. 12% of the total amount of equipment sent was lost on the way to our country (this is how much it was sunk at sea, which stopped deliveries in spring and summer). In the same 1942, the Soviet Union produced 25,436 aircraft and 24,446 tanks.
After the defeat of the Nazi troops near Stalingrad in February 1943, the contribution of the allies to which was insignificant, a radical turning point in the war occurred and the United States slightly increased the supply of military equipment.
In the spring of 1943, the United States and Britain decided to suspend the dispatch of cargo convoys to the Soviet northern ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, citing preparations for an operation against Italy, a landing on its territory. As a result, by the end of the second protocol, 1.5 million tons of cargo were not delivered. Only towards the end of November, after an eight-month break, did another convoy arrive via the northern route. Thus, in the battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943, military equipment was almost entirely of domestic production.
On July 1, 1943, the third protocol came into force. Canada joined in deliveries to the Soviet Union, Great Britain began to take a more active part in them. By this time, the needs of the USSR had changed somewhat. More needed Vehicle, communications equipment, clothing, medical equipment, explosives and food than tanks, guns, ammunition.
Aid to the Soviet Union, despite a delay in mid-1943, increased over the year as a whole to 63% compared to 1942.
As for the supply of foodstuffs, and some American authors, proving the decisive role of the United States in supplying the Soviet Army, emphasize precisely this, then not everything was all right here either. According to Roosevelt's promise, in 1943, food supplies were to be 10% of the total number of products produced in the United States. In the first six months of the year, food supplies to the Soviet Union accounted for only one third. It follows that the USSR received a little more than 3% of the food that was produced in the USA. Could this have played an important role for such a large country as the USSR?
For 1941 -1944 Our country received from the USA, Canada and Great Britain 2 million 545 thousand tons of food under Lend-Lease. At the same time, since 1944, the Soviet Union had to feed both the western regions of the USSR, and the countries of Eastern Europe, liberated by the Soviet Army, robbed and devastated by the Nazis.
However, the Soviet Union appreciated the help of the allies, especially since since the summer of 1943, American military equipment and various equipment could be increasingly seen on the fronts of the Soviet Army. American military supplies were based on increased by that time production in the United States (by 35% compared with the average of 1935-1939). According to the third protocol, in 1944, well-known and much needed by the USSR trucks and other motor vehicles were supplied, various metals, machinery and equipment, fuels and lubricants, locomotives, rails, wagons.
Lend-Lease. Dodge WF32.
At the beginning of 1944, negotiations began on the content of the fourth delivery protocol. Although Roosevelt considered the USSR the main factor in ensuring the defeat of fascism, in the United States, the forces that slowed down deliveries, advocated a review of relations with the Soviet Union, gained increasing influence, as the crisis in the war with Germany was overcome. The congress feared that some of the delivered materials, machinery, equipment could be used by our country to restore the economy after the war.
On May 2, 1945, i.e., after the death of Roosevelt (in April), a group of people in the US administration, which included, in particular, Deputy Secretary of State J. Grew and Head of the Foreign Economic Administration L. Crowley, insisted on limiting and even ending deliveries to the Soviet Union, taking advantage of the fact that the anti-Soviet-minded G. Truman became the president of the country, reported this opinion to him. And on May 10, a decision was made to revise the policy towards the USSR, expressed in a memorandum. According to this document, lend-lease supplies were allowed only for military operations against Japan. Purchases of other materials were possible only for cash. Deliveries to the Soviet Union after the surrender of Japan in August 1945 were finally stopped.
"Such a policy of change was one of the many harbingers of a new period in Soviet-American relations". Therefore, it is obviously no coincidence that in the United States a number of studies related to the termination of lend-lease include the concept of "cold war".
Having interrupted Lend-Lease deliveries, the United States signed an agreement with the USSR in October 1945 on the sale of previously ordered goods on credit. But in January 1947, the American government stopped deliveries under this agreement.
Summing up the assistance rendered to our country by the United States, Great Britain and Canada, it should be noted that specific gravity their supplies amounted to only about 4% of domestic production. In total, during the war, 42 convoys arrived at Soviet ports, and 36 were sent from the USSR. According to American sources, which differ in indicators, for the period from October 1, 1941 to May 31, 1945, 2660 ships were sent to the USSR with a total cargo volume of 16.5- 17.5 million tons, of which 15.2-16.6 million tons were delivered to the destination (77 ships with 1.3 million tons of cargo were lost at sea). In value terms, deliveries to the Soviet Union, transport costs and services amounted to 10.8-11.0 billion dollars, that is, no more than 24% of the total number of dollars spent by the United States on lend-lease assistance to all countries (more than 46 billion) . This amount is equal to approximately 13% of all US military spending, of which only 3.3% accounted for aid to the eastern front. During the war, the USSR received: 401.4 thousand vehicles and 2 million 599 thousand tons of oil products, 9.6 thousand guns (that is, about 2% of the production of this type of weapon in our country in the amount of 489.9 thousand artillery guns), 14-14.5 thousand aircraft (taking into account losses during transportation - about 10% of the total number, equal to 136.8 thousand aircraft produced by the Soviet industry), tanks and self-propelled guns - 12.2 thousand, or 12% (according to other sources, 7 thousand, or 6.8%), against 102.5 thousand Soviet-made tanks and self-propelled guns, 422 thousand field telephones, over 15 million pairs of shoes, about 69 million m2 of woolen fabrics, 1860 steam locomotives (6.3% of the total number of the USSR steam locomotive fleet), 4.3 million tons of food, which accounted for approximately 25% of the total supply tonnage.
“Our supplies,” acknowledges the head of the military mission, General Dean, “may not have won the war, but they should have supported the Russians.”
After the end of World War II, negotiations began between the USSR and the United States to settle Lend-Lease payments, as the American government continued to seek maximum benefits in the form of payments or reimbursement of goods in kind. The administration initially valued its claims at $2.6 billion, but the following year lowered the amount to $1.3 billion. These claims showed discrimination against the Soviet Union, for, for example, Great Britain, which received twice as much aid, had to pay only 472 million dollars, i.e., about 2% of the cost of military supplies.
Finally, on October 18, 1972, an agreement was reached to settle the Lend-Lease issue. The Soviet Union had to pay 722 million dollars on condition that the American side granted it the most favored nation treatment in trade with the United States, as well as export credits and guarantees. However, due to the unacceptable position for the USSR, which was then taken by the United States in accordance with the agreements reached, the implementation of the agreement remains incomplete.
I must say that the United States greatly enriched itself in the war. By the end of the war, their national income was one and a half times higher than the pre-war one. general power industrial production compared with 1939 increased by 40%. The losses of the Soviet Union in that war reached 485 billion dollars (US military spending amounted to about 330 billion dollars).
Leskie R. The Wars of America. - New York, Evanston and London. 1968. - p. 719.
Leighton R. M. and Coakley R. W. Global Logistics and Strategy. 1940-1943. - Washington, 1955. - p. 259.
Dawson R. H. The Decision to Aid Russia 1941. - Chapel Hill, 1959. - p. 287.
The New York Times. - 1941. - June, 26. - p. 18.
Wall Street Journal. - 1941. June, 25. - p. 4.
Kimball W. F. Churchill and Roosevelt. The Complete Correspondence I. Alliance Emerging. October 1933. - November 1942. - Princeton, New Jersey, 1984. - p. 226.
Ickes H.L. The Secret Diary - Vol. 3 - New York, 1954. - p. 595
Ibid. — p. 320.
Leighton R. M. and Cocley R. W. Global Logistics and Strategy. 1943-1945. - Washington, 1968. - P. 699.
Deane J.R. The Strange Alliance, - New York, 1947. - P. 95.
The history of lend-lease for the USSR
Already on August 30, 1941, British Prime Minister W. Churchill wrote to his cabinet minister, Lord Beaverbrook:
“I want you to go to Moscow with Harriman to arrange long-term supplies for the Russian armies. This can be done almost exclusively with American resources, although we have rubber, boots, etc. A large new order must be placed in the United States. The pace of deliveries, of course, is limited by ports and the lack of ships. When the second narrow-gauge railway from Basra to the Caspian Sea is laid in the spring, this road will become an important transportation route. Our duty and our interests require the provision of all possible assistance to the Russians, even at the cost of serious sacrifices on our part..
On the same day Churchill wrote to Stalin
“I tried to find some way to help your country in its magnificent resistance until the implementation of longer-term measures, about which we are negotiating with the United States of America and which will serve as the subject of the Moscow Conference”
The Moscow Treaty on the supply of the USSR was signed on October 1, 1941. Then three more treaties were concluded: Washington, London and Ottawa
Stalin's letter to Churchill September 3, 1941:
“I am grateful for the promise, in addition to the previously promised 200 fighter aircraft, to sell another 200 fighter aircraft to the Soviet Union ... However, I must say that these aircraft, which, apparently, can not be put into action soon and not immediately, but in different time and individual groups, they will not be able to make serious changes on the eastern front ... I think that there is only one way out of this situation: to create a second front somewhere in the Balkans or in France this year, which could pull 30-40 from the eastern front German divisions, and at the same time provide the Soviet Union with 30 thousand tons of aluminum by the beginning of October this year. and monthly minimum assistance in the amount of 400 aircraft and 500 tanks (small or medium)»
Churchill to Stalin September 6, 1941.
“…3. On the issue of supply. We…will do our best to help you. I am telegraphing President Roosevelt ... and we will try to inform you even before the Moscow conference of the number of aircraft and tanks that we jointly promise to send you monthly along with deliveries of rubber, aluminum, cloth and other things. For our part, we are ready to send you half of the monthly number of aircraft and tanks that you ask for from British production ... We will make every effort to start sending supplies to you immediately.
4. We have already given orders to supply the Persian railway rolling stock in order to raise its current throughput from two trains each way per day… up to 12 trains each way per day. This will be achieved by the spring of 1942. Steam locomotives and wagons from England will be sent around the Cape of Good Hope after they have been converted to fuel oil. A water supply system will be developed along the railway. The first 48 locomotives and 400 wagons are about to be sent ... "
Lend-Lease supply routes
- Soviet Arctic
- Arctic convoys
- Far East
- Black Sea
Most of the goods under the lend-lease program (46%) were transported from Alaska through the Soviet Far East
Stalin - Churchill September 13, 1941
“... I am grateful for the promise of monthly assistance from England in aluminum, aircraft and tanks.
I can only welcome that the British Government is thinking of providing this assistance not through the purchase and sale of aircraft, aluminum and tanks, but through comradely cooperation…”
The Lend-Lease Act was signed into law by US President Roosevelt on March 11, 1941. It was extended to the Soviet Union on October 28, 1941. According to this law, the countries that received aid under the Lend-Lease program neither during the war nor after did not pay for this aid and should not have to pay. It was necessary to pay only for what remained intact after the war and could be used
Lend-lease deliveries to the USSR
- 22150 aircraft
- 12700 tanks
- 13,000 guns
- 35000 motorcycles
- 427,000 trucks
- 2000 locomotives
- 281 military ship
- 128 transport ships
- 11000 wagons
- 2.1 million tons of oil products
- 4.5 million tons of food
- 15 million pairs of shoes
- 44600 metal cutting machines
- 263,000 tons of aluminum
- 387,000 tons of copper
- 1.2 million tons of chemicals and explosives
- 35,800 radio stations
- 5899 receivers
- 348 locators
Historians are still arguing about the benefits of the Lend-Lease supplies to the USSR. The value of aid is rated from unprincipled to essential
Britain owed the US at the end of the war $4.33 billion. Fully repaid in 2006. France paid off America in 1946. The USSR refused to repay the debt of 2.6 billion dollars. Negotiations on this matter have been conducted with varying success up to the present time, as Wikipedia says, partly Russia still paid off the debt. And finally it must pay off with the United States in 2030
Literally "loan-lease") - a system for the transfer by the United States on loan or on lease of weapons, military and other materials necessary for waging war to allied countries during the Second World War. Convinced by the experience of the First World War that the supply of military materials to the Allies on the basis of a loan does not provide a sufficiently profitable compensation, the United States during the Second World War decided to introduce another system, the idea of which belonged to President F. Roosevelt (see) and which, according to him, was not supposed to be a "debit and credit system", but a system of mutual military supply. In January 1941, Roosevelt came up with a proposal to create a L. system, and, despite the opposition of the isolationists, the US Congress on March 11, 1941, by an overwhelming majority of votes, passed the L. Law. . The L. Act gave the president the authority to sell, transfer, trade, rent, loan, or otherwise, military material or military information to the government of any country whose defense the president deemed essential to the security of the United States. The term of office of the President of the United States for the supply of materials and the provision of services was initially determined until June 30, 1943, then annually extended, with the last term set until June 30, 1946. However, already on August 21, 1945, the US government announced the termination of supplies for L. In fact they were discontinued in September 1945 to all countries, with the exception of the Kuomintang government of China, supplies to which continued in the future, being one of the most important means of American intervention in China. After the adoption of the law on L., the US government concluded with the countries that received aid on L. "basic agreements on lend-lease" and "agreements on mutual assistance." The amount of Lend-Lease deliveries in 1941-45, on average, amounted to only 15% of the total amount of US military spending and over 50% of US exports. The agreements concluded by the United States with certain countries that received Lend-Lease materials established the following basic principles for settling accounts for L.: 1. Materials destroyed, lost, and consumed during the war are not subject to any payment. 2. Materials remaining after the end of the war and suitable for civilian needs are paid in whole or in part in the form of a long-term loan. 3. Military materials remain in the countries that received them, but the US government reserves the right to reclaim these materials. At the same time, the US government says it will generally not exercise this right. 4. Equipment not completed by the end of the war and lend-lease materials in the warehouses of US government agencies can be purchased by the countries for which they are ordered, with the US government providing long-term credit to pay for such materials and equipment. According to the agreement between the United States and England of December 6, 1945 on the settlement of relations arising from L. , England undertook to pay $532 million for Lend-Lease materials and surplus property belonging to the United States left after the war, as well as for US installations on the territory of the United Kingdom. In addition, Britain pledged to pay $118 million as the difference between the value of mutual deliveries of goods and services provided by the US and British governments through the Latvian system after the victory over Japan. The total amount of 650 million dollars is payable by England within 50 years from December 31, 1951 equal parts annually with accrual from 1951 percent at a rate of 2% per annum. The importance of the assistance provided during the war in L. should not be exaggerated. In particular, the Soviet Army, which played a decisive role in the defeat of Nazi Germany, received immeasurable large quantity tanks, aircraft, guns, and other types of weapons than from the USA along the L. The proportion of allied deliveries of industrial goods to the USSR in relation to the volume of industrial output at the socialist enterprises of the USSR during the period of the war economy amounted to only about 4%. The enormous material losses suffered by the Soviet Union, which bore the brunt of the struggle against Hitlerite Germany and its allies, were in no way compensated for by the help received from the United States in the Leningrad region. The British Empire, although the role of the latter in the war could not be compared with the role of the Soviet Union. Although Roosevelt declared that the only important benefit that the United States would receive from deliveries along the L. was assistance in the speedy defeat of Germany and Japan, in fact L. facilitated the US's economic penetration into the countries of Europe and Asia. L. to a large extent contributed to the expansion of US production during the war years by increasing government military orders for the supply of weapons to the allies. Therefore, the L. system strengthened the expansionist tendencies in the USA, since American goods did not find sufficient domestic markets after the war because of the decline in the standard of living of the broad masses of the US population. Both during the war and especially after its end, significant deviations from the goals for which it was formally introduced took place in the L. system. Even during the war years, the United States delivered deliveries through Latvia to countries that not only were not part of the anti-Hitler coalition, but, on the contrary, supported Germany (for example, Turkey). After the Second World War, the US government used L. for openly reactionary purposes, continuing to supply weapons and other materials to the government of Chiang Kai-shek to fight against the democratic forces of China. In relation to England, France, and other capitalist countries, L. contributed to their economic and even political subordination to the United States, which manifested itself both in the settlement of settlements on L., and especially in the course of the implementation of the "Marshall Plan" by the USA. On October 15, 1945, the Soviet Union and the United States concluded an agreement on the supply of equipment, in the form of a long-term credit to the Soviet Union by the United States, which was available or ordered for Leningrad, but not delivered by that time, for a total amount of 244 million dollars. In December 1946 The United States unilaterally stopped supplying equipment to the USSR under this agreement, thus violating its obligations.
Lend-Lease is a program under which the United States provided its allies in World War II with everything they needed - weapons, food, production equipment and raw materials.
Most often, however, under "lend-lease" is understood precisely the supply of weapons, not paying attention to other goods.
Causes and conditions
The American leadership reasonably believed that in World War II, those countries whose defense was of vital importance to the United States should be helped.
Initially, the Lend-Lease program included China and the British Empire, but then other countries, including the USSR, joined it.
Adopted in March 1941, the Lend-Lease Law established the following supply rules:
- Equipment, weapons, food, materials and other goods used or destroyed during the war were not subject to payment.
- The goods left after the war, if they could be suitable for civilian purposes, were paid for on the basis of loans provided by the United States.
- If the United States is interested in returning this or that product after the war, it must be returned.
Thus, the supplies were a kind of "gift" to the allies during the war, and in peacetime they turned into a commodity and could be bought at quite reasonable prices.
Lend-Lease in the USSR
Lend-lease in the USSR is still the subject of fierce disputes between opponents and supporters of Soviet power. The former claim that without American supplies, the USSR is unlikely to have won the war, while the latter argue that the supplies were insignificant and did not play a special role in the fight against fascism.
Both of them are gravely mistaken. The Western "superpower" organized large-scale deliveries of weapons and other goods to European countries due to the fact that the US GDP was several times higher than this indicator in any developed European country, including the USSR.
Hundreds of thousands of tons of cargo were imported into the Soviet Union. More than 12 percent of the tanks and aircraft available in the Red Army were of American and British production, and armored personnel carriers were entirely imported: in our country, such equipment has not yet been produced.
But such Lend-Lease also had weaknesses. First, the agreements on the supply of weapons and equipment were not fully implemented. Of the 800 aircraft and 1,000 tanks destined for the USSR in 1941, only 669 aircraft and 487 tanks were sent. The situation more or less normalized only in 1943.
Secondly, a large number of foreign aid to the Soviet Union did not mean better quality. And here the point is not only that the United States deliberately supplied not the most modern and best of its equipment, but also that American military production generally lagged behind Soviet and European.
The USSR and Germany at that time invested most of their production forces in the development of weapons, including tanks, as a result of which they surpassed all other states in this; therefore, against the background of Soviet and German technology, American and even British technology often looked weak.
A more acceptable situation was with the supply of aircraft, less acceptable - tanks. The share of anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns was very small, since the USSR had enough of its own similar equipment. Small arms were also supplied, but on an absolutely microscopic scale - the share of American "trunks" in the Red Army was less than 1 percent.
Could the USSR do without Lend-Lease?
It is known that most of the Lend-Lease deliveries occurred in the period after 1943, when the turning point in the war came. That is, in the most terrible period of the war, the early one, the help of the allies was minimal, and in more successful years it was not so noticeable.
There are those who ask: if the Allies produced a large number of weapons, why did they not send more of them? In fact, the reason was not the stinginess of the "capitalist comrades", but the tonnage of the American and British cargo fleet - it was very insufficient for mass deliveries.
There is another version that the deliveries were simply delayed. And one more thing, the Americans were waiting for someone to help, either the USSR or Germany. depending on the course of the war. The more losses the parties have, the more investments. They have a calculation, as always.
Could the Soviet Union do without Lend-Lease at all? It seems that he could. It was enough to redistribute their own production capacities. However, this would have to mobilize a huge amount of manpower, which means the weakening of the army. Recall that America was an ally of the USSR.
It would be possible to turn a blind eye to the lack of the necessary equipment, but then the army would also be weakened. The war for the USSR would have turned into an even more protracted conflict, the Soviet Army would still have won the war, perhaps later. R. Sherwood (American historian) quoted Harry Hopkins, who did not consider American assistance important in the victory of the USSR over fascism. He said: "The victory was achieved by the heroism and blood of the Russian army."
Benefit for the Americans
Many political scientists, and even politicians themselves, do not hide the benefits of the states from the supply of not quite new and serviceable weapons. But since World War II, they have received their debt from Russia. The exhausted and destroyed USSR could not give it away, and there were all sorts of other reasons, for example, a tense relationship between the two countries. Fully profited.
“Few people know that military supplies under Lend-Lease (lend-lease) were not at all free for rent - Russia, as the assignee of the USSR, paid the last debts on them already in 2006,” writes historian and publicist Yevgeny Spitsyn.
In the issue of lend-lease (from English lend - to lend and lease - to rent, rent - ed.) For the USSR, there are many subtleties that it would be nice to understand - on the basis of historical documents.
Not exactly free
The Lend-Lease Act or the "Law for the Defense of the United States", which was passed by the US Congress on March 11, 1941, gave the President of the United States "the right to lend or lease to other states various goods and materials necessary for the conduct of hostilities", if these actions, by definition of the President, were vital to the defense of the United States. Various goods and materials were understood as weapons, military equipment, ammunition, strategic raw materials, ammunition, food, civilian goods for the army and rear, as well as any information of major military importance.
The lend-lease scheme itself provided for the fulfillment by the recipient country of a number of conditions: 1) materials destroyed, lost or lost during hostilities were not subject to payment, and the property that survived and was suitable for civilian purposes should be paid in full or in part in order to repay a long-term loan issued by the USA; 2) the surviving military materials could remain with the recipient country until the United States requests them back; 3) in turn, the tenant undertook to help the United States with all the resources and information he had.
By the way, and few people know about this either, the Lend-Lease Act obliged countries that applied for American assistance to submit an exhaustive financial report to the United States. It is no coincidence that US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr., during a hearing in the Senate Committee, called this provision unique in all world practice: "For the first time in history, one state, one government provides another with data on its financial situation."
With the help of lend-lease, the administration of President F.D. Roosevelt was going to solve a number of urgent tasks, both foreign policy and domestic. Firstly, such a scheme made it possible to create new jobs in the United States itself, which had not yet fully recovered from the severe economic crisis of 1929-1933. Secondly, lend-lease allowed the US government to exert some influence on the recipient country of lend-lease assistance. Finally, thirdly, by sending his allies only weapons, materials and raw materials, but not manpower, President F.D. Roosevelt fulfilled his election promise: "Our guys will never participate in other people's wars."
The initial term for Lend-Lease deliveries was set to June 30, 1943, with further annual extensions as needed. And Roosevelt appointed the former Secretary of Commerce, his assistant Harry Hopkins, as the first administrator of this project.
And not only for the USSR
Contrary to another common misconception, the lend-lease system was not created under the USSR. At the end of May 1940, the British were the first to ask for military assistance on the basis of special lease relations (an analogue of operational leasing), since the actual defeat of France left Great Britain without military allies on the European continent.
The British themselves, who initially requested 40-50 "old" destroyers, proposed three payment schemes: a gratuitous gift, cash payment and leasing. However, Prime Minister W. Churchill was a realist and perfectly understood that neither the first nor the second proposals would cause enthusiasm among the Americans, since the warring England was actually on the verge of bankruptcy. Therefore, President Roosevelt quickly accepted the third option, and in the late summer of 1940 the deal went through.
Then, in the depths of the American Treasury Department, the idea was born to extend the experience of one private transaction to the entire sphere of all interstate relations. Having connected the Military and Naval Ministries to the development of the lend-lease bill, the US presidential administration on January 10, 1941 submitted it to both houses of Congress, which was approved by them on March 11. Meanwhile, in September 1941, the US Congress, after a long debate, approved the so-called "Victory Program", the essence of which, according to the American military historians themselves (R. Layton, R. Coakley), was that "America's contribution to the war will be weapons, not armies."
Immediately after the signing of this program by President Roosevelt, his adviser and special representative Averell Harriman flew to London, and from there to Moscow, where on October 1, 1941, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Presidential Special Representative A. Harriman signed the First (Moscow) protocol, which marked the beginning of the spread of the Lend-Lease program to the Soviet Union.
Then, on June 11, 1942, the “Agreement between the governments of the USSR and the USA on the principles applicable to mutual assistance in waging a war against aggression” was signed in Washington, which finally regulated all the fundamental issues of military-technical and economic cooperation between the two main participants in the “anti-Hitler coalition” ". In general, in accordance with the signed protocols, all Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR are traditionally divided into several stages:
Before lend-lease - from June 22, 1941 to September 30, 1941 (before the signing of the protocol); The first protocol - from October 1, 1941 to June 30, 1942 (signed on October 1, 1941); The second protocol - from July 1, 1942 to June 30, 1943 (signed on October 6, 1942); Third protocol - from July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1944 (signed on October 19, 1943); The fourth protocol - from July 1, 1944 to September 20, 1945 (signed on April 17, 1944).
On September 2, 1945, with the signing of the act of surrender of militaristic Japan, World War II was completed, and on September 20, 1945, all Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR were stopped.
What, where and how much
The US government has never published detailed reports of what and how much was sent under the Lend-Lease program to the USSR. But according to the updated data of the Doctor of Historical Sciences L.V. Pozdeeva (“Anglo-American relations during the Second World War 1941-1945”, M., “Nauka”, 1969; “London - Moscow: British public opinion and the USSR. 1939-1945, M., Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 1999), which were extracted by her from closed American archival sources dated 1952, Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR were carried out along five routes:
Far East - 8,244,000 tons (47.1%); Persian Gulf - 4,160,000 tons (23.8%); Northern Russia- 3,964,000 tons (22.7%); Soviet North - 681,000 tons (3.9%); Soviet Arctic - 452,000 tons (2.5%).
His compatriot, American historian J. Herring just as frankly wrote that "Lend-Lease was not the most disinterested act in the history of mankind ... It was an act of prudent selfishness, and Americans have always clearly imagined the benefits that they can derive from it."
And this was true, since Lend-Lease turned out to be an inexhaustible source of enrichment for many American corporations. Indeed, in fact, the United States was the only country of the anti-Hitler coalition that received a significant economic gain from the war. Not without reason in the United States itself the Second world war sometimes called the “good war”, which, for example, is evident from the title of the work of the famous American historian S. Terkeli “The Good War: An Oral History of World War II” (“The Good War: An Oral History of World War II” (1984)). In it, he frankly, with cynicism, noted: “Almost the whole world during this war experienced terrible upheavals, horrors and was almost destroyed. We came out of the war with incredible equipment, tools, labor and money. For most Americans, the war turned out to be fun ... I'm not talking about those unfortunate people who lost their sons and daughters. But for everyone else, it was a damn good time."
Almost all researchers of this topic unanimously say that the Lend-Lease program noticeably revived the economic situation in the United States, in the balance of payments of which Lend-Lease operations became one of the leading items during the war. To carry out Lend-Lease deliveries, President Roosevelt's administration began to widely use the so-called "fixed profit" contracts (cost-plus contracts), when private contractors themselves could set a certain level of income in relation to costs.
In cases where significant volumes of specialized equipment were required, the US government acted as a lessor, buying all the necessary equipment for subsequent leasing.
Only numbers
Of course, lend-lease deliveries brought victory over the enemy closer. But here are some real numbers that speak for themselves.
For example, during the war years, more than 29.1 million units of small arms of all main types were produced at the enterprises of the Soviet Union, while only about 152 thousand units of small arms were supplied to the Red Army from American, British and Canadian factories, i.e. 0.5%. A similar picture was observed for all types of artillery systems of all calibers - 647.6 thousand Soviet guns and mortars against 9.4 thousand foreign ones, which was less than 1.5% of their total number.
For other types of weapons, the picture was somewhat different, but also not so “optimistic”: for tanks and self-propelled guns, the ratio of domestic and allied vehicles was, respectively, 132.8 thousand and 11.9 thousand (8.96%), and for combat aircraft - 140.5 thousand and 18.3 thousand (13%).
And one more thing: out of almost 46 billion dollars, which cost all Lend-Lease assistance, for the Red Army, which defeated the lion's share of the divisions of Germany and its military satellites, the United States allocated only 9.1 billion dollars, that is, a little more than one-fifth of the funds .
At the same time, the British Empire received more than 30.2 billion, France - 1.4 billion, China - 630 million, and even the countries of Latin America (!) received 420 million dollars. In total, 42 countries received deliveries under the Lend-Lease program.
It must be said that in Lately overall lend-lease deliveries began to be evaluated somewhat differently, but this does not change the essence of the overall picture. Here are the corrected data: out of 50 billion dollars, almost 31.5 billion were spent on supplies to the UK, 11.3 billion to the USSR, 3.2 billion to France and 1.6 billion to China .
But, perhaps, with the general insignificance of the volume of overseas assistance, it played a decisive role precisely in 1941, when the Germans stood at the gates of Moscow and Leningrad, and when only some 25-40 km remained before the victorious march along Red Square?
Let's take a look at the arms delivery statistics for this year. From the beginning of the war until the end of 1941, the Red Army received 1.76 million rifles, machine guns and machine guns, 53.7 thousand guns and mortars, 5.4 thousand tanks and 8.2 thousand combat aircraft. Of these, our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition supplied only 82 artillery pieces (0.15%), 648 tanks (12.14%) and 915 aircraft (10.26%). Moreover, a fair part of the military equipment sent, in particular 115 out of 466 British-made tanks, did not reach the front in the first year of the war.
If we translate these deliveries of weapons and military equipment into a monetary equivalent, then, according to the well-known historian, Doctor of Science M.I. Frolov (“Vain attempts: against belittling the role of the USSR in the defeat of Nazi Germany”, Lenizdat, 1986; -1945 in German historiography”, S-P., LTA Publishing House, 1994), which for many years successfully and worthily argues with German historians (W. Schwabedissen, K. Uebe), “until the end of 1941, a difficult period for the Soviet state - materials worth 545 thousand dollars were sent to the USSR under lend-lease from the United States, with a total cost of American supplies to the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition of 741 million dollars. That is less than 0.1% American aid received by the Soviet Union during this difficult period.
In addition, the first Lend-Lease deliveries in the winter of 1941-1942 reached the USSR very late, and in these critical months, the Russians, and Russians alone, offered real resistance to the German aggressor on their own soil and with their own means, without receiving any significant assistance from Western democracies. By the end of 1942, the agreed delivery programs to the USSR were completed by the Americans and the British by 55%. In 1941-1942, the USSR received only 7% of the goods sent from the United States during the war years. The main amount of weapons and other materials was received by the Soviet Union in 1944-1945, after a radical change in the course of the war.
Part II
Now let's see what the combat vehicles of the allied countries were, which initially went under the Lend-Lease program.
Of the 711 fighters that arrived from England to the USSR before the end of 1941, 700 were hopelessly outdated machines such as the Kittyhawk, Tomahawk and Hurricane, which are significantly inferior to the German Messerschmitt and the Soviet Yak in terms of speed and maneuverability and not even had cannon weapons. Even if the Soviet pilot managed to catch the enemy ace in a machine gun sight, their rifle-caliber machine guns were often completely powerless against the rather strong armor of German aircraft. As for the latest Airacobra fighters, only 11 of them were delivered in 1941. Moreover, the first Airacobra arrived in the Soviet Union disassembled, without any documentation and with a fully exhausted motor resource.
This, by the way, also applies to two squadrons of Hurricane fighters armed with 40-mm tank guns to combat enemy armored vehicles. The attack aircraft from these fighters turned out to be completely worthless, and they stood idle in the USSR throughout the war, because there were simply no people willing to fly them in the Red Army.
A similar picture was observed with the vaunted British armored vehicles - the Wallentine light tank, which Soviet tankers dubbed "Valentina", and the Matilda medium tank, which the same tankers called even more scathingly - "Farewell, Motherland", Thin armor, fire hazardous carbureted engines and antediluvian transmission made them easy prey for German gunners and grenade launchers.
According to the authoritative testimony of the personal assistant of V.M. Molotov, V.M. Berezhkov, who, as an interpreter of I.V. -lease obsolete Hurricane-type aircraft and evaded the supply of the latest Spitfire fighters. Moreover, in September 1942, in a conversation with the leader of the US Republican Party, W. Wilkie, in the presence of the American and British ambassadors and W. Standley and A. Clark Kerr, the Supreme Commander directly put the question to him: why did the British and American governments supply the Soviet Union poor quality materials?
And he explained that it was, first of all, about the supply of American P-40 aircraft instead of the much more modern Airacobra, and that the British were supplying useless Hurricane aircraft, which were much worse than the German ones. There was a case, Stalin added, when the Americans were going to supply the Soviet Union with 150 Airacobras, but the British intervened and kept them. "Soviet people ... are well aware that both the Americans and the British have planes equal to or even better in quality than German cars, but for unknown reasons some of these planes are not delivered to the Soviet Union."
The American ambassador, Admiral Standley, had no information on this matter, and the British ambassador, Archibald Clark Kerr, admitted that he was aware of the Air Cobras, but began to justify sending them to another place by saying that these 150 cars in the hands of the British would bring "much more benefit to the common cause of the allies than if they got into the Soviet Union.
Promised three years waiting?
The United States promised to send 600 tanks and 750 aircraft in 1941, but sent the first only 182 and 204, respectively.
The same story repeated itself in 1942: if the Soviet industry that year produced more than 5.9 million small arms, 287 thousand guns and mortars, 24.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and 21.7 thousand aircraft, then under Lend-Lease in January-October 1942, only 61 thousand small arms, 532 guns and mortars, 2703 tanks and self-propelled guns and 1695 aircraft were delivered.
Moreover, since November 1942, i.e. in the midst of the battle for the Caucasus and Stalingrad and the operation "Mars" on the Rzhev ledge, the supply of weapons almost completely stopped. According to historians (M.N. Suprun “Lend-Lease and Northern Convoys, 1941-1945”, M., Andreevsky Flag Publishing House, 1997), these disruptions began already in the summer of 1942, when German aviation and the submarines destroyed the infamous PQ-17 Caravan, abandoned (by order of the Admiralty) by British escort ships. The result was disastrous: only 11 out of 35 ships reached Soviet ports, which was used as an excuse to suspend the next convoy, which sailed from British shores only in September 1942.
The new Caravan PQ-18 lost 10 out of 37 transports along the way, and the next convoy was sent only in mid-December 1942. Thus, for 3.5 months, when the decisive battle of the entire Second World War was going on on the Volga, less than 40 ships with Lend-Lease cargoes came to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk one by one. In connection with this circumstance, many had a legitimate suspicion that in London and Washington all this time they were simply waiting to see in whose favor the battle of Stalingrad would end.
Meanwhile, since March 1942, i.e. just six months after the evacuation from the European part of the USSR, more than 10 thousand industrial enterprises, the growth of military production began, which by the end of this year exceeded the pre-war figures by five times (!). Moreover, it should be noted that 86% of the entire workforce were old people, women and children. It was they who in 1942-1945 gave Soviet army 102.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 125.6 thousand aircraft, more than 780 thousand artillery pieces and mortars, etc.
Not only weapons. And not only allies...
There were also deliveries under Lend-Lease that were not related to the main types of weapons. And here the numbers are really solid. In particular, we received 2,586 thousand tons of aviation gasoline, which was 37% of what was produced in the USSR during the war years, and almost 410 thousand cars, i.e. 45% of all vehicles of the Red Army (excluding captured cars). Food supplies also played a significant role, although during the first year of the war they were extremely insignificant, and in total the United States supplied approximately 15% of meat and other canned food.
And there were machine tools, rails, steam locomotives, wagons, radars and other useful property, without which you won’t get much.
Of course, after reading this impressive list of Lend-Lease supplies, one could sincerely admire the American partners in the anti-Hitler coalition, if not one nuance: at the same time, American industrial corporations also supplied to Nazi Germany ...
For example, the oil corporation "Standard Oil", owned by John Rockefeller Jr., only through the German concern "IG Farbenindustry" sold gasoline and lubricants to Berlin for 20 million dollars. And the Venezuelan branch of the same company sent 13 thousand tons of crude oil to Germany every month, which the powerful chemical industry of the Third Reich immediately processed into first-class gasoline. Moreover, the matter was not limited to precious fuel, and tungsten, synthetic rubber and a lot of different components for the automotive industry, which the German Fuhrer was supplied by his old friend Henry Ford Sr., went to the Germans from across the ocean. In particular, it is well known that 30% of all tires manufactured at its factories went to supply the German Wehrmacht.
As for the total volume of Ford-Rockefeller deliveries to Nazi Germany, there is still no complete information on this subject, since this is the strictest commercial secret, but even the little that has become public and historians makes it clear that trade with Berlin in the years by no means did not calm down.
Lend-Lease is not charity
There is a version that the lend-lease assistance from the United States was almost charitable. However, upon closer examination, this version does not stand up to scrutiny. First of all, because already during the war, under the so-called "reverse lend-lease", Washington received the necessary raw materials with a total value of almost 20% of the transferred materials and weapons. In particular, 32,000 tons of manganese and 300,000 tons of chromium ore were sent from the USSR, the importance of which in the military industry was extremely high. Suffice it to say that when, during the Nikopol-Krivoy Rog offensive operation of the troops of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts in February 1944, the German industry lost Nikopol manganese, the 150-mm frontal armor of the German "royal tigers" began to withstand the impact of Soviet artillery shells where worse than a similar 100-mm armor plate, which used to be on ordinary "tigers".
In addition, the USSR paid for allied supplies in gold. So, only on one British cruiser "Edinburgh", which was sunk by German submarines in May 1942, there were 5.5 tons of precious metal.
A significant part of the weapons and military equipment, as expected under the Lend-Lease agreement, was returned by the Soviet Union at the end of the war. Having received in return an invoice for a round sum of 1300 million dollars. Against the background of writing off Lend-Lease debts to other powers, this looked like outright robbery, so I.V. Stalin demanded to recalculate the “allied debt”.
Subsequently, the Americans were forced to admit that they were mistaken, but they added interest to the final amount, and the final amount, taking into account these interests, recognized by the USSR and the USA under the Washington Agreement in 1972, amounted to 722 million greenbacks. Of these, 48 million were paid to the United States under L.I. Brezhnev, in three equal payments in 1973, after which the payments were stopped due to the introduction by the American side of discriminatory measures in trade with the USSR (in particular, the notorious "Jackson-Vanik Amendment" - auth.).
Only in June 1990, during new negotiations between Presidents George W. Bush Sr. and M.S. Gorbachev, did the parties return to the discussion of the Lend-Lease debt, during which a new deadline for the final repayment of the debt was set - 2030, and the remaining amount of the debt - 674 million dollars.
After the collapse of the USSR, its debts were technically divided into debts to governments (Paris Club) and debts to private banks (London Club). The lend-lease debt was a debt obligation to the US government, that is, part of the debt to the Paris Club, which Russia fully repaid in August 2006.
According to own estimates
US President F.D. Roosevelt said bluntly that “helping the Russians is money well spent,” and his successor in the White House, G. Truman, back in June 1941, on the pages of The New York Times, said: “If we see, that Germany is winning, we must help Russia, and if Russia wins, we must help Germany, and in this way let them kill each other as much as possible "...
The first official assessment of the role of Lend-Lease in the overall victory over Nazism, which was then replicated in various interpretations in many encyclopedias and scientific papers, was given by a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR N.A. USSR during the Patriotic War" (M., Gospolitizdat, 1948) wrote: "If we compare the size of the deliveries of industrial goods to the USSR by the allies with the size of industrial production at the socialist enterprises of the USSR, it turns out that the share of these deliveries in relation to domestic production in the period of the war economy will be only about 4%.
The American scientists, military and officials themselves (R. Goldsmith, J. Herring, R. Jones) admit that "all allied assistance to the USSR did not exceed 1/10 of Soviet arms production", and the total volume of Lend-Lease supplies, taking into account the famous American stew "Second Front", amounted to about 10-11%.
Moreover, the famous American historian R. Sherwood in his famous two-volume book “Roosevelt and Hopkins. Through the Eyes of an Eyewitness” (M., Foreign Literature, 1958), written at the height of the Cold War, Harry Hopkins was quoted as saying that “Americans never considered Lend-Lease aid to be the main factor in the Soviet victory over Hitler on Eastern Front. The victory was achieved by the heroism and blood of the Russian army.
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